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Abstract
Ideology is a fundamental aspect of society, and ideological analysis has been
applied to the development of explanatory frameworks for understanding structural
dominance within social formations. Structural and post-structural conceptions of
ideology have focused on macro-ideological phenomena and processes, offering
explanation of relations between economic base and super-structure as they inter-
relate with ideological dominance. Ideologies serve the interests of particular social
formations or classes over others, and at the macro-level this has to do with
organised thought as it relates to power. This thesis explores the concept of ideology
and related concepts of dominance, power and hegemony, through relocating macro-
level understandings and analysis of ideology within analysis of superstructural
entities - notably organisations, groups and el ites. HIVIAIDS is an ecological
phenomenon that is accompanied by processes of sense-making that incorporate
ideological dimensions in the public sphere, particularly in relation to social policy
and strategy. Ideological discourses about HIV/AIDS have drawn on specific
epistemological foundations and world-views, incorporating intersections with
parallel ideologies, and in many instances being directed towards achieving
expansion and dominance of particular ideas. This ideological strategy incorporates
the construction of common sense. Ideological claims are reiterative, but are also
related to processes of legitimation that combine structural relations with
communicative power~~South African HIV/AIDS programme, 10veLife, is utilised
as a case study to demonstrate ideological trajectories over time. The inter-relation
between claims about the HIV/AIDS epidemic, claims about impact of the 10veLife
programme, and the utility of alliances and structural partnerships in legitimating
such claims is explored. These claims-making processes are found to also occur at
global level through the active resourcing and facilitation by 10veLife programme's
founding funder, the Kaiser Family Foundation. These activities intersect in the
development of an ideological bloc that is _directed towards expansion and
dominance through appropriation of indigenous and global discourse spheres. ~
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The 10veLife programme was first launched in South Africa in September 1999 (after
operating initially under the acronym NASHI - National Adolescent Sexual Health
Initiative). It was immediately positioned as an HIV prevention programme that was
going to single-handedly halve prevalence of the virus amongst youth and address
the 'limited impact' of existing HIV/AIDS programmes (loveLife 1999a). Founded
and core-funded by the US-based Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation (with additional
initial funding by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Old Mutual), 10veLife
brought together a consortium of implementing partners - the Health Systems Trust
(HST), the Reproductive Health Research Unit (RHRU), Advocacy Initiatives, the
Planned Parenthood Association of South Africa (PPASA) and the Media Training
Centre (MTC) - as well as collaborating partnerships with the Department of Health,
the National Youth Commission, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
The Sowetan and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). I
The programme's approach emphasised public relations largesse, linkages with
political and economic elites on an unprecedented scale, and a distinctive emphasis
on claims-making in relation to HIVIAIDS including related statistics and
programme 'impacts'. Organised under the auspices of First Lady, Zanele Mbeki, in
1999, 10veLife included an advisory board of 25 politicians, government officials,
corporate and media representatives, church leaders, entertainers and youth - only
two of whom had any credentials in reproductive health or HIV/AIDS.2
Over time these partnerships have shifted, and by 2002 the implementing partners comprised only
HST, PPASA and RHRU. Relationships with UNICEF, The Sowetan and the National Youth
Commission also fell away. Expansion of relationships with other partners is explored elsewhere
in this thesis.
2 The initial advisory board (titles listed at the time in loveLife I999a) included Zanele Mbeki
(First Lady and convenor), King Goodwill Zwelethini (Zulu King), Zindzi Mandela-Holongwane
(entertainment promoter and daughter of Nelson Mandela), Saki Macozoma (MD of Transnet),
Marcel Golding (Chair of Hoskins Consolidated Investments), Connie September (Member of
Parliament), Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane (Anglican Archbishop), Brenda Kali
(Programme Director, SABCI), Nina de Klerk (Director of the Association of Advertising
Agencies), Eddie Mhlanga (Chief Director, Department of Health), Khopotso Mopka (AIDS
counsellor), Tim Modise (radio broadcaster), Thandi Mazwai (vocalist, Bongo Muffin), Chantel
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At the time of the programme's outset, a number of colleagues and I were running
the national Department of Health's Beyond Awareness HIVIAIDS communication
programme. The campaign was grounded on critical reflections of the Department's
previous approaches to communication (particularly the poorly conceptual ised
HIVIAIDS play Sarafina 113) and specifically contested linear and top-down
communication interventions:
Goals and objectives for health communication can only be set if
there is a realistic understanding of the complex factors that
influence health in the first place. The role of communication in
influencing health therefore, requires an integrated approach that
includes a clear understanding of people's contexts, and the
various preventative and support strategies required to promote
and improve health. (Parker et al1999:22) 4
At the time international thinking around HIV/AIDS communication in relation to
sexual behaviour change was also being reviewed. Following a series of international
expert workshops convened by the United Nations HIVIAIDS Programme
(UNAIDS), and Penn State University, it was noted that many of the existing
theories and models "focus primarily on individual behaviour and make little or no
allowance for the role of the social and environmental context of disease prevention
interventions" (UNAIDS/Penn State 1999: 15). Weaknesses of these models were
noted as follows:
o The simple, linear relationship between individual knowledge and action, which
underpinned earlier interventions, does not take into account the variation among
the political, socioeconomic and cultural contexts that prevail in the regions;
o The emphasis on quantitative measures (rather than qualitative inferences or a
combination of both) results in distorted interpretation of the meanings and
realities in observed behaviours;
'Rasta Queen'IWanda 'Chocolate'IYolande 'Queen Goddess (from music group, Ghetto Luv),
Andy Kasrils (singer and deejay), Thomas 'Bad Boy T' Msengaiu (YFM deejay), Phinde Gule
(YFM presenter), Samantha Adams (former youth TV presenter), Betty Chiloane (matriculant),
Anu Nepal (community organiser), Eric Sibeko (law student), Bronwyn McGregor (actor).
Changes to the board have occurred over time, and these are further discussed elsewhere in this
thesis.
3 Sarafina 11 was an HIVIAIDS awareness play initiated by the then Minister of Health, Nkosizana
Zuma, who commissioned playwright Mbongeni Ngema to produce a follow-up production to his
internationally successful play and film, Sarafina. Ngema was contracted and provided with
relative flexibility in terms of budget, expending some R13-million in the pre-production phase.
4 See also Tomaselli, K. & Shepperson, A. (J 997). 'Comprehensive and Integrated HIV IAIDS
Prevention Campaigns: Potentials for South and Southern Africa.' Working Document for Task
Team for media. Durban: University of Natal.
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o External decision-making processes that cater to rigid, narrowly focused, and
short-term interests tend to overlook the benefits of long-term, internally derived,
broad-based solutions;
o The assumption that individuals can or will exercise total control over their
behaviour has led to a focus on the individual rather than on the social context
within which the individual functions, and disregard for the influence of
contextual variables, such as culture and gender relationships;
o There is an _ass~mption that decisions about mY/AIDS prevention are based on
rational, volitional thinking with no regard for more true-to-life emotional
responses to engaging in sexual behaviour;
o There is an assumption that there is a sequential linear relationship between
knowledge, attitude, belief, behaviour and practice (KABBP), when engagement
in sexual intercourse often precedes any rational decision based on full or even
partial knowledge of risk-taking behaviour;
o There is an assumption that creating awareness through media campaigns will
necessarily lead to behaviour change;
o There is an assumption that a simple strategy designed to trigger a once-in-a-
lifetime behaviour, such as immunisation, would be adequate for changing and
maintaining complex, life-long behaviours such as consistent condom use
(UNAIDS/Penn State 1999:23-24).
It was remarkable that in spite of both local and international thinking being
positioned as critical of top-down interventions located in mass media
communication, a programme that both implicitly and explicitly ran counter to these
critiques (IoveLife) was, as I shall demonstrate, being located at centre stage of the
response to my prevention in South Africa. Moreover, the programme had garnered
extensive support internationally and locally and had secured considerable multi-year
multi-million rand funding commitments. Furthermore, the considerable funding
base of the programme introduced a range of practices that ran counter to those
established by existing programmes. For example, in contrast to conservative fiscal
practices and acknowledgement of broad-based interventions, 10veLife emphasised
flashy high cost launch events, whilst programme communication was heavily
weighted towards singular promotion of the 10veLife programme through public
relations activities. Other anomalies included statistical pronouncements and
I I
generalisations about the epidemic in South Africa that ran counter to any existing
research findings, with such pronouncements being linked to the notion that a single
programme, 10veLife, would on its own, transform HIV prevalence amongst youth in
South Africa.
In the early phases of the programme, the objectives were framed as follows: "to
initiate a national conversation about the 10veLife brand and excite the popular
imagination about 10veLife" and to ~make explicit the link between sexual behaviour
and HIV" (loveLife 2001a). This 'conversation', located directly within the linear
top-down approaches to communication that both Beyond Awareness and
UNAIDS/Penn State were so critical, was positioned within a paradigm that ran
counter to related concerns about the need to recognise cultural diversity, gender
relations, spirituality and socioeconomic conditions that were inter-related with HIV
prevention (see UNAIDS/Penn State 1999). The 10veLife launch campaign, for
example, was framed by discourses of 'sexual titillation' such as a billboard
campaign entitled 'foreplay' (see Figure 1), and stickers with slogans such as 'the
naked truth', 'use your mouth' and 'oral sex' (loveLife 2001a:12-13). These
representations, in effect, constructed 10veLife's target 'market' - young people aged
12-17 - as strongly focused on sexual pleasure with parallel constructions centred on
youth as materially oriented, brand driven consumers.
12
Figure 1: loveLife 'Foreplay' campaign
The notion of 12-17 year old South African youth as mono-cultural, unified by
sexual desire and materialist consumption, directly contradicted obvious diversities
of language, culture and access to disposable income amongst youth, whilst
divergent stages of sexual awareness and maturity within the 'target' age group was
masked in the conflation of 12-17 year old youth as the 'target' group. The
predominance of families living in poverty throughout South Africa contradicted the
orientation towards a bourgeois aspirational 'positive lifestyle' - positioned as
integral to achieving the goals of the 10veLife programme, whilst differing relations
to sexual activity within the 12-17 year old age range needed to be recognised rather
than conflated.
In spite of these contradictions and theoretical deficiencies, 10veLife continued to
gamer political and financial support. Cabinet ministers were often on hand to launch
10veLife activities;5 in 2000, R47-million was contributed to the programme by the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation;6 and in 2001 a direct grant of R75-million over
three years was made by the South African Treasury (Hickey & Whelan 2001).
Supportive partnerships were expanded to include relationships with the Independent
5 See The Sunday Tribune (2000, July 8) loveTrain to carry safe sex messages, and the
organisation's Y-Centres (see http://www.loveLife.org.za/corporate/media_room/archive.php)
6 See The Star (2000, July 12) Gates's R47-million opens doors for sex education.
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Newspaper Group and the Sunday Times to produce and distribute the youth
magazines ThethaNathi and S'camto respectively/ and the programme was
diversified into an eclectic mix of activities including: a national level
communication campaign incorporating broadcast, print and outdoor media;
telephone helplines for youth and parents; event-based activities including 'Iove-
tours', a 'loveTrain' and 10veLife games; service provision through a relatively small
number of community-based Y-centres, adolescent friendly clinics and community-
based franchises; peer education through youth 'GroundBreakers'; and a programme
focusing on parents.8 Event-based activities were also expanded into wider tangents
over time - for example, in 2002 10veLife partnered with EarthShip Mission
Possible, a project of polar explorer Robert Swan, to send a group of
GroundBreakers to Antarctica. This was followed by the trucking of the yacht around
South Africa and display at the World Summit on the Environment in Johannesburg.9
A partnership with the Royal Cape yacht club included 10veLife participation in the
Cape to Rio yacht race and a later trip up the west coast of Africa. 10 Such forays had
very little to do with HlV prevention - the Antarctica trip was linked to cleaning up
the environment, whilst the other yachting ventures were linked to encouraging




Dr David Harrison, CEO of 10veLife said: "The concept of the
loveLife GroundBreaker Challenge is to demonstrate to young
people that by pushing personal limits, even 'impossible' goals
can be achieved. Even though only ten GroundBreakers will sail
to Rio when they return to South Africa they will lead a sailing
development programme, hopefully involving hundreds of
teenagers throughout South Africa. The partnership between
10veLife and the Royal Cape Yacht Club will hopefully encourage
sailing clubs around the country to take young people from
disadvantaged backgrounds to participate in the challenge,
expanding their horizons and at the same time breaking down the/\ ~




\" lYSee The Star (200 I, October 3) Independent joins loveLife HIV battle.
See www.loveLife.org.za. accessed 12 December 2003.
See Earthship mission possible launches at MonteCasino. www.loveLife.org.za.





10 See The Argus (2002, November 11) loveLife GroundBreakers take to the ocean; See loveLife,
(2003, October 16) 'Yacht 2051 update'. www.loveLife.org.za. retrieved August 2004.
11 See loveLife (2002, September 10) From ice breakers to sea breakers, wWIV.lovelife.org.za,
retrieved August 2004.
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The programme's strong emphasis on public relations activities was weighted
towards launches, often including international and local elites - for example in May
2001, King Goodwill Zwelethini (also a member of the 10veLife Advisory Board)
and musician Harry Belafonte, inaugurated a 10veLife Y-Centre in KwaZulu Natal;
in the same month, the launch of a 10veLife Y-Centre in Orange Farm included
Zwelithini, Zanele Mbeki (loveLife 'Convener') and various local musicians; and in
September 2002, former President's Nelson Mandela and Bill Clinton, along with
Hollywood actors Kevin Spacy and Chris Tucker, were on hand to launch the
GroundBreaker programme at Orange Farm. 12 Local politicians such as Deputy
President, Jacob Zuma, Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, religious
leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu and entertainers such as Pieter Dirk Uys
were also drawn in, and appeared in a series of advertisements promoting the
10veLife 'Parent Campaign' in 2002.
As I shall demonstrate in this thesis, such endorsements, in combination with
financial resources and partnerships with various corporates, bolstered the
programme's positional power within the AIDS field in South Africa. Through such
linkages, the programme had in effect commandeered the sphere of HIVIAIDS
programming in relation to youth in South Africa, with little consultation on the
ground, nor with organisations working in the field, whilst at the same time,-_..
constructing the notion that it was the 10veLife alone that youth found meaningful.
Young people and HIV/AIDS in South Africa were homogenised and commodified
by 10veLife, and as I shall show, communication about the programme centred on
reiterative claims-making that marginalised other programmes in the field._ This
approach in effect, and over time, involved an appropriation of the indigenous
HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS-youth sphere - a process that as I demonstrate, also
occurs within the global sphere.
Reflexivity and social inquiry
One of the early problems to be confronted In developing this thesis was the
positioning of myself in relation to the research subject (the 10veLife programme).
Much of my work as Director of the Centre for AIDS Development, Research and
12 This event garnered front-page publicity in the Independent Newspaper Group's weekly, the
Sunday Independent (2002, September 9) Clinton and Madiba enthral Orange Farm. There was
also some PR spin-off via invited elites - for example, then University of Witwatersrand Vice
Chancellor, Norma Reed, included references to dancing with Mandela at the 'inspirational
launch' in her regular column in Wits Edge (September 2002).
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Evaluation (CADRE) was related to contributing to, and managing national level
mY/AIDS communication activities in combination with conducting related
theoretical and practical research in the mv/AIDS communication field. It appeared
initially that there was potential to explore analysis of the 10veLife programme
through adopting a narrative method that would allow for "self-reflexivity,
systematically problematis[ing] the position of the researcher in relation to his/her
subject/s, and critically examin[ing] how data is collected and interpreted in terms of
observed relations" (Tomaselli 2004:6). My embeddedness in the field and in
relation to the subject, seemed to suggest that such an autoethnographic approach
would provide a useful methodological frame. Ellis defines autoethnography as:
...
a genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of
consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural. .. Auto-
ethnographers gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-angle
lens, focusing outward on social and cultural aspects of their
personal experience; then they look inward, exposing a
vulnerable self that is moved by, and may move through, refract
and resist cultural interpretations. (Ellis 1999:673)
Ethnography, the anthropological approach from which autoethnography is derived,
is about contexts - but more so, it is about researchers within contexts: researchers
who see, feel and touch the world they describe, transcending the notion of
researcher as a distant objective observer and reaching into the notion of researcher
as subjective participant. Although most ethnography is located outside of the
researcher's own lived context, autoethnography provides the framework for
intersubjective and theoretical accounts within the researcher's own contexts (see
Tedlock 2000). This approach allows researchers to address the tensions that exist in
social research which are rooted in objectifying the subject and include the problem
of potentially isolating the researcher from his or her socio-cultural and political
history.
Ethnographic method has to do with research methodologies that attempt to delve
deeply into the subject's milieu with a view to exposing a culture from the point of
view of those who live it. There is less clarity however, regarding the nature of
objectivity within the context of researcher as subject, where subjectivities are
foregrounded over objectivity. The empirical principles of social science research
lend themselves to an authoritative voice of the researcher, often conveyed in a
distant, clinical and passive voice. In autoethnography the voice of the author shifts,
drawing the reader in through active voice, into the world of the author's subjective
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perceptions. This requires balance if one is to avoid an egocentric account that blurs
what is being studied - a balance between writing from within the context and
authorial narcissism. This has to do both with matters of narrative style and matters
of subject. With regard to the latter, Bullough and Pinnegar suggest:
When biography and history are joined and when the issue
confronted by the self is shown to have relationship to and
bearing on the context and ethos of a time, then self-study moves
to research... Each self study researcher must negotiate that
balance, but it must be a balance - tipping too far toward the self
side produces solipsism or a confessional, and tipping too far the
other way turns self-study into traditional research. (Bullough &
Pinnegar 2001 :15)
Autoethnography includes other limitations - notably, the blurring of methods of
recall and documentation, and limits of reliability within narrative (see Ellis &
Bochner 2000)
In exploring the utility of autoethnography as a methodology for PhD level inquiry, it
became clear that it was unlikely to be sustainable in relation to the subject at hand.
Specifically, I had no interest in immersing myself in a more sustained and direct
way within the 10veLife programme as a researcher. My relation to the 10veLife
programme as 'I' was depersonalised, and had more to do with the relation of the
theoretical framework of 10veLife to its practical construction in the public sphere. I
was more interested in its implications for mY/AIDS policy in South Africa, than as
an entity to be engaged intensively, and therefore a more conventional academic
approach to inquiry has been adopted.
Such a relation to the subject cannot however, simply be bypassed. I remain in some
ways connected to the research subject by virtue of my individual and work-related
interests in the sphere of mY/AIDS, and this needs to be addressed. Reflexivity,
which includes critical analysis of one's own biases and acknowledgement of the
relation of researcher to subject (see Kleinsasser 2000), is a necessary part of
qualitative research practice. It serves as a process within itself, addressing
researcher/author subjectivities including gender, class and culture, unmasking
theoretical assumptions, critically examining method and process, and at the same
time contributing to introspective learning. As Jordan & Yeomans (1995:393)
suggest: "Reflexivity ... operates on the basis of a dialectic between the researcher,
research process and its product".
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Addressing the contradictions of the loveLife programme involves the development
of a methodological approach that is underpinned by a range of theoretical
frameworks derived from cultural studies - particularly theoretical approaches to
ideological construction as they intersect with processes of dominance. Whilst this
theory-led critical approach is less served by a narrative method, there are certain
aspects of my location in the field that require foregrounding of ethics and reflexivity
with respect to the research project and research subjects.
In a more typical ethnographic research project, human subjects are studied within
defined contexts and informed consent involves obtaining permission to work in the
study 'community', to seek consent from individual informants, and to be clearly
identified as a researcher. Dingwall (1980) addresses this question, exploring the
complex variations of subjects who are primary, secondary or marginal to the
project, and illustrates the impracticalities of obtaining permission from each person.
He suggests that one method of addressing the problem is to be as overt as possible
about data collection and to provide mechanisms for subjects to critically engage the
researcher. This approach contrasts with covert research methods whereby
researchers insert themselves into research contexts without identifying their research
interests - for example, posing as mental patients, air force recruits, alcoholics, and
voyeurs (Homan, 1980).
For the most part, the inquiry in this thesis deals with the loveLife programme's
public constructions and representations, and what this data allows is an exploration
and analysis of patterns of ideological construction in discourse that can be related to
the functioning of ideology that exposes contradictions and dominance. What is less
possible however, is the relation of such discourses to the concept of ideological
intent of the agents located within loveLife - i.e. it is one thing to foster ideological
processes that are contradictory and to be ignorant of them, but quite another to
consciously foster such processes consciously. Various research strategies might be
adopted to explore this latter point, including, for example, interviewing the various
individuals who constitute the loveLife programme, or covertly engaging with the
loveLife programme. This approach may, however, pose ethical problems in the
sense that research subjects might need to be kept uninformed about the critical
nature of the inquiry. A related problem was that as a researcher and practitioner in
the field, I was known to be critical of the loveLife programme, and this might
influence attempts at open inquiry. Additionally, critique of the programme (amongst
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other programmes and related mY/AIDS policies) was a function of my work in the
mY/AIDS field and could not be sublimated to the research inquiry.
A central question of this thesis is the exploration of the relation of contradiction to
ideological representation - a process that is nuanced by understanding whether
contradictions are consciously known (and perpetuated in spite of being known), or
are simply a product of structural relations. Access to data that might contribute
understanding to this question involved some level of covert research - i.e. accessing
internal loveLife programme documents via third parties on the one hand, and
sublimating declaration of my interest as a researcher on the other. With regard to the
former, the process of obtaining documents was not consciously followed as a
research strategy, but individuals who had access to internal documents did on
occaSIOn provide these to me. The documents were not particularly 'secret' or
startling, but did provide important insights. For example structural relations and
related mechanisms that had fostered particular aspects of ideological representation
were revealed through access to legal contracts between the loveLife programme and
the Independent Newspaper Group/Sunday Times: both contracts contained clauses
that suggested that critical reporting on the loveLife programme by either newspaper
group was potentially constrained, whilst in the case of the Independent Newspaper
Group, the existing pro-bono practice of promoting the Department of Health's
national toll free AIDS Helpline alongside HIY/AIDS stories was required to be
replaced by direct promotion of loveLife's youth helpline ThethaJunction. 13
Monitoring reports of the Thethalunction helpline demonstrated contradictions
between 'internal' knowledge and public claims - for example, at a time when
claims were being made to receiving 60 000 calls a month internal data was showing
maximum levels of around 28 000 calls a month, with considerably lower numbers
of calls actually being answered. '4 In loveLife evaluation studies, claims were also
13 See Memorandum of Understanding between loveLife and Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd
(October 200 I) and Contract Agreement between loveLife and the Sunday Times (January 2002).
14 For example, over the period November 2000 to October 2001, the average rate of calls was
28545, with a peak of over 65000 in one month (apparently in conjunction with running of a
competition). In the following quarter, the number of calls 'offered' (i.e. calls to the line) versus
calls 'handled' (i.e. calls actually answered) was also monitored, and it was noted that over the
period October 200 I to December 2001 calls 'offered' ranged from 19223 to 25 550, with calls
answered ranging from 12775 to 18782. In essence, the average call rate to the line was below
25000, whilst actual calls answered were lower still. (See loveLife (200 I) Monitoring and
evaluation of loveLife, September 2000 to August 200 I, and loveLife (200 I) Quarterly
monitoring report, October 2001 to December 2001.) Claims to an average of 60000 calls were
however being made publicly when framing the loveLife programme. For example, at a
conference in the United States, president of the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, Drew
Altman, claimed during a presentation on loveLife in March 2002: "There is a toll free telephone
hotline staffed by trained counsellors that is now mind blowing to me, receiving 60,000
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being made that correlated exposure to the 10veLife programme with mY/AIDS
related behaviours and practices. For example, as I later demonstrate, although
monocausal correlation was suggested in a final research report (Pettifor, Rees,
Steffenson, Hlongwana-Madikizela, MacPhail, Vermaak, & Kleinschmidt 2004),
questions about exposure to Soul City and the Red Ribbon Campaign had been asked
in survey questionnaires, and in pre-publication drafts it was shown that young
people had as high or higher levels of exposure to these other mv/AIDS
programmes other than 10veLife itself. IS This important and relevant observation was
omitted in the final report.
Another research approach that may be considered covert involved engagements
with the 10veLife programme through subjecting the programme to public critique in
relation to the contradictions identified through various research processes
(including, but not exclusively, research related to this thesis). This included
participation in internet discussions as part of a debate brought about by an
international communication website, the Communication Initiative (which elicited
public correspondence from the 10veLife programme);16 a paper critical of 10veLife
presented at the First South African AIDS Conference (which elicited private
correspondence from the director of the 10veLife programme); and access to private
correspondence between 10veLife and Fair Lady magazine in response to an
impending article on the programme. I?
Homan (1980) refers to covert research as being framed by processes where the
researcher's relation to the subject is not overtly stated, raising the question as to
whether this form of sociological inquiry is legitimate - for example, in the case of
his own research into Pentecostal churches, where the pragmatic consideration of
"going underground would afford the greater opportunity of observing the normal
language-behaviour of old-time Pentecostals" (p. 49). One concern is the right of the
research subject(s) to privacy - for example, to not have themselves observed in




calls a month - a month." (See American Foundation for AIDS Research (2002) 14 th National
HIV/AIDS Update Conference, Social Marketing: The Art ofAIDS Prevention, March 2002.
www.kaisernetwork.org, retrieved December 2003.)
These figures are presented in Chapter 5 on p. 120. (See draft and final versions of Pettifor, A.,
Rees, H.V., Steffenson, A., Hlongwana-Madikizela, L., MacPhail, c., Vermaak, K., &
Kleinschmidt, r. 2004.)
See the debate conducted on HIVIAIDS communication in October 2002,
www.comminit.com/majordomo/southafrica/ and Smith, C. (2002, November 29). The culture of
the stick people, Mail and Guardian.
These discussions are detailed elsewhere in this thesis.
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informed consent. Bulmer (1980) questions the validity of 'dishonest representation
of interests' by suggesting that this is rationalised by an ends-means argument, but
acknowledges that there are degrees of 'deception' and that covert methods cannot
be ruled out entirely as methods of social research. Again, the examples that apply to
the present research do not involve deception in terms of attempting to directly
obtain documents from 10veLife, nor were third parties requested to procure such
documents. A guiding principle in this regard, has been to defer to a concept derived
from journalistic ethics, which has to do with public interest - i.e. in the context of a
complex HIY/AIDS epidemic, it would be in the public interest to know that a large
scale programme drawing on public funds is involved in practices that appear to be
related to vested rather than public interests (for example, making claims that are
known to be untrue, or threatening critics of the programme). Equally, it would be
both legal and legitimate to draw on sources documents not immediately located in
the public domain. In the present instances, the data at hand has provided important
insights and support to theoretically founded arguments (including informing further
lines of inquiry), and can thus be understood as ethically forming a legitimate part of
the research inquiry. There is also perhaps a converse ethical requirement - notably,
that ignoring or failing to integrate such information would work against the concept
of public interest (and by extension, research interest).
Exploring how the programme might address critiques made in the public domain,
immediately positions critiques and responses within discourse fora that may well be
subjected to analytic research. There is perhaps some blurring of the lines here in
terms of my formal work in the AIDS field, and my role as PhD student, given that
in both instances, public level critique need not necessarily be related to declaring
parallel research agendas - any public discourse is subject to analysis. Similarly,
whilst responses to some of these critiques may have taken the form of letters, it does
not necessarily follow that such letters fallout of the public frame of reference (or
research frame), whether or not they are addressed to single individuals (including
myself).
Defining the research project
mY/AIDS is an ecological phenomenon that has impacted directly on material
conditions and lived experience globally. In South Africa the epidemic has reached
prevalence levels in excess of ten percent in the general population, and in some
populations, regions, and contexts, infection levels are far higher (Shisana et al 2002;
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UNAIDS 2004b). AIDS interventions thus occupy an important place within the
sphere of public policy and funding investment. Interventions in response to AIDS
occur at all levels of society, including both organic and relatively informal
responses (such as small groups of individuals working collaboratively to provide
care to individuals who are ill or to children orphaned by AIDS at grassroots level) as
well as formal responses located within the state or other formal institutions and
groups. All AIDS interventions require resources to be sustained, and larger national
and international level programmes are often resource intensive. Similarly, at most
levels of intervention, a competition exists between programmes, organisations and
groups to secure acceptance, and in some cases expansion and dominance, within the
broad response to the epidemic. This direction towards dominance, whether formal
or informal, overt or covert, involves ideological dimensions - specifically the
framing in the public sphere of the ideas that constitute a given programme or
intervention, and further, related pr~cesses of legitimation. Ideology thus intersects
with discourse processes that foster dominance.
Whilst not all groups or organisations working In the HIY/AIDS field in South
Africa emphasise ideological discourses (i.e. discourses about the core ideas framing
their activities), nor do all seek dominance or expansion (for example, through
reiteration of their claimed impacts), at some level or another, any group or
organisation requires some framing of its core ideas, goals and processes to function
within society. AIDS work carries with it a sense of social purpose that is
interconnected with moral purpose, of contributing positively to society, and as a
result AIDS groups and organisation related foundations and donors are assumed to
be functioning primarily with the social good in mind - a process that I shall
demonstrate, allows for appropriation of particular spheres. Whilst some degree of
competition for resources and related ideological positioning is inevitable, what set
the loveLife programme apart from the outset was the apparently concerted
investment in securing competitive advantage through employing a range of
strategies that were intrinsically ideological, at the same time occupying a position
that contradicted emerging theoretical frameworks that sought to inform future
communication-oriented mY/AIDS policies and strategies. As I shall demonstrate,
this process was situated both within and beyond discourse, in a complex of
alliances, partnerships and structural relations. Within this context, discourse can be
understood not simply as the use of language, but a particular use of language that
has to do with the production of knowledge - i.e. a language practice. Discourse has
to do with constructing knowledge over a range of texts - by "both producing and
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organising meaning in a social context" (Edgar & Sedgwick 1999: 117) and with
direction towards preferred meanings (Hall 1997; Foucault 1972). As Hall (1997:54)
observes: "Discourse is enmeshed with power", whilst at the same time having an
inter-relation with culture.
It was the reiterative and positional discourses about the 10veLife programme that
captured my attention. Particularly, what was interesting in relation to my
involvement as a researcher and practitioner working in the mY/AIDS field, was
that as much as there were critical perspectives of the programme embedded within
discourses of colleagues working in the field, the programme itself was able to
expand and dominate AIDS policy thinking with little need to address latent critiques
and resistances. Equally, whilst it was possible to critically reflect on the programme,
theoretical frameworks immediately at hand appeared insufficient for explanatory
analysis of the phenomenon of its dominance. The focus of this thesis is the
development of such a theoretical framework, and utilising it to apply concepts of
ideology to organisational level dominance processes. This has involved a return to
what might be termed 'classic' cultural studies texts - primarily the work of the
Birmingham School during the 1970s and 1980s which explored and developed post-
structural thinking around ideology, drawing extensively on the work of Marx,
Althusser, Gramsci and Poulantzas (see Thomas 2000). Drawing on these analyses,
but working past economism, I have set out to recast understanding of the role of
discourse within ideological production and reproduction, exploring processes
conducive to legitimation and dominance within the context of the social
predicament of mY/AIDS. The 10veLife programme is drawn upon as a case study,
and is used to demonstrate the complex of ideological relations that underpin
attempts to secure dominance within the mY/AIDS field locally and globally.
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CHAPTER 2
Theorising ideology and ideology critique
The emerging phenomenon of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s was very much located in
public discourse. During this phase, emphasis was placed on biomedical orientations
that focused on the viral nature of HIV and modes of infection. These discourses
were not without ideological dimensions: HIV infection was attributed to risky
sexual practices amongst gay men, Haitians and Africans, and politicking was rife
amongst scientists laying claim to the 'discovery' of the virus. This period laid the
foundations for a wide range of social explanations of behavioural and social factors
that contributed to vulnerability to HIV infection, as well as extending to the social
spheres that lay beyond individual HIV infection. Explanations with regard to the
latter were largely grounded in social and biomedical research involving analyses of
epidemiological trends in relation to intersections with sexual behaviours, practices
and contexts.
Whilst such research, functioning in concert with the range of responses and
interventions, was integral to the development of HIV/AIDS policy, these processes
have also formed the foundation for a wide range of ideological developments in
relation to the disease and including constructing, legitimating and replicating
particular interpretations of the epidemic. The concept of ideology offers an
understanding of the relationship between social and material conditions and the
ideas that frame social life in any given era. Ideologies are all pervasive systems for
structuring thought and action with a primary orientation towards ensuring
dominance of particular ideas at one level or another.
The roots of ideology
Ideologies can be understood as clusters of ideas that are related to the coherence of
society. One or more ideologies may be generalised throughout society, or may apply
more specifically to fractions of society. Ideologies can work in concert or can be
antagonistic to each other. Certain constructions within ideologies may be specific to
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a particular ideology, but ideologies as a whole overlap with other ideologies and
ideological formations and are thus not readily understood as unified sets of ideas.
Ideologies may be deeply embedded in the economic base of society and may be
termed macro-ideologies, whilst others are related to macro-ideologies but are
situated in the superstructure and are less embedded in the base.
Ideologies can be understood in a neutral way as a systematic and elaborated set of
ideas with a relative coherence, or alternately, critically, as ideas that involve
subjectivities that include contradictions and distortion. The Marxist conception of
ideology has emphasised the notion of ideology as distorted ideas that are derived
from economic relations of production and reproduction which are functional to
maintaining imbalanced relations of dominance. In this sense, ideology has a
negative polemical conception: "The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal
expression of the dominant material relationships, grasped as ideas; hence of the
relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its
dominance" (Marx & Engels 1986: 13). Ideology overcomes the contradictions that
are implicit in the processes of class domination through perpetuation and
legitimation of particular ideas within the political superstructure through the state.
Dominant ideologies regulate and limit conflicts between classes as well as other
disproportionately empowered social formations. A critical concept of ideology
requires an understanding of how distorted ideas enter into the social domain, and
how they become accepted as valid. As Hall (1996:29) describes it, in the classical
Marxist conception of ideology: ideas arise from and reflect material conditions;
these ideas express social relations and their contradictions in thought; these ideas
provide the motor of history; these ideas are determined by the economic base; there
is an interplay between the economic base and the ideas that make up ideology; and
there are ruling ideas which are located within the ruling class.
Subjectivity is intrinsic to the concept of ideology. For Durkheim, society is made up
of social representations that are systematic, collective and conducive to social
cohesion through the interplay between beliefs and practices that are
institutionalised. Society is thus a "formation of social representations, of
constraining norms and patterns, a normative structure, an ideological community"
(Schmid 1981:59). Althusser, like Durkheim, sees knowledge as a system of
production that is held together and reproduced through practices - "ideology is a
representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of
existence" (Althusser 1971: 104). For Althusser, knowledge is institutionalised
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through practices that are constrained and contained through ideological and
repressive state apparatuses in such a way that social conditions are perpetuated.
Important to the concept of ideology then, is the production and reproduction of
knowledge, and in the Marxist conception, knowledge is the product, in the final
instance, of the economic base.
A phenomenological conception of ideology is advanced by Berger and Luckman
whereby "the subjective mind creates a subjective reality (externalisation) which, as
time goes by, turns into institutions, traditions and culture (objectification) and then
finally acts back on the mind and shapes it - (internalisation)" (Schmid 1981 :62).
The production of ideology in this sense, rests within productive activity. Productive
activities are transformed, through repetition, into practices. We are born into
activities and consequently, practices. These exist both in the domain of physical
experience, and at the same time are abstracted in consciousness - i.e. actions have
both a physical and mental aspects. Practices are interrelated through the general
processes of production and reproduction, and in their abstract form, interrelated via
ideology. Thus:
... a socio-economic formation, understood in the Marxist sense
as a mode ofproduction within the superstructure, can be seen as
a network of interrelated practices, each of which produces its
spontaneous ideology. The implication of the concept of social
formation is that each single practice is an interrelated practice
of a common whole which can be described in terms of its 'logic'.
Thus, the capitalist social formation is a network of practices
patterned by a capitalist logic. (Schmid 1981 :66)
In this view, the human subject is the starting point for the formation of ideology, but
at the same time becomes subject to its reproduction. This latter concept is similar to
Althusser's conception of interpellation whereby ideology 'recruits' or hails subjects
and at the same time 'transforms' them so that they become subjects: "They live the
relation with their real conditions as if they themselves were the autonomous
principle of determination of that relation. The mechanism of this characteristic
inversion is interpellation" (Laclau 1986:27).
Therborn notes that interpellation within ideology has three fundamental modes that:
... subject and qualify subjects by telling them, relating them to,
and making them recognise: What exists, and its corollary, what
does not exist... the visibility of the world is thereby structured by
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the distribution of spotlights, shadows and darkness; What is
good, right, just, beautiful, attractive, enjoyable, and its
opposites. In this way our desires become structured and
normalised; What is possible and impossible; our sense of the
mutability of our being-in-the-world and the consequences of
change are hereby patterned and our hopes, ambitions and fears
given shape. (Therborn I999a:18)
Activity and practice can be understood as cohering in a narrow ideological way, but
also broadly through the interrelation of practices in the social domain that constitute
broader overarching ideologies. Practices interrelated by activity may be distinct,
such as within economic classes, which may have divergent ideological perspectives,
but are bound together by the overarching ideology-logic of the dominant economic
system. For example, rulers and ruled relate to the world in substantially different
ideological ways, as do labourers and managers, men and women, children and
adults, poor and wealthy - any number of categories that are divergent by virtue of
their activities and practices, yet these co-exist within particular ideologies.
For Marx (1986: 15) "the mode of production of material life conditions the general
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their
consciousness". Overarching ideologies, such as in the social system of capitalism
are self-legitimating because of overwhelming determination by the economic base.
However, such ideologies are also held together by cross-cutting practices that may
be ideological in different ways, for example: the bourgeoisie and the peasantry can
practice the same theology; the same forms of gender dominance; the same acts of
exchange - yet their experience of social and material conditions differs markedly.
As Markus (1991) points out:
fetishistic modes of thought 'arise from the relations of
production themselves' [and] are the 'direct and spontaneous
outcomes' of the elemental social practices of individuals...
fetishistic forms of thinking enable individual social agents to
orient themselves successfully within the given system of social
relations which are taken as the fixed prius of their life. (p. 91)
Such processes have to do with alienation and are related to the conception of
ideology that incorporates the notion of 'false consciousness'. This latter concept is
however differently expressed by Marx and Engels (1986) in the German Ideology,
where false consciousness is primarily related to the activities of bourgeois
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intellectuals, with the working classes being more aware of the contradictions oftheir
relationship to production, thus allowing for the process of class struggle.
Critiques of the Marxist position centre on determinism, which can be seen as
undermining the independence of ideas; reductionism, where ideas are seen as
directly derived from the economic base; and the delineation of ideas that occurs
only in class terms (see Hall 1986:45). The value of the Marxist concept however, at
its broader level, is that it traces how social ideas arise and are transformed into
ideologies, and further, how these are connected to economic activities - the logic of
which necessarily requires some level of distortion for its maintenance. In
Althusser's expanded structuralist conception, ideology is lifted out of a purely
economic system, with greater emphasis being placed on processes of domination
which occur through mythical representations of the world involving subjectification
that are perpetuated by ideological and repressive state apparatuses.
A dual conception of ideology is offered by Poulantzas (1973), which involves an
overarching dominant ideology that incorporates sub-ideologies, whereby elements
of a range of ideologies are included within the dominant ideology. The dominant
ideology is perpetuated by the ruling class, which is "encompassed in the concept of
hegemony whereby the dominant class manages to represent itself both as internally
unified and as unifying the general interests of people" (Boswell, Edgar & Baker
1999:363). For both Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas (1973), ideology is
materialised through particular formations such as education, religion and law, which
have the effect of subjectifying individuals and obscuring contradictions.
Ideology has to do with sets of ideas that are oriented towards internal coherence and
consistency that emanate from and/or serve the interests of particular social classes,
formations or groups. As Lull (2000:13-14) observes: "Organised thought is never
innocent; it always serves a purpose. Ideologies are implicated by their origins, their
institutional associations, and the purposes to which they are put. .. ". Ideology is
expressed through processes of systematically organising, articulating, circulating
and perpetuating ideas. Ideology and discourse are thus interdependent, for it is only
through discourse that ideologies can be brought into being and sustained.
In the context of mv/AIDS, social response to the epidemic incorporates
mechanisms for simplifying and making coherent, complex and rapidly changing
material and social phenomena through discourse. Thought is organised, and through
processes of organising and articulating ideas, particular interpretive frames are
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constructed that function ideologically, that seek to interpellate subjects. HlV/AIDS
is a phenomenon that impinges on material conditions and lived experience, and it
follows that the social representation of the disease incorporates an ideological
dimension.
Ideology and dominance
Hegemony involves understanding the mechanisms through which ideology mediates
contradictions to maintain ideological dominance. Gramsci works from a dualist
notion of politics where force and consent coexist - ideas are not simply imposed,
but rather they are mediated by the lived experience of subordinate classes. The
political strategy of this approach involves leadership and consent, which takes into
account the nature of particular classes:
[the dominant class}... leads classes which are its allies, and
dominates those which are its enemies. Therefore, even before
attaining power a class can (and must) 'lead'; when it is in power
it becomes dominant, but continues to 'lead' as well... There can
and must be a 'political hegemony' even before the attainment of
governmental power, and one should not count solely on the
power and material force which such a position gives in order to
exercise political leadership or hegemony. (Gramsci 1971:57-58)
Gramsci's account of ideology involves a conception of the materiality of ideology
as "an organic and relational whole, embodied in institutions and apparatuses, which
welds together a historical bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles"
(Laclau & Mouffe 1985:67). Ideology thus becomes the terrain where struggles are
played out. The ideological totality however, is greater than materialist conceptions
of class struggle, because it incorporates political domains that are not framed simply
in class terms and do not necessarily have any 'class belonging'. As Laclau and
Mouffe (1985:68) note, 'class does not take state power, it becomes state'. Class
hegemony is thus based on historical products of class struggle, but once
incorporated into the state, a different set of interests prevail. The value of the
Gramscian conception of ideology is that through merging ideas with a political
account of dominance, ideology becomes understood as interconnected with social
mobilisation.
Although the concept of hegemony offers an understanding of processes of
developing and maintaining ideological dominance, it is only intended as a partial
29
explanation of such dominance. As Mumby (1997:347) points out, there has been an
overemphasis in communication studies on "issues of domination (even if such
domination is read as consensually derived and non-coercive) with a corresponding
neglect of resistance and transformation as the dialectical 'other' of the exercise of
relations of power and domination" .
Ideology mediated through hegemony allows for dominance "by securing the
'spontaneous consent' of subordinate groups including the working class, through
the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which
incorporates both dominant and dominated groups" (Strinati 1998: 165). This notion
of consent has to do with an acceptance of the general direction of social life and the
need for social stability, and what amounts to tn,lst in the elite formations that
constitute the dominant group. Hegemony is thus:
... the spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the
dominant fundamental group; this consent is historically caused
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of
production. (Gramsci 1971:12)
Hegemony is produced and reproduced through discourses which insert and reiterate
ideas so that they become 'popular knowledge', overcoming alternate interpretations
of social life and material conditions, and serving to subordinate resistance through
constructing common sense:
Common sense is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half-
way between folklore properly speaking and the philosophy,
science, and economics of the specialists. Common sense creates
the folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of
popular knowledge at a given place and time. (Gramsci
1971:326)
Common sense allows that the dominant social formation and relations of production
are embodied in hegemony as a legitimated consensual framework within which
individuals are complicit. As Hall, Lumley and McLennan (1978:50) note, within
common sense, there is an "absence of a 'consciousness of historicity' and hence of
self-knowledge as the principal feature that condemns common-sense thinking to a
position of dependence and subordination". Common sense is related to ideology in
the way that social cohesion depends upon consciousness being subjugated to
30
leadership of the dominant class, avoiding the consequence of social upheaval
inherent in class struggle. Hegemony allows for concessions to take place, provided
they do not threaten the dominant social formation. The dominant class can make
'sacrifices' but. ..
there is no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise
cannot touch the essential; for though hegemony is ethical-
political, it must also be economic, and must necessarily be based
on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the
decisive nucleus of economic activity. (Gramsci 1971:161)
Hegemony involves the unequal representation of ideas through the production of
common-sense conceptions that overwhelm expression of contradictions. In all
societies the naturalness of conceptions of tradition, culture, personal liberty,
economic ordering and transaction, leadership and the like, together form part of a
common-sense framework that is not readily undermined. This is a significant
power, given that lived experience is often in stark contrast to common sense. For
example the relationship between the concept of the generation of wealth through
work, and the contradictory lived experience of vast imbalances in remuneration for
work/effort. In this way, common-sense conceptions that occur within hegemonic
frameworks are explicitly related to ideology, dominance and power:
[The concept of hegemony]. .. suggests that there is a set of
cultural and social practices, ideas and interpretations that can
be recognised as naturally occurring, not socially constituted,
givens in social life. These tend to be presented as essential
elements in the formation of the self, in developing a relationship
between self and society, and in locating both on cognitive maps
of socio-historic experience. (Mosco 1998:242)
Capitalist states have survived as a result of successfully ensuring that the conditions
serving their reproduction have been maintained, and this has been achieved through
processes oflegitimation that have been economic (as in relations of production), and
political, in the sense of hegemony (which moderates disruptions of the deeper
economic order).
In relation to mv/AIDS, ideas are constructed with a view to making sense of the
emerging epidemic. This incorporates processes of common-sense making through
legitimating practices - for example, the use of research and other knowledge related
discourses, which, in the process of their simplification, constitute a common-sense
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framework of the epidemic. Ideological practices involve discourses emanating from
elites which frame understanding and articulate contemporary knowledge and
forward movement. This process of articulation is lead by a wide range of
international organisations including research generating institutions, United Nations
(UN) organisations, governments and the like, and it is through this process that a
dominant world-view (in the global sense) and resultant common sense has been
constituted in relation to the epidemic. This macro-ideological frame is constituted as
a range of ideologies and ideological positions which constantly interact with elites
forming alliances and addressing critiques that emanate both from within dominant
elites, as well as from less dominant groupings. Contested discourses include, for
example, the aetiology of HIV and AIDS, behavioural versus contextual causality of
HIV infection, capital-intensive top-down intervention strategies versus
developmental horizontal and bottom-up approaches, individualised versus
social/contextual interventions, and rights-oriented approaches versus regulatory
approaches. Processes of common-sense making (i.e. dominance of particular
discourses) thus occur in relation to HIV/AIDS as much as they would occur in
relation to any other social struggle.
Communicating ideology and hegemony
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) refer to the concept of articulation as the process of
modifying the relation between ideological elements, with the product of articulation
being discourse. Larrain (1985: 130), Iinks ideology and language "not in the sense
that ideology is found in the use of language, that is, in the selection and combination
of signs, but also in the sense that the material practices which are at the basis of
ideology are construed as languages, as systems of signification". Signification and
discourse have to do with language as social practice whereby language is a
fundamental structure of society, but at the same time is constituted by society:
Ideology therefore appears a crucial phenomenon to be studied in
connection with language; not that ideology is necessarily a
special language or that one can locate ideology in a particular
kind of discourse. Ideology is rather a level of meaning. which
can be present in all kinds ofdiscourses. (Larrain 1982:130)
The work of Barthes (1977; 1993) draws on Saussure's structuralist semiology to
locate an understanding of ideology within linguistics, where language and speech
represent the latent underlying discourse structure and manifest discourse content
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respectively, and where the latent structure is concealed from the manifest content.
Barthes derives the concepts of denotation and connotation from the Saussurian
strand of semiology, and these concepts in turn become points of formulation of his
fundamentally ideological concept of myth.
The basis of Saussure's thinking was the understanding of signs as incorporating
dyadic relationships between signifier and signified. Each sign thus has a sensory
element, the signifier, and an object element, the signified. In general, the
relationship between the signifier and signified is arbitrary and unmotivated. There is
no causal relationship between a word and its real world object other than that the
word is an agreed upon sign for the object, and this allows that signification is a
process that is entrenched culturally through convention. This latter notion leads to
an understanding that signs only exist within a context of sign systems or language
systems which in turn incorporate langue, a system of differences between signs, and
parole, the individual instances sign usage. Langue is dependent upon an underlying
structure of rules that determine how signs might be used and is thus implicitly a
product of convention developed through temporal social institutionalisation.
Individuals may readily construct complex meanmgs through combining signs
(parole), but the langue itself resists modification (Fiske 2000; Barthes 1977;
Saussure 1974).
Saussure's structuralism allows for considered understanding of the nature of signs
and sign systems, but once signs are used, it becomes necessary to shift towards a
cultural and ideological analysis that relates to how meaning is brought about.
Volosinov recognises that ideology is a product of consciousness that is in turn a
product of signs: "Everything ideological possesses meaning: it represents, depicts,
or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words, it is a sign. Without signs
there is no ideology" (Volosinov 1987:146). He argues further for an ideological
framing of the semiotic:
This ideological chain stretches from individual consciousness to
individual consciousness, connecting them together. Conscious-
ness becomes consciousness only once it has been filled with
ideological (semiotic) content, consequently, only in the process
ofsocial interaction. (1987:147)
Ideology and language are thus interdependent, with language being the basis of
'ideological creativity'. In Barthes' extension of the basic signified-signifier-sign
relationship into a second order of denotation and connotation, a sign is made up of a
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denotative content, which involves pointing to its object - for example a photograph
of a car - and a connotative content which relates to the meaning which lies beyond
the literal representation - for example, by the way the car is portrayed in to
symbolise particular meanings (Barthes 1977, 1993). This approach is not dissimilar
to Peirce's triadic construction of signs where iconic, indexical and symbolic
elements co-exist. For Peirce, a likeness or icon relates to signs that can be
interpreted by looking like that for which they stand - for example a picture - which
has sensory qualities that are similar to what it represents. An index involves inferred
signification - for example a weathervane indicating wind direction, or a sundial
indicating time of day. "The sign draws attention to the existence of the unseen - it
has an existential relationship to the phenomenon it depicts" (Tomaselli 1996: 30).
Extending the concept of connotation is Barthes' formulation of myth. This concept
focuses on distortion, whereby myth is an elaboration of connotation that has shifted
into the domain of meaning - a process that serves both to obscure underlying ideas
and to perpetuate particular interpretations. Myth is a system of communication that
is located beyond, but derived from, denotative and connotative sign systems of
semiology - 'myth is a type of speech' (Barthes 1993: 109). When located in
discourse, myth is defined not by its object, but by the location of a particular
discourse within broader systems of discourse. Following from the dyadic
relationship between signifier and signified, which gives rise to the sign (first order),
the sign becomes the signifier for a second order semiological system, which has to
do with the construction of meaning. Connotation is thus the agent of myth:
Myth has an imperative, buttonholing character: stemming from
an historical concept, directly springing from contingency... it is
I whom it has come to seek. It is turned towards me, I am
subjected to its intentional force, it summons me to receive its
expansive ambiguity. (Barthes 1993:124)
Myth and ideology are interconnected. Ideology has to do with how myths coalesce
into a system of ideological legitimation, of shifting ideas into common sense in the
service of obscuring underlying conditions. Myth thus operates at a third level
whereby myths are "subservient to ideology, a third order sign operating within the
realm of the symbolic. Signification at the level of myths symbiotically interacts with
the logical grid of significations - it slides between the second and third orders"
(Tomaselli 1996:67). Unlike conventional language where signs are unmotivated,
myth involves motivation - specifically the construction of ideological meaning that
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allows myth to be conceptualised as a metalanguage. Myths draw on the naturalistic
construction of first order signs, but are socially constructed in the second order,
drawing on notions of universality to allow for their location in the domain of
common sense. Myth evokes meaning through a process of signification that is
ahistorical in form, allowing for distortion:
Myth is a value, truth is no guarantee for it; nothing prevents it
from being a perpetual alibi... Entrusted with 'glossing over' an
intentional concept, myth encounters nothing but betrayal in
language, for language can only obliterate the concept if it hides
it, or unmask it if it formulates it. The elaboration of a second-
order semiological system will enable myth to escape this
dilemma: driven to having either to unveil or liquidate the
concept, it will naturalise it. (Barthes 1993:123, 129)
Myth thus succeeds in achieving common-sense legitimation by the implication of its
truthfulness. However, there is not an absolute false consciousness at work - rather,
the concept allows that there is a relational understanding of dominated and
subjugated myths within discourse. What Barthes proposes
is nothing so much as an anthropology of modernity. Like the
anthropologist, he is looking at the belief systems, the material
practices, the structures of valuation, and so on, that constitute
our culture's socio-logic... The ambition of semiology manifests
itself here as a desire to pinpoint the range of ways humans exist,
sustain themselves .. . and interact. (Polan 2001 :459)
In essence, the world of production, and the reproduction of the world.
Similarities exist between the concepts of myth, interpellation and common sense.
Myths perpetuate dominant ideology through efficiently shifting the heterogeneous
complexity of human society into a simplified construction that softens
contradictions and presents social relations as an apparently seamless homogenous
whole. "The very end of myths are to immobilise the world: They must suggest and
mimic a universal order which has fixated once and for all the hierarchy of
possessions" (Barthes 1993:155).
Myths can only be effective if they succeed in being perpetuated - so whilst myths
can be constructed by dominant and marginalised groups, it is the dominant group
that have access to the means to reproduce myths at a level sufficient for their
perpetuation. At a primary level then, myths are open signs which allow for multiple
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interpretations, but become closed signs when their meaning becomes naturalised
through consistent propagation: "While both dominant and dominated groups within
a socio-political system propagate myths, it is the myths spoken from the seats of
power whose objective is the maintenance of power, which become the public
myths" (Tomaselli 1996:72). As a result, in a terrain of competing myths, it is the
group that has control over the means of reproduction of ideas - typically located via
access to political power and systems of information production and dissemination -
that can ensure that their mythologies are reinforced, perpetuated and naturalised.
In relation to the above, it can be seen that tensions exist between material and ideal
conceptions of ideology, and that these concepts attempt to achieve an understanding
of the relationship between ideology and discourse. The materialist view attempts to
understand how domination is achieved and perpetuated by masking contradictions
emanating from the economic base, allowing "a particular form of consciousness
(which) gives an inadequate or distorted picture of contradictions, either by ignoring
them, or by misrepresenting them" (Larrain 1983 :27). But ideology in this
conception is not completely resistant to the processes of struggle and tensions that
are described between concepts of 'false consciousness' and 'critical consciousness'
so, whilst the notion of an overarching ideological system is endorsed as a product of
lived experience and economic relations, it is the contradictory elements of lived
experience that give rise to critical consciousness. Theorising the concept of ideology
then becomes an attempt to explain
how the forms of consciousness generated by the lived experience
of subordinate classes and social groups facilitate the
reproduction of social relations and thus impede such classes and
groups from developing forms of consciousness that reveal the
nature of their subordination. (Purvis & Hunt 1993:478)
Hegemony is located within a dominant ideological frame, with space created for
limited counter-hegemonic dissent through discourse. The structural foundations of
language, conceived of as determining consciousness, allow for a structural
conception that is similar to that of the relationship of lived experience to ideology.
These two systems have in common, the process of discourse. In one sense, the
ideological dimensions of discourse include that which lies beyond language in the
conventional sense - and becomes language (or semiotics) in the broader sense - i.e.
physical and social constructs that constitute lived experience. 'Articulation' may be
expressed through action or through language, but it has ultimately to do with the
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construction and contesting of meaning through discourse: "Discourse is constitutive
of social relations in that all knowledge, all argument, takes place within a discursive
context through which experience comes to have, not only meaning for its
participants, but shared and communicable meaning within social relations" (Purvis
& Hunt 1993:492).
Ideology and myth are intimately connected to processes of fostering power and
effecting subjugation - both as determined by their structural underpinnings, and
within processes of articulation of meaning through discourse. Hegemony
incorporates a process of myth-making through common sense that involves fixing
and closing meaning, and it is the process of fixing and closing meaning that is
central to moderating conflicting discourses between dominating and dominated
ideologies.
Representation of ideology
Ideologies are subjective and thus involve processes of representation. For Coward
and Ellis (1977:78):
Ideology is a specific social practice: an articulation of the fixed
relations of representation to a specific organization of reality,
relations which establish the positions that it is possible for the
individual to inhabit within the social totality. It closes off the
contradictions of the human subject with the imaginary
identifications ofunity.
Hall (1985:103-4) cautions against an all-encompassing approach to ideological
discourse - "it does not follow that because all practices are in ideology, or inscribed
by ideology, all practices are nothing but ideology". Ideological discourses do
specifically involve the production and reproduction of ideological effects, linking
social practices with social processes: "Ideological discourses contain forms of
signification that are incorporated into lived experience where the basic mechanism
of incorporation is one whereby sectional or specific interests are represented as
universal interests" (Purvis & Hunt 1993:497). Communication of ideology through
discourse is a conscious activity that encompasses processes of providing
explanation of theoretical underpinnings and world-view, of addressing
contradictions, of connecting to related.supportive structures and ideologies, and of
promoting populism (i.e. expansion of common sense) with a view to dominance.
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Hall's (1993) encoding/decoding concept emphasises communication as a
transmission process that is "a 'complex structure in dominance', sustained through
the articulation of connected practices, each of which, however, retains its
distinctiveness and has its own specific modality, its own forms and conditions of
existence" (p91). It involves an underpinning set of technical infrastructure, relations
of production and frameworks of production that allow for encoding of meaning
through mass media delivery systems which then give rise to the process of decoding
meaning via technical infrastructure which transforms into relations and frameworks
of production to complete the circuit. Meaning is a central concept and
communication is dependent upon meaning being taken through processes of
decoding that are linked to ideas being 'put to use'. Hall cautions however, against
concepts of communication that are implicitly behaviourally deterministic. The
determinate moments are encoding and decoding.
Encoding/decoding allows for construction of polysemic connotative signs and
meanings, but incorporates an acknowledgement that there is an orientation towards
'dominant or preferred meanings', which are, in essence, ideological. These function
in context:
Meaning is polysemic in its intrinsic nature: it remains
inextricably context bound. It is caught in, and constituted by, the
struggle to 'prefer' one among many meanings as the dominant.
The dominance is not already inscribed in structures or events,
but it is constructed through the continuous struggle over a
specific type of practice - representational practice. (Hall
1989:47)
Although Hall (1989) suggests structures are less deterministic, it remains that
dominant ideological readings are influenced by mechanisms and structures within
the encoding process that are hegemonically oriented.
Analyses of processes of ideological domination have been applied regularly to the
mass media have been largely critical of libertarian and pluralist notions of a free
press, recognising the interrelation between capitalist modes of production and media
validation of the dominant economic and ideological bloc. Political economists have
noted that there has been an over-determination of the role of the mass media and
suggest that focus should extend to "decentring the media ... viewing systems of
communication as integral to fundamental economic, political, social and cultural
processes in society" by recognising parallel systems within the family, religion,
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education and other formations/systems that serve a capitalist mode of production
(Mosco 1998:71). In this sense, the political economy of communication is
constructed from the interrelation of communication exchange and social relations -
specifically an assumption that it is an integral relation that is mutually constituted.
Mosco notes that central to this approach is an epistemological skirting of idealism
and essentialism - positioning political economy of communication as a realist
epistemology that has to do with broadening the knowledge process "from simple
determination to multiple, dynamic interactions" (1998: 137). The approach is also
critical, integrating analysis and transformation through intellectual praxis premised
on the 'ubiquity' of social change.
In relation to AIDS, primary ideological discourses which function mainly at the
level of public policy, are disseminated through a wide range of representational
mechanisms including dialogue, discourses at conferences and related events, via
research papers and reports, through the mass media, and other discourse
mechanisms. These may be termed genres of discourse. Secondary HIY/AIDS
discourses, which relate mainly to individual conceptions, behaviours and practices
are also constituted within broader ideological frameworks, but are subservient to
them: for example, the foregrounding of individual knowledge and behaviour as the
primary focus of AIDS interventions, whilst at the same time masking underpinning
structural conditions that perpetuate the epidemic. 18 These discourses also occur
within a range of genres - typically advertising and purposive programming via mass
media (television, radio, print, outdoor), small media (leaflets, posters, booklets,
audio tapes, video tapes), and dialogue-oriented approaches (drama, participatory
activities, counselling). There is thus an ideological layering of meanings in relation
to HIY!AIDS, which extend from public policy through to individual behaviour.
Language and representation
Language constructs meaning because it IS a semiotic representational system.
Language is inextricably linked to cultural (and ideological) production in the sense
that
18 For example, labour migration breaks up families and contributes to a range of vulnerabilities to
HIV infection, yet the dominant discourse is the notion that interventions should focus on the
knowledge and behaviours of migrants within the workplace, and not on the structural conditions
that give rise to their vulnerability. Such dominant discourses naturalise the notion that it is the
morality of the individual, not the underlying 'morality' of the economic system that gives rise to
migrancy, nor the profit-making corporates which benefit from the system that should be
addressed.
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culture is concerned with the production and the exchange of
meanings - the giving and taking of meaning - between members
of a society or group... Thus culture depends on its participants
interpreting meaningfully what is happening around them, and
'making sense' of the world, in broadly similar ways. (Hall
1997:2)
Hall (1997) sees cultural meanings as being directly related to social practices and as
having cultural effects. He notes that discourses 'cluster ideas, images and practices',
and he defines 'discursive' as "any approach in which meaning, representation and
culture are constitutive" (p. 6). Consequently, while semiotics addresses the 'how' of
representation, the discursive approach has to do with cultural aspects of meaning -
the social practices that emerge as a result of discourse. Representation is thus an
active process of construction and reception - encoding/decoding. As Grossberg
(1984:399) notes: "Texts reveal their social significance, not on the surface of images
and representations, but rather, in the complex ways that they produce, transform and
shape meaning structures".
Representation of ideology through discourse applies to the construction of meaning
at the primary level (underpinning epistemological assumptions and relation to
macro-economic ideologies); at the secondary level, to the second tier of ideas that
involve the pragmatic aspects of ideology - i.e. ideology in practice; and at the
tertiary level, to processes of legitimation and hegemony. Whilst to some extent
discrete, these levels also overlap and interact. Primary level constructions are
abstractions; secondary level constructions are largely descriptive; whi 1st tertiary
level constructions involve justification through masking and co-opting ideas with
the purpose of fostering expansion. Primary level constructions are fundamental and
largely internally consistent, whilst secondary and tertiary level constructions are
opportunistic having to do with legitimation and consent.
The ideological process can be understood not as a circuit, but as a spiral whereby
ideology is represented through reiteration and legitimation in support of the
development of common-sense constructions, but is at the same time subject to
critique. Critique is addressed through non-fundamental adaptations via hegemony.
Ideology is thus continuously in a state of flux, although the core theoretical
underpinnings remain intact. Each level is mediated by processes of representation.
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Ideology formation in relation to AIDS is thus in a continuous state offlux as a result
of a wide range of factors including the process of assimilating new knowledge, but
extending to legitimation and the addressing of conflict through hegemonic and other
dominance practices.
Ideology and the subject
Ideology has a material existence. Its purpose is to organise and unify meaning in the
service of social cohesion. In doing so it produces and reproduces human
subjectivity. In capitalist social formations, subjectivity is oriented towards the
construction of class positions through the integration of the state and the formations
of capital. In the Marxist conception, the reduction to class formations is limiting and
subject to obvious critiques, but this does not negate the concept of ideology arising
out of and reflecting social conditions, and the necessity of hegemonic dominance
for overcoming the contradictions of social relations as they are expressed
economically. All societies are constituted from systems of interaction that are in
essence economic - whether or not they are capitalist per se. The organisation of
human society requires specialisation of one form or another, resulting in
differentiations in forms of labour that ensure survival of the individual and/or family
and/or larger forms of social organisation. Forms of labour are intrinsically unequal,
and in any social order this gives rise to hierarchies of power that are political.
Differentials of power have the capacity to 'excite' the social fabric, and potentially
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give rise to ruptures unless contradictions are contained. A dominant class-based
ideology thus serves to contain contradictions through orienting human
consciousness away from positional conflict through the process of hegemony.
Consequently, differentials of power are perpetuated. Hegemony allows that human
subjects can perceive elements of contradiction as a result of reflection emanating
from lived experience and material conditions (and also potentially through alternate
ideologies or fragments of alternate ideology), but at the same time the dominant
ideology, through hegemonic practice, is able to universalise the legitimation of the
power of a dominant social group or class.
Human society is complex, as are the ideologies to which it gives rise. This
complexity exists to the point that any ideology is impossible to perceive or describe
beyond its general traits. Ideologies are constantly in a state of flux, both in their
overarching form, and in their content. Ideologies dominate by virtue of their
capacity to shift emphasis. Dominant ideologies are structurally embedded, involving
organised forms of explanation and validation of social conditions that allow for their
perpetuation without necessarily devolving to the use of force or repression.
Ideologies are ambiguous in their masking of contradictions, and are vulnerable to
critique (i.e. the discourse process of exposing underlying assumptions, biases and
legitimations). Ideologies may be subverted through critique, but their power is not
readily diminished if they have reached the point of being consolidated into
dominant hegemonic forms. Contesting dominant ideologies requires a unification of
ideas amongst non-dominant ideologies to the point that they have sufficient impetus
to overcome dominant ideologies, and in turn become dominant themselves - i.e. a
process of systematic counter-hegemony.
Ideologies are indisputably linked to the contest for domination of social ideas and
this necessitates some explanation of dominance in ideology. Part of the problematic
of economism per se, is that it frames dominant ideology largely in class terms, but
overlooks cross-cutting ideologies that are drawn into the frame of dominance in a
way that complexifies and strengthens dominance and power of particular social
groups and classes. Ideologies incorporating particular constructions of race, gender,
religion and rights, amongst others, are often part of a dominant ideological bloc.
Alternate constructions of the same phenomena may be utilised to articulate and
organise resistance to domination. The interplay of ideological elements can thus be
understood as an ideological bloc, whilst in a dominant form, the bloc consolidates
power via hegemony, amongst other strategies of dominance.
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In the case of AIDS, as the epidemic advances, ideological assumptions about how
the epidemic is constituted, and what responses are appropriate, become dominant.
These forms of dominance are articulated through discourses that legitimate
particular practices (i.e. 'theory', research) and through practice (i.e. supporting and
resourcing particular HIV/AIDS interventions). Over time, a dominant ideological
bloc has developed globally, the ideology of which has become entrenched as a
dominant construction of the epidemic. Global AIDS policy, for example, is largely
defined and regulated by the United Nations agency UNAIDS. Policies pertaining to
regions such as sub-Saharan Africa are determined via reference to research that is
conducted largely by non-indigenous organisations and research agencies, with the
consequence that indigenous perspectives and solutions are marginalised. In the case
of Uganda, for example, much was made of declines in antenatal HIV prevalence in
the early 1990s, and it has been argued that this was a product of bottom-up
indigenous responses to the epidemic including the establishment of local-level
support systems for people and families affected by the disease, as well as
foregrounding of political will and commitment (see Low Beer & Stoneburner 2004).
In response, various reinterpretations of what occurred in Uganda have been
developed at the level of global policy. This has involved the skirting of bottom-up
and horizontal forms of organisation in favour of a reorientation towards individual
response - for example, the attribution of the 'ABC' (abstain, be faithful, use a
condom) concept as being primary in Uganda, and the prioritisation of top-down
imposition of national level AIDS councils. These assumptions favour top-down
intervention rather than emphasis on the potentials for the development and support
of bottom-up and horizontal forms of response (the latter of which more closely
mirror what actually occurred in the early 1990s in Uganda). Similarly, given a
dominant orientation within global AIDS policy that incorporates emphasis on
medical science, biomedical approaches are emphasised as pathways to addressing
behavioural aspects of HIV and are also more likely to secure favour and investment.
For example, a large proportion of the global HIV budget is dedicated to research
into HIV vaccines and HIV preventive vaginal microbicides, both which only offer
potential solutions many years downstream from the present epidemic. These
concepts however, draw legitimacy as a product of their 'scientific' orientation, and
alongside biomedical and curative aspects, are readily framed as common sense. In
contrast social and community-led bottom-up approaches are financially




Analysis of ideology is a critical concept that presupposes that ideologies include and
involve negative characteristics that have to do with a combination of distortions and
differentials of power. Critique of ideology involves, in essence, the unmasking of
contradictions and related power differentials.
Shelby (2003: 156-7) distinguishes between non-evaluative and evaluative
conceptions of ideology. A non-evaluative conception is largely descriptive of
ideological values or doctrines and is non-judgmental. An evaluative conception is a
critical conception whereby negative values are assumed to exist within ideology. He
locates ideology within belief systems, positing that such beliefs are shared within a
group, and are known to be widely held; ideological beliefs form, or are derived
from, a coherent system of descriptive and/or normative thought; ideological beliefs
are related to identity of group members; and ideological beliefs impact significantly
on social action and social institutions (Shelby 2003: 158). In other words,
ideological beliefs are directly related to forms of social action that are, in one way
or another, institutionalised. Shelby's description is however, considerably weighted
towards consciousness and subjectivity, implying rather than emphasising the
relation of beliefs to social practice which are more consistent with Poulantzas' view
that ideology involves lived relations materialised as social practices (see Boswell et
aI1999a:366).
Shelby draws on Geuss's methodological approaches to the critique of ideology.
These include epistemic critiques (empirical validity, consistency, logic, etc.),
functional critiques (negative consequences of particular systems of belief), and
genetic critique (whereby negative elements are derived from the aetiology of
beliefs). This suggests both a rationalist and a moral approach to critique that is
functional to exposing contradictions in ideological belief systems from a
transformative point of view. More specifically, ideologies may be seen as
intrinsically negative in the sense that they are 'wrong' because they involve
domination, exploitation and inequality. Critique of ideology then, is itself
ideologically weighted:
The critic of ideology aims to reveal the illusory nature of
ideologies so that the structures of domination and exploitation
that they conceal and reinforce can be seen for what they are and
that, thereby, the oppressed can more clearly see what direction
their political efforts should take as they struggle collectively to
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overcome these obstacles to freedom, equality and human
flourishing. (She/by 2003:188)
A critical approach to ideology involves analysis of the ways that ideas are
constructed, legitimated and perpetuated. The construction of ideology has to do with
mechanisms of representation through communication that formally set out the
framework of a particular ideology in such a way that it retains an apparent logic and
internal coherence. Such construction can be considered primary to any given
ideology. The legitimation of ideology involves the development of a secondary tier
of arguments that support and expand upon the primary construction. Perpetuation
relates directly to the dissemination of core primary and secondary elements of the
ideology through communicative discourse, but also through consolidation in terms
of economic and other forms of organisation that are structural in nature. The
political purpose of ideology is expansion and dominance, whilst hegemony has to
do with addressing and moderating critique. In relation to the above, assumptions
underpinning the understanding of ideology can be summarised as follows:
o Ideology involves a consolidation of a particular world-view or framework of
relating to the world that purposively excludes or limits alternative under-
standings. In this sense all ideologies are distortions of reality; (Marx & Engels
1986; Gramsci 1971)
o Ideologies are constructed through the production and reproduction of ideological
forms of knowledge located within discourse; (Schmid 1981; Hall 1986; Laclau
& Mouffe 1985)
o Ideological distortions mask underlying contradictions and inequalities and the
strength of ideologies lies in their capacity to appear common sense, reasonable
and logical; (Gramsci 1971; Purvis & Hunt 1993)
o Ideologies seek expansion and dominance and are consolidated and perpetuated
through discourse. Expansion may be further secured through varying degrees of
force and/or processes of hegemonic consent; (Gramsci 1971; Therborn 1999;
Lull 2000)
o Ideologies become dominant through institutionalisation that includes economic
institutionalisation as well as linkages to supportive economic, political and social
power formations that are oriented towards drawing in relationships to other
ideological formations; (Althusser 1971; Laclau & Mouffe 1985)
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o Hegemony includes addressing, managing and moderating critique, and
reconstituting of elements of ideology wherever expedient; (Gramsci 1971)
o Ideologies are in a constant state of flux as a result of interrelation and
engagement with social processes. Ideologies are however, at the same time,
resistant to change. (Gramsci 1971)
Critique of ideology may at first sight appear to be a moral project that weighs one
ideological perspective against another from the point of view of privileged truth - a
position that may be only indirectly related to empirical reason. Such forms of
judgment however, are not integral to critique of ideology. Instead, critique of
ideology is both a herrneneutic and an empirical project that involves theoretical and
practical analysis. It is centred not on truth, but on transparency. To circumvent a
moral truth position and to focus on transparency, critique of ideology necessarily
involves counter-ideological frames of reference. Critique of ideology thus takes the
form of an inquiry into the relative grounding of ideological claims, and an
exploration of what is revealed and what is masked. Such inquiry is implicitly
ideological.
Ideologies, their related representations and structural manifestations, can be
categorised at various levels. Macro-level ideologies such as capitalism, racism, and
patriarchal gender-power relations have long and complex historical trajectories that
incorporate structural embedding in economic and social formations. In some ways,
macro-ideologies may be described as totalising, given that they pervade through
multiple societies and, in the Marxist conception, have engineered consent through
brute economic force. The core principles of these macro-ideologies have repeatedly
been subjected to ideological critique, and their illusory and oppressive aspects
repeatedly unmasked, yet they have remained dominant. Critiques have brought
about some superstructural changes that have been addressed through hegemonic
practices for ameliorating dissent. In democratic capitalist states, for example, there
has been recognition of, and interaction with, labour unions; rights frameworks that
reject racism have often been entrenched in legislation; and power imbalances have
been addressed through systems of rights that foster gender equality. Fundamental
structural aspects have however remained intact and thus macro-level ideologies are
deeply resistant to change. In South Africa, for example, the foregrounding of racial
oppression in apartheid-era capitalism was functional for a period of time, but
became dysfunctional as local and international resistance grew and economic
production and profits were negatively impacted. This contributed to a reformulation
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in the post-apartheid era that shifted certain elements within the superstructure, but
ensured continued domination of the inequalities embedded within the capitalist
status quo.
Ideologies are a product of social life and ideological dominance is related to social
cohesion. An interplay exists between ideologies as they emerge as a product of
conditions of existence and economic relations on the one hand, and the shaping of
society through ideas on the other.
At a superstructural level there exist a wide range of ideologies including non-
dominant ideologies that are positioned as ideologies of resistance - for example
social movements such as those that resisted apartheid and racism, and anti-
globalisation movements that resist global capitalism. Other ideologies involve
consolidation of ideas around particular social phenomena - for example poverty and
health - whilst others have to do with organising particular practices within social
life - for example religion, education, gender, politics (in the sense of political
parties), and phenomena such as mY/AIDS. As Freeden (2001 :6) points out:
"Ideologies are the arrangements of political thought that illuminate the central ideas,
overt assumptions and unstated biases that in turn drive political conduct".
The structuring and consolidation of ideas within superstructural ideologies includes
a political dimension - i.e. the articulation of a simplified descriptive framework for
organising and understanding social complexity that is oriented towards expansion.
In this sense ideology can be applied not only to social formations such as classes,
but also to organisations and groups within society. Analysis of political practices of
ideology may be applied as much to micro-ideological practices as it may be applied
to macro-ideological practices. In effect, political practice is ideological practice,
having to do with seeking dominance of ideas through discourse.
Ideologies are descriptive of both the present and the future with the latter being
represented politically as an improvement of the social conditions of the present.
This political dimension is forward looking and involves an ideological conception
of social transformation that is part of the process of securing positional hegemony.
The political ideological model of social transformation is however, not necessarily
radical - rather it is a useful mechanism for overcoming contradictions through
hegemonic consent that includes expansion and dominance. Interpellation
incorporates processes of past, present and future - what exists, what is good, what is
possible (Therborn 1999). For an ideology to become dominant it needs to be
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sufficiently connected to economic structures as well as political and cultural
formations, and it needs to be capable of addressing contradictions. As Joseph
describes it:
We might develop the objective basis of hegemony by looking at
Gramsci's conception of the passive revolution. This notion is
used to describe the attempts by the ruling group to organise the
'superstructure' in line with 'structural' developments. Gramsci
has in mind the situation in Italy where the ruling class attempted
to compensate for its historical weakness by carrying through a
reorganization of civil society in order to pre-empt the direct
activity of the masses. This reorganization takes the form of
modernisation which is in line with the structural developments
that are occurring in the economy. It seeks to cultivate these
changes in order to try and prevent any potential crisis, by
putting into practice a far-reaching reorganisation that creates
the impression ofprogress. (2001:183)
Ideological frameworks allow that contradictions exist, and these are moderated by
articulation of promises of a better way of life that overcome the many contradictions
that are inherent in the lived experience of social and material conditi?ns. In South
Africa, for example, poverty and unemployment are dominant features of present day
social life, and anti-poverty rhetoric is central to government political discourse. The
contradiction of the widespread lived experience of poverty is explained away
through promises of a better life for all through social development primarily led
politically by the African National Congress (ANC) in collaboration with the private
sector and other social actors locally and globally. Although lived experience and
material conditions may be experienced as oppressive, ideological explanations of
reality and their related visions for the future are thus capable of populism through
common-sense making, and are positioned to ameliorate dissatisfaction with the
present.
Baradat (1994:7-8) provides a useful summary of some of the key features of
ideology including: a political orientation that offers a view of the present and future
with the latter oriented towards material improvement of the present; attainability
within a relatively short timeframe (a single lifetime); an action-orientation that
provides an understanding of steps to be taken towards change goals; and direction
(communication) towards the masses.
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The concept of transformation as embedded within ideology is interconnected with
domination of ideas, given that it is through the concept (or promise) of change that
contradictions are overcome and that the necessary foundations for dominance are
provided. In this sense, ideology is not simply about bringing about 'false
consciousness' through limiting awareness of contradictions and maintaining a static
status quo. 'False consciousness' conceptions are unsustainable as a result of the
differential between material conditions and ideas as they are formulated within
ideology - contradictions are concretely apparent to disadvantaged and
disempowered groups and classes, and may also be so to dominant classes (although
less penetratingly experienced). The pol itical aspect of ideology - of transformation,
of improving social and material conditions - thus provides ideologies with a power
and capacity to be sustained over time. It is not 'false consciousness' that sustains
ideology but rather practices of dominance that maintain consent through political
discourse focused on common-sense making, extending where necessary to consent-
making through accommodation of critique. Force and repression are however
largely removed from the equation. The use of physical force,19 whilst it may bring
about the visible trappings of consent (by reducing overt resistance), tends to sharpen
contradictions and not overwhelm them, thus increasing the potential for resistance.
Ideological dominance thus includes the efficiency of softening perception of
contradictions by functioning mainly in the sphere of discourse.
In relation to the above, critique of ideology involves not only analysis and
deconstruction of ideological ideas and action in relation to the present, but also in
relation to their political formulations of the relationship between present and future.
Ideological domination inevitably includes the development of structural relations
that foster domination integrated with dominating discourse practices. Whilst various
ideologies may include alternate explanations of the world and visions for the future,
they often incorporate fundamental commonalities that allow for strategic
collaboration - i.e. formation of an ideological bloc, which, in the dominant phase
incorporates hegemony: for example the ideological bloc that exists between state
and capital in Western democracies. Hegemony involves management and
moderation of intra- and inter-ideological contradictions and synergies. The
challenge within an ideological bloc is to ensure internal coherence and stability - a
functional relation as well as a structural one. Hegemony lends to the economic
superstructure, a system for addressing the ideological surpluses that are the product
of contradiction. As Mouffe (1987:221) notes: " ... the political struggle was far more
19 As opposed to legislative and other social regulatory forms of force.
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complex than had ever been thought by reductionist tendencies, since it did not
consist in a simple confrontation between antagonistic classes, but always involved
complex relations of forces".
In the context of mY/AIDS particular interpretations of the epidemic coalesce into
ideological systems of thought. These constructions are related to the economic base
of society, and are embedded within them - for example, it is ideologically expedient
to shift from view, the masking of contradictions that underpin labour migration and
its fostering of my infection, or horizontal and bottom-up social mobilisation in
favour of top-down intervention.
Ideological reproduction
The production and reproduction of ideology involves a process of generating
meaning in relation to social and material conditions. Hall (1995) asserts that
meaning is a 'social production, a practice', and that meaning is constructed through
language and symbolisation - which is a flexible process. He further notes that the
process of construction involves a systematic process that is directed towards
narrowing interpretation:
Because meaning was not given but produced, it followed that
different kinds of meaning could be ascribed to the same events.
Thus, in order for one meaning to be regularly produced, it had
to win a kind of credibility, legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness
for itself. That involved marginalising, down-grading or de-
legitimating alternative constructions. (Hall 1995: 67)
The question becomes how such meanings are contained within a narrower frame
and how this occurs within dominant communication systems. Hall argues that the
social practices of the media - technology, editing practices and the like - are
processes of codification that play a determining role in 'recurrent signification'. The
process of making meaning within a particular paradigm and contributing to closure,
is related to the Althusserian concept of ideology operating within a superstructural
closed circuit that perpetuates the economic mode of production by obscuring its
contradictions. However, this structural-functional conception requires expansion
into the concept of the struggle for ideas and meaning, which suggests a relative
autonomy of ideology. Ruling ideas are not the totality of ideas - rather they are
dominant ideas that constantly impose a limiting function on critical discourse -
which is in part, expanded through the concept of hegemony. Dominance over
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economic processes extends to dominance over ideological processes through
winning consent of subordinate groups. Ideas are constantly in flux, but are
moderated through a process of reformism (or transformation) that allows change to
be contained within the dominant ideology (or bloc): "the gradual but continuous
absorption, achieved by methods which varied in their effectiveness, of the active
elements produced by allied groups - and even those that came from the antagonistic
groups" (Gramsci 1971 :59). Economic crisis and concomitant experience (lived
conditions) sharpen awareness of contradictions and constantly challenge the
processes of constructing meaning. The struggle for meaning cannot therefore be
removed from the concept of ideology - ideology and ideological struggle are
intertwined, with the ultimate tension being between reformism and revolutionary
action in relation to contradictions. Ideologies thus offer an explanation of lived
conditions and a promise of social transformation, with dominance being contested
through a struggle for meaning that is further moderated by cross-cutting interests of
all individuals and classes, which are weighted towards social stability.
A framework for analysis
Ideologies are structured and consolidated ideas that are generalised throughout
society that relate to social coherence. Ideologies involve distortions that simplify
interpretations of lived experience and material conditions, and as a consequence,
offer a limited view of the world. Ideologies also include a political vision of the
future. The political purpose of ideologies is expansion and dominance. Ideology is
thus not a fixed articulated body of ideas - rather ideology involves processes of
consolidating and replicating ideas.
Ideologies may be structurally embedded within economic and social systems
(macro-ideologies) located in broad based social formations or may be largely
situated within the superstructure within single or inter-related groups (blocs).
Ideologies include explanations of social inequality and disproportionate relations of
power. Contradictions inherent in inequality and simplification of the interpretation
of lived experience and material conditions are moderated through processes of
dominance that allow critique to be contained. Ideologies are communicated through
processes of signification and discourse, which subjectify lived experience. Part of
this subjectification is a political process within hegemony that masks and moderates
elements lived experience through a vision for the future. Ideologies 'hail' their
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subjects through interpellation but are not necessarily capable of ensuring individual
subjectification - i.e. the dialectical relation is never removed.
Hegemony has to do with serving the interests of dominant groups or classes and
expanding the popular base of a particular ideas and particular practices through
addressing critique. Critique of ideology of involves epistemological and empirical
approaches that seek transparency and set out to reveal limitations and contradictions
of ideologies with a view to reformation and/or transformation.
Ideology and ideological analysis has largely been applied at the macro level,
directed towards explanations of systemic relations such as those embedded within
capitalism, or explanations of the dominance of particular social classes via
intersections of base-superstructure relations as they relate to the state, or to
transitions of power in relation to the state. Theories of ideology have been to a
lesser extent applied to groups within society or inter-relations between groups, yet
ideology and hegemony may as equally be applied to such formations. Single groups,
or groups collectively, may be seen as functioning ideologically if they function
politically at the level of inserting ideas into the public sphere with a view to
influencing social practices. When ideologies are directed at publics and are related
to public goals they are immediately also functioning with a view to situating
particular ideas in a superior position to others, and thus ideology and dominance are
intertwined. In relation to a group/organisation, or bloc of groups/organisations,
ideology has to do with servicing vested interests.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodological approaches to ideological
analysis and critique
HIV/AIDS, as a material/ecological phenomenon, has required explanation at a
social level and emerging knowledge has been consolidated through a range of
discourses. These discourses have coalesced into various trajectories related to the
ideological dominance of particular ideas, or the establishment of common-sense
perspectives, with the consequence that they influence HIV/AIDS intervention
policies and practices. These function ideologically through reiteration and
legitimation, and in the trajectory towards dominance, are likely to incorporate
hegemonic strategies to consolidate power and to address critique. Hegemonic power
includes both structural and ideological forms of dominance.
The 10veLife programme has utilised discourses to addresses a range of groups
including AIDS researchers, strategists, policy makers, and the general public on the
one hand, and the programme's stated 'target group' of 12-17 year old youth on the
other. This has included both discourses about the 10veLife programme - its
assumptions, is vision, its relationships to other organisations and its impacts - as
well as discourses that have to do with creating a 'positive lifestyle' amongst South
African youth for the suggested purpose of transforming sexual and reproductive
health practices with a view to mitigating individual and social risk to HIV/AIDS.
This thesis examines the ideological discourses and practices that relate to what
might be termed the meta-discourses of the 10veLife programme - discourses that
involve representation of the programme as an appropriate and viable intervention in
relation to AIDS. These discourses occur both within South Africa and globally.
The following chapter outlines a range of analytic issues to be considered towards
framing a methodology for analysis. This includes reflections on processes of
representation; epistemological foundations (including quantification, causality and
consumption); processes of legitimation (including moral panic, research
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discourses); and dominance practices (including structural linkages and mechanisms
for addressing critique).
Construction of ideology
Ideologies have theoretical and pragmatic dimensions and are a product of processes
of social organisation that include the coalescing of ideas as a consequence of social
and material life, as well as the construction of ideas through discourse into bodies of
knowledge that are descriptive of the past, present and future.
Ideology can be distinguished from culture, the latter being the totality of meanings
and social practices in any given group or society, whilst the former can be
understood as the subset of discourses that are specific to ideological practice.
Freeden defines ideological practice as "the performance of, and participation in, an
identifiable regularity of action or thought, one replicated as well as shaped by other
I such practitioners. It is hence a communal activity taking place in social space and
\ occurring over time" (2000:304). He notes further:
To analyse an ideology (as distinct from to participate In
formulating one) is to categorise, elucidate and decode the ways
in which collectivities in fact think about politics, the ways in
which they intentionally practice the art ofpolitical thinking, and
unintentionally express the social patterns which that kind of
thinking has developed. That analysis encompasses a span
ranging from what is done to what can be done. It includes and
exploration of what ideologies claim should be done, but excludes
any judgment concerning what ought to be done from an external,
absolute or unitary moral viewpoint. (Freeden 2000:304)
Ideologies thus create linkages between knowledge and social practice - ideological
praxis - a political engagement with the world through transformative practice.
Ideological praxis adds a conscious and proactive dimension to the construction of
ideas:
Ideologies are ubiquitous yet crucial political phenomena that
operate at the intersection of language, power and allegiances to
public goals. They are attempts to manage the usages ofpolitical
language and, through them, the political practices are shaped,
recalled and given voice by such language, in order to determine
the policies of groups, most notably societies, without which
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individuals are disoriented and hence incapacitated. (Freeden
1999:413)
Ideologies involve the formation of human subjectivities and in this sense they are a
material force in social relations that, to a greater or lesser extent, reproduce subjects
through interpellation. Interpellation affects both dominant and non-dominant
ideologies - i.e. lived experience and material conditions may give rise to
identification with alternate non-dominant ideologies.
Ideologies have inertia in the sense that they are related to simplification and
masking of aspects of social life and material existence through attempting to present
consistent and coherent meanings through discourse. Consistency of ideas
necessarily involves resistance to change. However, such consistency exists only so
far as it is expedient, and through the process of hegemony ideological ideas and
frameworks can be modified to ensure that they are sustained:
Ideologies retain their relevance to changing circumstances only
by constantly revising and 'up-dating' their basic concepts.
Nevertheless, if an ideology is to exhibit a degree of internal
coherence over time, it must have a distinctive core of concepts of
propositions and an internal reference system of themes and
questions. (Hall 1986:34)
Macro-level ideologies such as capitalism, gender, race and religion have been
institutionalised over long periods of time and are structurally embedded in the
economic base (and consequent superstructural social practices) and are thus, as a
matter of course, dominant. Ideologies located predominantly in the superstructure
are potentially shorter lived and more vulnerable. However, integration of
superstructural ideologies within conceptual frameworks and social practices
reproduced by macro-level ideologies allows for consolidation of power. Ideologies
operating within the broader framework and assumptions of dominant macro-
ideologies thus tend to be more stable and more capable of power and dominance.
Any given ideology is both flexible and inter-related with other ideologies. As
Therborn notes:
They [ideologies} have no natural boundaries, no natural criteria
distinguishing one ideology from another or one element of an
ideology from its totality. Particularly in today's open and
complex societies, different ideologies, however defined, not only
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coexist, compete and clash, but also overlap, affect and
contaminate one another. (1999a:79)
It is important therefore, to integrate a contextual understanding within any analysis
of ideology - i.e. a contextualisation of the relationship to parallel ideologies and
ideological practices.
Ideology and representation
Hall (2002) defines representation as the production of meaning through language.
Representation involves two interlinked systems of representation - a classifying
system or 'conceptual map' and a semiotic system that is constituted through signs
and language:
At the heart of the meaning process in culture... are two related
'systems of representation.' The first enables us to give meaning
to the world by constructing a set of correspondences or a chain
of equivalences between things - people, objects, events, abstract
ideas, etc - our system of concepts, our conceptual maps. The
second depends on constructing a set ofcorrespondences between
our conceptual map and a set of signs, arranged or organized
into various languages which stand for or represent those
concepts. The relation between 'things', concepts and signs lies
at the heart of the production of meaning in language. (Hall
2002:19)
Hall (2002) draws on Foucault's concept of discourse, which casts a relationship
between knowledge and power in the production of meaning. Discourse "never
consists of one statement, one text, one action or one source. The same discourse,
characteristic of the way of thinking or the state of knowledge at anyone time ... will
appear across a range of texts, and as forms of conduct at a number of different
institutional sites within society" (Hall 2002:44). This is related to Foucau]t's (1988)
concept of episteme or discursive formation, which refers to discourses addressing
the same objects with the same patterns and commonaJities occurring across a range
\ of texts. Knowledge is_thus interconnected with power through discursive formations
I ~~_generate meaning (truth) through repetition and reiteration: .
'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for
the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation
of statements. 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems
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of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power
which it induces and which extend it. A 'regime' of truth.
-\ (Foucault 1988:133)
Knowledge linked to power thus has the "power to make itself true" (Hall 2002:49).
For Foucault, ideological critique has to do with the "possibility of constituting a
new politics of truth" whereby the challenge is to detach "the power of truth from the
forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the
present time" (1988:133).
Ideological discourses can be thought of as 'regimes of truth' that involve
positioning of world-views and political ideas with the intent of bringing about
interpellation. In terms of construction, ideologies are layered discourses. At the first
level are epistemologically derived orthodoxies - ideas that have to do with
assumptions about what constitutes knowledge. These may involve explicit
theoretical frameworks or epistemological assumptions, or alternately, these
assumptions may be relatively untheorised frameworks that have an implicit
epistemological foundation (orthodoxies). At the second level are the rationalisation
and legitimation of ideas. This includes discourses that reiterate foundational
assumptions and which expand these into broader sets of ideas. At the third level are
the interplay of structural relationships to other ideologies and ideological formations
that involves a struggle for dominance including hegemony.
In relation to discourse analysis, Hodge and Kress note the need for a hermeneutic
strategy characterised by "endemic suspicion, a critical doubt that texts mean what
they seem to, an apparent certainty that somewhere a very different 'real' meaning
lies hidden" (1993:160). Such scepticism is implicit within any ideological analysis-
however the true/false dichotomy needs to be avoided. Critique of ideology involves
processes of analysis and deconstruction that are oriented towards transparency with
a view to revealing the limits of paradigmatic assumptions and lacunae in terms of
what is masked. This extends to an exploration of power that is embedded in
discourses through discourse genres which allow both a reiterative aspect and a
structural aspect and which intersect with structural relations of access to the means
of producing discourse.
Ideology critique is a critical evaluative process that is centred on peeling away
layers, unpacking contradictions and analysing processes of domination. It is in itself
an ideological process and can be understood as a counter-hegemonic activity in so
much as it sets out to organise critical thinking and to unmask assumptions
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underpinning dominance. Ideological critique that takes place in the public domain
and that organises critical ideas ideologically (through reiteration and legitimation)
becomes transformative in the sense that an ideological struggle of ideas is
established.
Discourse power
Cultural Studies includes analysis of the intersections between ideology and culture.
In the case of British Cultural Studies, the 'circuit of culture' model - which
incorporates inter-related processes of representation, production, consumption,
identity and regulation - has become central to analysis of contemporary cultural
discourses. The direction of analysis however, is from materialised products/objects
outward - for example, analysis of the Sony Walkman (du Gay et al 2001), analyses
of photography, museums and news reporting (Hall 2002), advertising and fashion
(du Gay 1997), music (MacKay 1997), and the body (Woodward 2002). Such
approaches offer insights into the ideological and cultural dimensions of cultural
artefacts, but what is necessary is a related approach that is more focused on the
production and reproduction of culture/ideology per se - i.e. analysis operating in the
opposite direction, from the originating ideas towards materialised practices.
Ideological analysis involves understanding the layering of ideological discourses
from the basis of theoretical underpinnings, through reiterative discourse processes
and structurallhegemonic relations. This includes an understanding of how
discourses are produced and reproduced in social life, and how ideological ideas are
consolidated, reiterated and inter-related to other ideas in a struggle for dominance.
Concepts of ideology and ideological effects within Communication Studies,
Cultural Studies and related disciplines have often been applied to the mass media,
with early explorations centring on media as agents of propaganda. As Curran,
Gurevitch and Woolacott note, the media were seen as:
powerful propaganda agencies brainwashing a susceptible and
defenceless public. The media propelled 'word bullets' that
penetrated deep into its inert and passive victims. All that needed
to be done was to measure the depth and size of penetration
through modern scientific techniques. (1995:11-12)
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This propaganda orthodoxy was not readily accepted and challenged on the basis of
naIve determinism rooted in linear theories of communication. As Tomaselli points
out:
The concept of propaganda reflects the deterministic history of
the communications discipline as a whole. Propaganda was seen
as the archetypal case of the communications process in general,
and was based on the mechanistic cause-effect C-M-R model. As
it was discredited, so too, the idea of propaganda became
increasingly problematic. (1992:19)
Although empirical approaches directed towards quantifying media influence were
generally dismissed, Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches recognised that media
played a role in the reproduction of society through maintaining class domination.
Although the two positions were counterpoised, each offering alternative visions of
determination, Curran et al (1995:14) note that where the approaches intersect is the
notion that the media play "a strategic role in reinforcing dominant social norms and
values that legitimise the social system" - i.e. reiteration of meaning, not
determination of meaning. Hall (1993) moves some way towards this middle-ground
conception of mass media through his notion of preferred meanings within the
concept of encoding and decoding, although contemporary shifts in cultural studies
have moved towards the relation between identity and the subject. Identities are
"points of attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for
us ... They are the result of a successful articulation or 'chaining' of the subject into
the flow of discourse" (Hall & du Gay 2002:6).
A focus on the construction of ideological meaning necessitates that closer attention
be given to discourse and discourse processes, with a lesser emphasis on the
construction of subject identities. Strategic ideological practices - including for
example, public relations and political 'spin' - are conscious ideological practices
that cannot be underplayed in contemporary analysis of discourse, particularly given
that there is a resurgence in the use of these approaches across a range of discourses.
The 2003 war in Iraq, for example, was largely predicated upon and justified by, the
myth of 'weapons of mass destruction' by the United States and British
governments. This myth, which became the meta-narrative in the build up and early
phases of the war, was continuously propagated, with 'spin,20 being applied to
20 In an analysis of the concept of 'spin', Gaber (2000) shows how a concept contained in a text
such as a government announcement is reiterated and further shaped through reactions to
announcements, publicising speeches, and reacting to reactions. Spinning is, in essence, a process
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deflect attention as it became apparent that no such weapons [chemical weapons]
existed. The first television broadcasts of the entry into Iraq showed soldiers and
journalists repeatedly putting on and removing chemical suits and gas masks in
preparation for their entry into Iraq. This established the focal point of the
justification for the war, at the same time introducing the concept of 'good' weapons
(coalition bombs and missiles which kill/maim people indiscriminately and destroy
infrastructure),21 and 'bad' weapons (Saddam Hussein's alleged chemical weapons
which kill/maim people indiscriminately, but which leave infrastructure intact). This
ideological masking allowed for a repeated irony to occur - Western television
reporters standing alongside wrecked buildings, blown up cars and dismembered
bodies (as a result of mass destruction wrought by 'good' weapons), lamenting that
Saddam Hussein's 'weapons of mass destruction' were still nowhere to be found.
'Good' weapons were thus depoliticised, whilst 'bad' weapons were intrinsically
political.
Ideologies mask alternative perspectives and contradictions through reiteration and
legitimation, and it follows that part of this process involves methods of propaganda,
including contemporary practices of public relations and 'spin'. Ellul (1973:9-19)
sees propaganda as a scientific process that is driven by scientific rules and
empiricism which, to be effective, must be total: "The propagandist must utilise all
of the technical means at his disposal", it must be "continuous and lasting" and "it
must be organized". Viewed negatively, propaganda has a conspiratorial aspect to it
- for example Henderson's (1943:71) definition of propaganda as "a process which
deliberately attempts through persuasion techniques to secure from the propagandee,
before he can deliberate freely, the response desired from the propagandist".
Conversely, in liberal pluralist definitions, propaganda is constructed as an ethical
practice related to the dissemination of knowledge - originally framed in this way by
the Catholic church, but in contemporary communications, often being defined as
corporate communications or public relations. Herman and Chomsky recognise that
media institutions are vulnerable to propagandistic manipulations because of their
ties to parallel ideological elites and their structure as profit-making concerns,
although, Herman (2000: 102) notes in relation to the Herman/Chomsky propaganda
whereby a particular theme or message is kept in public attention through nuancing it in a variety
of ways, and manipulating media attention on the issue. Itcan be used to promote' in-group'
discourses, but also to destroy opposition - for example, by 'stoking the fire' around negative
conceptions of 'out-groups'.
21 Such destruction also has consequent profit benefits to US-based corporates, when it comes to
'reconstruction' .
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model, that the "model describes a decentralised and non-conspiratorial market
system" which is open to manipulation by elites.
Therborn (1999), in an examination of the social organisation of ideological
discourse, provides a categorical system for exploring dominance. He distinguishes
between discursive and non-discursive practices - the former being related to
representation, and the latter being the deployment of 'affirmations and sanctions'
that are connected to a 'particular structuring of social discourse' (1999:82). Non-
discursive practices involve the social orderings of dominance. Political rituals of
nationalism such as marches, flag waving or anthems, for example, are related to an
organisation of the ideological order that affirms nationalism. In this instance, the
process of affirmation has a legitimating function. He further outlines discursive
forms of sanction that shift subjective interpellation into an objectification of the
subject. These include:
o Excommunication, whereby the subject/object is excluded from meaningful
discourse by being described as, for example, traitorous, vexatious or insane;
o Restriction, whereby there are socially institutionalised restrictions on who may
speak, how much may be talked about, what might be talked about and on what
occasion;
o Shielding, whereby particular discourses and authors are protected, or are
recognised as the main (or only) ones who can make valid assertions;
o Repetition, whereby given discourses are incessantly repeated, such that the only
valid enunciations apart from the authorised text itself are exegesis, commentary
and reinterpretation;
o Delimited appropriation of discourse, whereby discourses are restrictively
situated - for instance religious discourse, 'education', political speeches and
discussions are situated in determinate ecological settings: churches, schools,
political campaigns. (Therborn 1999a:81-84)
These categorisations are applied to various manifestations of apartheid ideology by
Tomaselli (1992), who notes how mass media formations including the state
controlled broadcast media, the liberal press and the alternative press employed such
non-discursive strategies. He argues for democratisation of communication that
includes 'bottom-up' and horizontal approaches.
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Black (2001: 133-134) provides additional typologies of propaganda including:
o A heavy or undue reliance on authority figures and spokespersons, rather than
empirical validation to establish truths, conclusions, or impressions;
o The utilisation of unverified and perhaps unverifiable abstract nouns, adjectives,
adverbs, and physical representations, rather than empirical validation to establish
its truths, conclusions or impressions;
o A reduction of situations into simplistic and readily identifiable cause and effect
relations, ignoring multiple causality of events;
o A time perspective characterised by an over emphasis or under-emphasis on the
past, present, or future as disconnected periods rather than a demonstrated
consciousness of time flow;
o A finalistic or fixed view of people, institutions, and situations divided into broad,
all-inclusive categories of in-groups (friends) and out-groups (enemies), beliefs
and disbeliefs, and situations to be accepted or rejected in toto;
o A greater emphasis on conflict than on co-operation among people, institutions,
and situations.
Parallels can be found between such conceptions and the imperatives of ideological
discourse. Ideologies depend upon a range of discourse practices that seek to
interpellate subjects through common-sense processes of simplification, reiteration
and legitimation. Such representations lean towards propagandistic representation -
for example, positive orientations of particular viewpoints, simplifications,
endorsement and legitimation, connotation and myth, and temporal inconsistencies
may be utilised. Propagandist representations promote positive conceptions of
particular ideological points of view thus incorporate valorisation (whereby a
particular ideological formation or viewpoint is represented as good, moral, right,
just, leading), and hyperbole (whereby positive characteristics are exaggerated).
Negative conceptions of threats to particular ideological viewpoints are achieved by
othering- by diminishing threats and critiques by undermining them.
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loveLife and representation
The 10veLife programme is represented through a complex of discourses. These
discourses articulate perspectives on the past, present and future in relation to the
AIDS epidemic. This can be understood as representing specific ideological
positions including, for example, the notion that mv/AIDS can be understood
through quantitative behavioural research, which is amplified into assertions that
youth are the 'driving force' underpinning the epidemic; that other interventions
addressing mv prevention amongst youth in South Africa have failed; that 10veLife
is a new vision of prevention that will bring about significant impacts in HIV
reduction over a short period of time; and that 10veLife is succeeding in changing
sexual behaviours of youth (IoveLife 1999a; 10veLife 2000d; 10veLife 2002b, 2002c;
10veLife 2003a, Harrison & Steinberg 2002). These representations are fixed
ideologically through repetition and reiteration via a range of discourse genres
including mass media genres, events, brochures, conferences, research reports, elite
discourses and the like.
Ideological discourses are seldom discrete, and are also not necessarily constructed
coherently when it comes to outlining core doctrines and beliefs. In relation to a
particular 'object' - in this case the 10veLife programme - ideological dimensions
can however be read through ideological typologies recurring through various
discourses emanating from the programme. Such discourses also originate from the
ideological bloc that is interrelated with the programme. The 10veLife programme
can thus be understood as being represented within the framework of Foucault's
concept of episteme or discursive formations - 10veLife itself, and the various
~-_.-
elements of the ideological bloc within which it is located. Methodologically, this
may be explored through examining:
o Implicit epistemologies, which are embedded within orthodoxies (or common-
sense representations) that include quantification, concepts of cognitive
behavioural causality and concepts of youth in relation to globalisation;
o Processes of legitimation, which include moral panic, behavioural research and
elite discourses which service the construction of 'common sense" ,
o Practices of ideological domination which may include coercive practices - for
example excommunication and/or other practices outlined by Therborn;
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o Hegemony, which includes the entrenching and expansion of an ideological bloc
incorporating elites, as well as consent-making practices.
Epistemologies and orthodoxies
The 10veLife programme is grounded within an implicit epistemology of
quantification and assumptions about behavioural causality that contribute to the
construction of common-sense representations of mY/AIDS and youth in South
Africa. This is further framed through particular orthodoxies in relation to youth
sexual behaviour on the one hand, _and youth identity on the other. The discourse
orientation here, is to insert into discourse, a series of 'self-evident' constructions of
the programme and its context. Used in this way, common sense can be understood
as a process that is related to rationalisation and coherence:
Social actors must always mediate between maintaining a natural
internal coherence and coping with external phenomena, whether
material or social. Thus, the 'common sense' of the social order
(as various ideological formations) may originate in the
collective,. but, if persistent, it is soon internalised in the 'taken-
for-grantedness' of the individual's natural attitude. (Lewis
1992:283)
Quantification
Quantitative epidemiological research has been foregrounded in mY/AIDS research
as a function of the science of epidemiology. In the case of mv/AIDS, epidemiology
involves analysis of the relationship between mv infection patterns, behavioural and
contextual factors (primarily demographic), which are employed to inform public
health strategy. It sets out to identify correlations between contextual risk,
behavioural risk and disease risk and/or infection. In the early phase of the AIDS
epidemic in the United States, for example, epidemiological methods were used to
track the emerging disease amongst gay men with a view to understanding infection
patterns and identifying the infectious agent - a process that led to the 'discovery' of
mv.
Epidemiology is specifically about studying excessive occurrences of disease - and
epidemiological methods are primarily quantitative: "Quantification is a central
activity of epidemiology because the standard epidemiological measures often
require counting the number of cases of disease and examining their distribution
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according to demographic variables such as age, sex and race" (Friis and Sellers
1999: 11). Quantitative and epidemiological research is also generally associated with
a positivist paradigm that emulates the natural sciences, and which in turn constructs
a particular conception of objectivity and truth: "Positivists utilize empirical
methodologies borrowed from the natural sciences to investigate phenomena.
Quantitative strategies serve this positive-science ideal by providing rigorous,
reliable and verifiable large aggregates of data and the statistical testing of empirical
hypotheses" (Berg 2001: 10).
Research in general, and quantitative research in particular is intrinsically ideological
in the sense that it involves aggregation, simplification, and objectification. It can
also be related to the concept of the Panopticon, a concept that encompasses systems
of surveillance that are related to power, and that underpin descriptive knowledge of
the world - a process that shifts human subjects into objects (Foucault 1980).
Quantitative HIV/AIDS research in South Africa has been largely descriptive,
employing large and small-scale surveys focusing on responses to questionnaires
oriented towards understanding knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and practices (KABP).
Quantitative surveys have also extended to gathering HIV and syphilis biomarkers
through surveys of female antenatal clinic attendees (for example, Department of
Health 2002). More recently, surveys have combined HIV surveillance with KABP
approaches (for example, Shisana et al 2002). Such data, and its analysis, is
constrained by the limits of questionnaire-based approaches that allow for only
aggregate rather than individual level understanding. For example, such surveys
cannot explore the diverse reasonings and contextual factors that underpin individual
responses to closed-ended questions. Consequently, quantitative data is only
meaningful at an aggregate level, where responses to questions are analysed
proportionally. Analysis cannot devolve to individual level responses with a view to
addressing why a particular respondent may have answered in a particular way.
Analysis of biomarkers, such as HIV antibodies in blood or saliva, or syphilis
antibodies in blood, can be used to demonstrate a relation to demographic
patternings. Such data is however insufficient, even when combined with KABP
data, to provide understanding specifically how and why infection might have
occurred.22
22 For example, in quantifying HIV prevalence one is measuring infections that may have occurred
up to a decade previously, whilst the behavioural data gathering relates to present behaviours and
practices, which may be considerably removed from previous risk practices.
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KABP findings are largely represented through percentile breakdowns of responses
to particular questionnaire items, and may be linked to demographic categories such
as race, age range, and geographic location, amongst others. Such forms of
quantification mask a range of underlying contextual complexities. For example,
responses to questions are typically presented discretely, such as "56% of white
youth aged 15-19 said they used a condom at last intercourse" but rationale for
particular responses are not gathered. Such rationale may however include a range of
important information such as a respondent not understanding the question clearly or
at all (and responding either yes or no); or purposely misleading the questioner (by,
for example, giving an answer that is known to be socially acceptable); or as a
product of knowing he/she is HIV positive (and therefore using a condom); or
wanting to have a child (and therefore not using a condom), and so on.
Quantitative research may also incorporate processes of deeper correlative analysis -
notably multivariate analysis - which attempts to more closely produce
understanding of causal pathways. It remains however, that causal relationships
cannot be sufficiently demonstrated in many instances given that in real terms the
originating data is limited in scope - particularly in relation to contextual and
cognitive rationale. Consequently, within such research there is an ideological effect
that contributes to masking contexts of material conditions and lived experience in
relation to the epidemic, which renders contradictions invisible.
Quantitative research has been extensively integrated into representational practices
of the 10veLife programme through discourse. Such discourses include implicit and
explicit constructions of social phenomena as quantifiable, whilst at the same time
positioning quantification as offering an explanation of the complexities that
constitute the mY/AIDS epidemic. Within 10veLife, quantification is employed as a
representational practice, and is fundamental to processes of ideological construction
that mask complexity.
Behavioural causality
Cognitive approaches conceptualise human behaviour as a process that is led through
mental intention, whilst behaviourism foregrounds external stimuli:
We think and then act; we have ideas and then put them into
words; we experience feelings and then express them; we intend,
decide and choose to act before acting. Behaviourists, on the
other hand, look at antecedent events in the environment and the
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environment histories of both the species and the individual...
The environment selects behaviour. (Skinner 1985:291)
Cognitive theories of behaviour have been at the forefront of HIV prevention
interventions since the early 1980s and include theories such as the health belief
model (Becker 1974), the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen 1980), the AIDS risk
reduction model (Catania et al 1990), and theories of social learning (Bandura 1986),
amongst others. These theories foreground volitional control over behaviour and
assume, in the case of HIV prevention, that an individual will adopt a number of
strategies to mitigate risk of infection. Cognitive mv prevention strategies include,
for example, choosing not to have sex, choosing to have non-penetrative sex,
choosing to be faithful, choosing to reduce one's number of sexual partners, or
choosing to use a condom. What is masked however, are the complex power
relations that are integral to sexual interaction. Specifically, any act of sex,
consensual or not, involves more than one individual, and sexual activity thus
implicitly involves dynamics of power. In the case of consensual sex, for example,
any conscious mv prevention strategy needs to be referenced to power relations
between sexual partners that reshape the concept of willed behaviour. It is noted in
Parker (2004a:2), for example, that an individual may adopt the strategy of staying
faithful to his/her sexual partner, but still face infection because of an unfaithful
partner; a young person may be coerced or persuaded to engage in sexual activity by
a person older than themselves, towards whom trust and authority is a culturally
determined norm; emotional needs for love, comfort and support may overwhelm
imperatives for mv risk reduction; physical needs for food and shelter may be
exchanged for sex as a matter of survival; desire for material goods such as fashion
items, cell phones or money may foster transactional sexual relationships; fear of
physical violence may influence sexual decision-making within an established
relationship; differential power relationships within the family or within school and
other institutions pose risks for coercion, child sexual abuse and rape; and
fragmented social contexts, along with poor policing and justice systems contribute
to sexual violence and rape. Other contextual factors that influence and exacerbate
mv risk include poverty, unemployment, labour migration, rapid urbanisation, and
war. Thus, in relation to quantitative research, given underlying complexities, causal
pathways between behaviour and mv infection are poorly established.
With regard to the meta-discourses of the 10veLife programme, causal claims have
regularly been made - for example: "Among sexually-experienced young people
who are aware of 10veLife, 69% say 10veLife has caused them to abstain from sex or
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reduce their number of sexual partners; 78% say 10veLife has caused them to use
condoms" (IoveLife 2002c:2). Over and above being based on leading questions,
such propositions are linked to a cognitive-behavioural paradigm that suggests that
'knowing about 10veLife' can be correlated with marked shifts in sexual behaviour
and that this relationship is a causal one. Knowing about 10veLife is decontextualised
from knowledge of other HIV prevention programmes, as well as a wide range of
other contextual factors that may influence behaviour -for example, illness and death
of parents and relatives from AIDS, orphaning, and living in poverty - all of which
give rise to a range of psychosocial needs. Related differentials of power that frame
and determine when and how sex might occur are also overlooked. The construction
of a causal relation to mv prevention through 'knowing about loveLife,23 therefore
masks a range of deeper factors that relate to risk perception and behavioural
response.
Youth, modernity and consumption
Modernity is a social process that has come to be identified with the progressive
globalisation of industrial modes of production that has produced "social divisions
that intersect with, but are not reducible to, class" (Hall, Held and McGrew 1993 :3).
Globalisation is linked to the development of technology and communication
systems that have supported global economic expansion. The concept is viewed by
some as a new world order that "is a benign force leading us ultimately to the era of
converging world incomes... converging institutions as democracy becomes a
cultural norm, and cultural richness as people of different backgrounds interact more
frequently" (Milanovic 2002:2). In other conceptions it has a conspiratorial aspect
whereby globalisation is seen as:
a cover concept for global capitalism and imperialism...
bringing about increased domination and control by the wealthier
overdeveloped nations over the poor underdeveloped countries,
thus increasing the hegemony of the 'haves' over the 'have
nots '... that produces an undermining of democracy, a cultural
homogenisation, and increased destruction of natural species and
the environment. (Kellner 2002:286)
23 In real terms this construction involves fuzzy logic anyway. Any person who had been exposed
once to the programme could answer yes, as could a person exposed repeatedly. Over and above
this aggregation, the notion that simply knowing about the loveLife programme can be translated
into a causal relation to behaviour requires explanation of what constitutes 'knowing' and 'what is
known', and how this might contribute to a causal relation. Validity is constrained as a product of
not providing any form of explanation as to how such a correlation might work in the first place.
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·The economic foundations of globalisation have been perpetuated within the political
framework of neo-liberalism which can be understood as "a broad structure of beliefs
founded on right-wing, yet not conservative, ideas about political democracy,
individual freedom, and the creative potential of individual freedom" (Peet 2002:62).
Whilst the free market approach to global economic expansion has to do with flows
of goods and capital between core and peripheral economies that are held in place by
political and economic structures, globalisation is entrenched by cultural approaches
that seek to homogenise individuals and promote consumerism through mass media
communication channels. Skiair (1999: 158) notes that in poorer regions of the world
the "culture-ideology of consumerism prioritises the exceptional place of
consumption and consumerism in contemporary capitalism, increasing consumption
expectations and aspirations without necessarily ensuring the income to buy". The
ideology of consumption is represented largely through discourses and genres of
advertising, along with endorsement of a consumer-oriented way of life - mainly via
television and film products emanating from the developed world. This extends to
culture industries oriented towards concepts of branding and fashion.
In a report on the state of South Africa's population 2000, the Department of Social
Development recognised the negative consequences of globalisation, noting a shift
from state to market that in South Africa could lead to marginalisation, vulnerability
and poverty:
While some may benefit from these measures [globalisation
trends], they often have an adverse effect on those who are
socially excluded from economic market relations... People
caught up in poverty, or who are at risk of becoming poor, use
the assets available to them, such as family and community
networks and basic resources to fend off the social impact of
globalisation. But when these assets are depleted, the ability of
the poor to cope under adverse conditions diminishes.
(Department ofSocial Development 2000:6)
The 10veLife programme represents youth identity as incorporating reification of
consumption within the framework of globalisation - specifically the consumption of
branded goods and valorisation of global brands and products. For example:
"We'll keep providing the latest issues, info and entertainment
tailor-made for you positive-thinking, info-hungry young go-
getters out there. We'll also look at that catch-phrase we keep
dropping - a positive lifestyle - and what it really means: making
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pOSItive choices, being motivated, believing in the future and
yourself. .. The world's getting smaller and it's time we realise
we're all drivers, not .passengers, on a global journey to good,
healthy living. So start your engines." (S'camtoPrint 2003,
February 2:3)
10veLife publications such as S'camtoPrint integrate discourses on sexual health,
personal reflections, fashion, music, films and the like, interspersed with
advertisements for global and local branded goods, Hollywood films and a general
emphasis on the intersections between global and local:
"Stylish Stepping: Dickies is a hip American clothing and
footwear that's organic, kwaito, pantsula, cross-cultural - and
very cool. Dickies is about expression and culture"; "Wear a
legend: Fubu showed its versatility in 2001 by launching Fubu
Records, followed in 2002 by Fubu Eyewear. So don't expect
Fubu to lay low now - its sweet smell of success will soon be
available countrywide with the debut of Plush fragrances for men
and women. Answer these two questions and you could win... "
(S'camtoPrint 2003, February 2:18)
The construction of youth identity in this way services the ideological function of
homogenisation that masks the diversity and complexity of South African youth. In
relation to consumption, most households in South Africa are unable to dedicate
expenditure to the consumption of costly branded fashion items - items which
typically range in cost from R200 to R700 each. In 2000, for example, 80 percent of
South African households had annual incomes less than R46 221 [R3 851 per
month], and 60 percent had incomes of less than half this amount, R22 509 [RI 875
per month] (Statistics South Africa 2002:28). Additionally, 12-17 year old youth -
the programme's primary target audience - do not ordinarily have independent
access to disposable income for the purposes of intensive consumption of the kind
advocated by loveLife. 24
The relation between consumption and HIV prevention is not clearly defined by
10veLife. Rather, it is positioned as an assumed by-product of a focus the concept of
a 'positive lifestyle', which is positioned in relation to a failure of other programmes
to get young people to internalise personal risk:
24 Children in this age range are typically in school, are unlikely to be employed, and are dependent
on their parents for economic survival. Furthermore, the impacts of HIV/AIDS also exacerbate
youth poverty by virtue of the death or parents and caregivers, and/or the need to care for ill
parents and relatives, and/or the need to provide and care for siblings in the case of orphaning.
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It was thus critical to establish a programme which attracted
young people and with which they wanted to identify and talk
about. Recognition that a major influence on post-liberation
South Africa is the global youth culture of music, fashion, pop
icons and commercial brands led to the positioning of 10veLife
[as] an aspirational lifestyle brand for young South Africans.
(Harrison & Steinberg 2002:4)
The logic of the interrelation between the two constructions is unexplained, and it is
assumed at a common-sense level, that if young people pursue the trappings of
materialist consumption within the paradigm of globalisation, it follows that they
will at the same time pursue self-preservation by preventing their own lIlY infection
through identification with an aspirationallifestyle brand.
Legitimation
Ideologies necessarily involve processes of legitimation that are oriented towards
bringing about and sustaining dominance and expansion. Legitimation has to do with
simplification and reiteration: "Ideologies are the arrangements of political thought
that illuminate the central ideas, overt assumptions and unstated biases that. .. drive
political conduct" (Freeden 2001 :6). Legitimation shifts ideological discourses into
the domain of common sense through focusing on rationalising particular
representations. Legitimation also has to do with reinforcing 'the right to rule',
whether or not that right is a product of consent and/or consensus. In the case of the
10veLife programme, this includes discourses of moral panic, empirical
rationalisations employing quantitative research, and discourses emanating from
within related dominant ideological formations.
Moral panic
Moral panic is an ideological discourse that Hier argues is "a form of moral
regulation ... formulated in terms of a critical conception of ideology which allows
for the discursive [re]production of a sense of phenomenal security through a moral
economy ofharm" (2002:312). Moral panic involves the identification of a threat to a
community or society that is personified through identification with an individual,
group and/or social practice which is advanced through discourse and explicitly or
implicitly infers a call to social action. Moral panic discourses "arise because, as with
all sociological phenomena, threats are culturally and politically constructed, a
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product of the human imagination" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994:151). One aspect of
the ideological dimension of moral panic is that it works from the position of what is
normative, identifying an 'other' who are imbued with negative non-normative
characteristics. Ideological direction is thus given to and 'us-and-them' dichotomy.
Whilst an objectivist position assumes a phenomenological relation to moral panic -
whereby it is related to social conditions such as disease or death, social dysfunction,
conflict, exploitation and social injustice - the constructionist view locates moral
panic in the ideological domain through discursive identification of the threat
constituted by 'the other' and validation of particular pathways to action.
The construction of moral panic has largely been studied in relation to the mass
media and involves the homogenisation of 'the other' as a 'moral threat' to society:
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its
nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the
mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors,
bishops, politicians and other right thinking people; socially
accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways
of coping are evolved or resorted to; the condition then
disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes less visible.
Sometimes the subject of the panic passes over and is forgotten,
except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has
more serious and long lasting repercussions and might produce
such changes as those in legal and social policy or event the way
society conceives of itself. (Cohen 1972:9)
Within the context of the 10veLife programme, youth are identified as 'the other',
and are causally located at the centre of the HIY!AIDS epidemic:
Already more than 4-million South Africans (10% of the
population) are HIV positive. Conservative estimates are that in
excess of 10 million South Africans will die of AIDS in the next 5-
10 years. In the past year the rate of HIV infections among
adolescents aged 15-20 years increased by 65%... failure to
influence the sexual behaviour of this age group will have
incalculable consequences for the scale of the HIV epidemic in
South Africa (loveLifeI999a: 1).
Moral panic thus serves an ideological purpose in drawing attention away from the
specific conditions that contribute to youth vulnerability to HIY - for example,
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coercive sexual encounters framed by high age differentials between sexual partners
(and related adult culpability), and a range of contextual factors including family
breakdown as a product of labour migration, gender disempowerment, and the like
(see Kelly & Parker 2000; Kelly, Ntlabati, Oyosi, van der Riet & Parker 2002a).
Research .discourses
Youth sexual behaviour and youth responses to the 10veLife programme are
overwhelmingly represented through quantitative research. This includes a series of
specific research reports that have been positioned as either informing understanding
of youth at a given point in time, or evaluating responses by youth to the 10veLife
programme. As outlined further above, quantitative research carries with it a
common-sense orthodoxy that is interconnected with the epistemology of natural
science. Within this paradigm, quantitative approaches are understood as a
specialised branch of social science founded on concepts of methodological rigour -
for example, sampling methodologies, standardisation of measures and indicators,
detailed and standardised methods of data collection, statistical tests based on
mathematical formulae, amongst others. (see Friis & Sellers 1999; Becker 1996;
Bryman 1984). Although loveLife surveys draw on the implied rigour and validity of
quantitative research, research activities are at the same time characterised by
inadequate explanations of methodology and narrow interpretations of findings that
are oriented towards valorising the loveLife programme (loveLife 2001a; 10veLife
2002b; Parker 2003a). Similarly, fuzzy logics are evident in claims made in the
programme's monitoring reports (loveLife 2003b) - for example, under the heading
'expanded national and community dialogue and debate' it is stated that
"loveLife attracted considerable independent media coverage
during 2002. The total value of below the line media coverage
received by loveLife was around R29 million... This coverage
[print] was achieved through a total of J195 print articles during
2002, with a total circulation of around 66 million for the whole
of 2002 (all publications combined). Overall, most media
coverage (80% of the value) was estimated to be positive, 20%
negative and 2% neutral. .. The peak in the value ofpositive press
generated in May coincided with the launch of S'camto
GroundBreakers Il. (pJ4-l5)
The concept of 'attracting considerable independent' media attention suggests that
IoveLife is an entity within the South African social formation that is newsworthy
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and that this stimulates journalistic interest. This masks the formal relationships
loveLife has with a range of newspaper groups as well as the organisation's public
relations practices that purposively engage the media through press releases, media
advisories, invitations to events and other activities to generate copy. Additionally, in
the claims outlined above, the volume of articles is quantified to suggest that
combined reach of the publications in which loveLife articles appeared is 66-million
- a total considerably more that the total South African population of 45-million.
This reach is also quantified in monetary terms as R29-million. 25 Absence of
methodological explanation makes it impossible to understand how particular
quantifications were achieved, what judgments were made to reach particular
numerical conclusions, and what qualitative categorisations and judgments were
employed to constitute 'positive' and 'negative' coverage. Masking of
methodological processes shifts the discourse of findings into a common-sense
framework that requires that quantifications be taken at face value and conclusions
legitimated on the basis of an assumed underlying objective scientific method. This
example demonstrates how discourses of quantitative research and implicit validity
and legitimacy are utilised in such a way that they incorporate valorisation and
hyperbole.
Hegemonic consolidation
Joseph (2000: 190) identifies two aspects of hegemony - structural and agential.
Structural hegemony relates to economic and social structures, whilst agential
hegemony "corresponds to the normal understanding of the struggle for dominance,
the application of strategy, the exercise of power, the striving for consent, the
articulation of interests, the construction of blocs and the battle of ideas". Hegemony
thus involves strategic alliances of social groups that allow authority to be exerted
over subordinate groups and it is this aspect of hegemony that relates to developing
positional dominance. This notion adds to an understanding of Gramsci's (1971)
concept of consent, given that hegemony is specifically to do with understanding
particular practices of dominance. Whilst dominant social formations are readily
identified within broader base/superstructure relations, within the context of analysis
of the ideology and hegemonic practices of groups it is useful to explore the concept
of leadership as framed by Gramsci (1971). In this instance, the ideological practice
25 This approach is typically used by public relations agencies. who justify monthly retainers and
fees by providing clients with tabulations of the assumed publicity value of newspaper column
centimetres achieved and suggesting that these have equivalencies to formal advertising.
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of 'leading' through the establishment of inter-relations with existing dominant
formations and groups can be considered as fundamental to establishing dominance
of a particular group.
Elite endorsement and structural linkages
Ideological discourses have to do with particular forms of power and dominance. In
Marxist terms, ideological discourses are constituted within the ruling class through a
range of interactions between the state, capital and related ideological formations.
Studies of the intersections of power within the ruling class have largely been
understood in relation to the politics of power, with Marxists emphasising dynamics
of class, and liberal-pluralists emphasising the dynamics of elites (Higley & Moore
2001). Elites personify structural power - for example, political leaders, leaders
within the civil service, leaders within corporate formations including the mass
media, leaders within educational institutions, all of whom are functional to decision-
making that affects public policy and social process. The concept of elite can be
extended to include what might be termed 'opinion elites' whose capacity to inform
social processes is not specifically embedded within structural formations, but whose
opinions and representations shape and inform world views and political processes -
for example entertainers, religious leaders, academics - whose opinions are valued
within society. Elites may also be located within counter-ideological and counter-
hegemonic processes, whereby leadership is given to ideas and movements within
civil society that contest dominant ideologies and ideological formations.
Elites are important to processes of representation in the sense that particular
discourses devolve to particular individuals by virtue of their structural/elite
positioning. Gramsci sees ideas as 'material forces' and that these are weighted not
numerically, but in terms of who generates them:
'" the expansive and persuasive capacity of the opinions of a few
individuals, the active minorities, the elites, the avant-gardes, etc.
- i.e. their rationality, historicity or concrete functionality. Which
means it is untrue that all individual opinions have 'exactly'
equal weight. (1971:192)
Elite discourses have been widely used to legitimate the 10veLife programme. These
discourses occur within particular historical moments - for example, the launch of
specific components ofthe programme, in relation to research findings, or in relation
to broader commentaries on mY/AIDS in relation to youth. For example, 10veLife
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brochures include statements of elite support alongside overviews of the 10veLife
programme (IoveLife 2002b; 2003a; 2004a)
Elite endorsements are ideological in that they provide a linking relation to other
ideological formations, and in this sense provide the foundations for the linkages that
constitute ideological and hegemonic blocs. Elite endorsements function at the level
of legitimation, but shift into hegemonic discourses as a result of reiteration and
structural/functional linkages to the 10veLife programme. These together provide
support to processes of ideological dominance.
The concept of elites can be linked to analyses of political economy - which can be
defined as "the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually
constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources" (Mosco
1996:25). The political economy of communication is positioned as intersecting
with "dynamic geometries of power embedded in social relations throughout society,
noting that it incorporates "unequal structures of representation" (Mosco 1996:244).
Studies of mass media have linked media representations to dominant ideology as a
result of mass media discourses "amplifying and extending the existing
predispositions that constitute the dominant culture, not [in] creating them", whilst at
the same time being "closely linked to the dominant power structure through
ownership, legal regulation, the values implicit in professional ideologies in the
media, and the structures and ideological consequences of prevailing modes of news
gathering" (Gurevitch et al 1982:14-16). The political economy of the media thus
involves the intersection between analysis of media institutions and institutional
relationships on the one hand, and the construction of particular meanings through
discourse as a result institutionalised practices on the other. This method of analysis
can be applied to other ideological groups. For example, it is necessary to understand
how ideological groups are structured, how they relate to other ideological groups,
and how this structure of alliances is employed in processes of representing,
legitimating and reiterating a particular ideology. It is recognised that ideologies are
never discrete - they are connected to macro-ideologies and parallel superstructural
ideological formations to constitute an ideological bloc that reinforces conditions of
dominance.
The 10veLife programme has been consciously structured in relation to a range of
formations, institutions and organisations including international funding
organisations (Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, Gates Foundation, the Global
Fund for mY/AIDS, TB and Malaria), global institutions (UNICEF, World Health
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Organisation and UNAIDS), the state (South African Government and Department
of Health), local organisations (RHRU, PPASA, HST), media institutions (Sunday
Times, Independent Newspaper Group, SABC, SAfm, Ster Kinekor, Metro FM), and
corporates (Anglo American, Vodacom, Avis, SAA).26 These structured partnerships
form the basis of a hegemonic bloc that allows for a positional dominance of the
10veLife programme. Linkages to elites and other ideological formations are also
constituted through advisory boards and groups that ostensibly provide oversight and
guidance to the programme and it is through these linkages that elites provide
support, endorsement and legitimation of the 10veLife programme. It is through such
linkages that power is derived - given that the related formations, institutions and
organisations are already politically, socially and economically dominant.
Critique and hegemonic consent practices
At the intersection of representation and ideology IS a struggle for meaning.
Ideological meanings are constructed through reiterative discourses that are directed
towards dominance of particular ideas. Dominance is interdependent with common-
sense frameworks (or orthodoxies) that are amplified through discourse practices that
include processes of legitimation, with ideology being reinforced through
structural/functional linkages to parallel dominant ideological
formations/institutions/groups. For Gramsci, domination and leadership are
conscious processes:
The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as
'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social
group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to
'liquidate', or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads
kindred and allied groups... It subsequently becomes dominant
when it exercises power, but if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it
must continue to lead as well. (Gramsci, 1971:57-8)
Although he is referring here to the ascendancy of a social group to a position of
dominance within the state, this conception can be applied to processes of
ascendancy and the managing of hegemonic processes within any ideological group.
The 10veLife programme, through a range of political and structural processes has
assumed (without any broad-based support), intellectual and moral leadership for
mY/AIDS prevention in relation to youth South Africa. This has been entrenched
26 See www.lovelife.org.za. accessed 12 December 2003.
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through a range of structural/functional linkages that are reiterated through
ideological discourse practices.
Ideologies are inherently contradictory, and it follows that in the process of securing
dominance, ideas will be contested. Ideological critique may occur on the surface -
essentially criticism of particular ideas that does not necessarily address fundamental
ideological dimensions. Such critique may take place within the dominant common-
sense framework, so, for example, the 10veLife programme may be critiqued for
fundamental methodological errors or for drawing inappropriate conclusions from
quantitative research data, but not necessarily in relation to the epistemological limits
of quantitative research per se. This differs from deeper levels of critique, which are
centred around unmasking underlying assumptions and contradictions - for example
the orthodoxy of quantitative research, or ideological distortions that are the result of
particular representations (i.e. the unmasking of fundamental contradictions). As
Lears (1985:577) observes: "hegemonic culture depends not on the brainwashing of
'the masses' but on the tendency of public discourse to make some forms of
experience readily available to consciousness, while ignoring or suppressing others".
Critique is a deeper process that takes place outside of the domain of common sense
- it does not defer to common-sense rationale. Some forms of critique are thus
reformative, whilst others are transformative. Deeper levels of critique often involve
a consciously counter-hegemonic orientation that is explicitly (or implicitly)
ideological. Counter-hegemony involves the self same processes that are necessary to
ideological construction and representation - distortions that are the product of
orthodoxies, legitimation reiterated through discourse in combination with the
development of an ideological bloc.
A revolution can be made and defended only through the creation
of widespread popular consent as ci result both of an ideological
struggle and a concrete programme of reforms. A new collective
will is created around a new historical project... weakening the
adversary can only be met by waging a hegemonic struggle, in
which the working class goes beyond an economic-corporate
vision of its task and unites a new historic bloc. (Showstack
Sassoon 1987:221)
Consent is a hegemonic process that involves overcoming both criticism and critique
without devolving to force and violence given that "violence qua violence is highly
unstable, unpredictable and costly" (Fontana 1993: 144).
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Whilst discourse is the process through which consent is achieved, it is also inter-
related with power, and in this sense consent should not be thought of as a passive
process through which ideology is reproduced. In other words, there is a coercive
element located within discourse that is not simply about shifting ideas into the realm
of common sense. Coercive discourse is foregrounded in the techniques and practices
of propaganda, which allow ideas to be weighted in particular ways so as to invoke
power. These include, for example, practices of dominance through discourse
identified by Therborn (1999) and Black (2001) including excommunication,
restriction, shielding, and discourses of legitimation. Processes of consent and
legitimation are weighed in favour of dominant ideologies, and superstructural
ideologies that are linked to them: "Because members of the dominant class largely
control the base or material structures and processes of social relations, they have a
distinct edge in ideological battles. Thus, always underlying the superstructural over-
determination, is the determinacy of the base" (Lewis 1992:281). For Gramsci
(1971), hegemonic consent is linked to leadership and the giving of direction to
social life that is a product of, and a pathway to, ideological dominance.
In relation to the 10veLife programme, critical perspectives may be silenced by
limited access to discourse fora. With a view to understanding the possibility of
latent critical perspectives, a telephone survey was conducted by the Centre for AIDS
Development, Research and Evaluation (CADRE) in 2002. This involved discuss-
ions with 49 individuals holding management positions in governmental and non-
governmental organisations whose functions encompass HIV/AIDS and youth
related work.
27
These responses give insight into the range of perspectives that exist
in relation to the 10veLife programme, and foreground the limitations of critical
perspectives dislocated from the public sphere. Critical perspectives of 10veLife have
also occurred within the public sphere - for example, articles in publications such as
Fair Lady, The Citizen, Noseweek, and the Mail & Guardian.28 Some critiques have
also been brought to the fore through complaints to bodies such as the Advertising
27 Selection was made through identifying youth-oriented HIVIAIDS organisations listed in the
national HIVIAIDS directory. Interviews explored a range of perspectives on the loveLife
programme and respondents were guaranteed anonymity. Interviews were tape-recorded,
transcribed and analysed using qualitative research software. These critiques are analysed in
relation to the ideological aspects of the loveLife programme. Additional information on the
protocol and questions is included in Appendix 1.
28 Noseweek (2003, July) loveLife has SA media against the wall, pp. 12-28; The Citizen (2003, July
29) Lewd loveLife promotes itself - not reduced teen AIDS levels; Smith C (2002, November 29)
The culture of the stick people, Mail & Guardian; Delate R (2003, January) Time to talk about it,
Fair Lady, pp. 32-40.
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Standards Authority, as well as at conferences and other fora, including, for example,
internet discussion groups.29
Critique of ideology is dependent upon access to a range of discourse genres and fora
through which to direct critique. Counter-hegemonic discourses require spaces
within which to locate discourse, yet such spaces are not readily accessible. In the
case of the 10veLife programme, for example, discourses of criticism and critique are
not readily located in the large media groups which have partnered with 10veLife;
government support and funding of the 10veLife programme limits space for
alternate discourses emanating from non-governmental organisations or individuals
located within government structures who are dependent upon political or
government support themselves; and critiques of research findings are interdependent
with appropriate frameworks for delivering critique. It is in this sense that the
knowledge/power relations that are embedded within discourse, can also be
understood as existing beyond discourse, within structural power relations that
provide space to particular discourses whilst excluding others. In effect, ascendant
and dominant ideologies control discourse processes through power that is
determined by imbalanced access to the means to produce and reproduce knowledge.
Methodological considerations
The categorisations above provide a theoretical framework for exploring ideological
dominance of the 10veLife programme - an entity which is produced through a range
of alliances and partnerships and which operates within the context local and global
response to mv/AIDS. The following chapters integrate this theoretical framework
with a range of discourses emanating from the programme; related discourses by
associated elites, and commentaries and discourses emanating from individuals and
groups offering criticism and critique of the programme.
29 See Communication Initiative discussion on HIV /AIDS campaigns in South Africa,
www.cominit.com. retrieved November 2002; Petition against lewd loveLife billboard,




Foucault's concept of episteme refers to historical relations that underpin knowledge
and consequently discourse. Episteme has a generative function - it is the foundation
from which knowledge and discourses are built: "Foucault is at pains to stress than
an episteme is not in itself a form or body of knowledge; it is a structure defining the
conditions that both make knowledge possible and restrict its scope" (Macey
2000: 113). Episteme represents the aspects of knowledge construction that give rise
orthodoxies - standardised and/or dominant ways of viewing the world and of
explaining lived experience and material conditions. Orthodoxies service processes
of ideological masking by virtue of narrowing understanding of social conditions,
and at the same time shifting these narrow frameworks of understanding into
ideological domination through common sense. In the case of 10veLife, three
epistemological orientations have been central to discourses about the programme -
quantification, behavioural causality and youth modernity in relation to consumption.
Discourses of quantification
Quantitative methods of understanding behavioural and social aspects of mv/AIDS
in South Africa are central to discourses of the 10veLife programme. It is through
quantification that the founding assumptions of the programme are laid out, and it is
through quantification that 10veLife's activities and 'impacts' are articulated. The
programme's founding assumptions are grounded in a series of quantitative
assertions - for example: 4-million South Africans are mv positive ... mv infection
amongst youth increased by 65 percent in a year... more than a third of babies
annually are born to mothers under 18 year's of age (IoveLife I999a: 1).
Quantification is central to a range of reports produced by the programme and
quantitative discourses are used to offer analysis of the contemporary mv/AIDS
context (IoveLife 2000c; 2000d; 2001c) as well as the impacts of the 10veLife
programme (IoveLife 2001a; 2002b; 2003a). Quantification is also embedded in
other discourses - for example, the goals of the programme: "loveLife aims to reduce
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the incidence of HIV among 15-20 year olds by 50 percent over the next three to five
years (loveLife 1999a:2); and other quantifications including numbers of partner
organisations, overall budgets, calls to the helpline, estimates of cost-benefit and the
like (loveLife 2003a; Harrison and Steinberg 2002). Quantification is reiterated in a
range of other discourses within genres including events, press releases, media
reports and statements:
If current infection rates continue, halfofall South Africans
below the age of15 could become infected over the next 10 years
(Mail and Guardian 2003,22 May); 10veLife reaches more than
100000 young people a month through youth centres, school
sports, toll free helplines, government clinics and community
bodies (Business Day 2003, 8 August); Surveys showed that eight
in ten youths had heard of it, while over 85% identified 'very
strongly' with its messages. (SAPA 2003, 3 December)
Young people, HIV/AIDS and the 10veLife programme are thus reduced to a
patchwork of numerical descriptors that are put forward as verifiable facts (although
sources and means of verification are seldom mentioned). Reduction to
quantification involves reification through shifting subjects into objects, in the
process, creating a common-sense naturalised framework that sees the complexities
of social life reduced to categories and proportions, whilst allowing for a mythical
discourse framework to be perpetuated:
Because numbers seemingly expel private interests and
ambiguity, they are respected as trustworthy forms of discourse...
Precisely because of their reductive and summative capacities,
numbers are a powerful symbol system. (Peters 2001 :436)
At an ideological level, quantification is used in relation to an explicit explanatory
power - the world of HIV/AIDS and the response via the 10veLife programme can be
ostensibly understood through numbers. Quantification draws on a relation to natural
science that "relies on a presupposition of empirical verification, that is, the notion
that we can rely on our sensory perception of the world to provide us with accurate
data" (Angen 2000:381). In relation to ideology, quantification involves a process of
simplification that masks a complex of underlying conditions and relativities.
Quantification implies a one-to-one relation between discourse and the object of
discourse - and further, a one-to-one relation with lived experience. Quantification is
oriented towards the common-sense frameworks of natural science to which all
individuals are attuned and inclined as a product of the processes of human learning.
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Early processes of learning, for example, include a series of cause and effect
relations that allow for interaction with the world - objects fall to the ground if we
release them, our bodies move as a result of willed actions, we feel pain as our
bodies collide with material objects. It is through this orientation that the logic of
causal relations is readily imposed, and the world of scientific explanations of social
reality are naturalised as we progress through life. We thus have a natural inclination
towards positivism that is rooted in scientific logics, and which, in turn, is readily
imposed on social logics.
Processes of quantification and mathematical measures, reduced to percentages along
narrow indices, divorce understanding of human subjects as constituted through a
complex of social interactions that are interdependent with material conditions.
Quantification can thus be understood as intrinsically ideological, as a 'regime of
truth'. The authority of mathematical constructs, combined with descriptors of
distribution, concentration, probability and projections constitute a 'knowledge' of
the world that is removed from human social interaction: "In this approach to
knowledge constitution, interaction of the objects of study (not subjects) is
unnecessary ... a fact is constituted outside the structure of social relations" (Young
1981: 122). It is in this way that quantification is also related to al ienation - an
alienation from the complex processes that give rise to numbers in the first place:
Postivism attempts to equate the understanding of social reality
with the scientific explanation, prediction and control of natural
reality as practiced by the 'hard' sciences ofphysics, physiology,
chemistry or biology. Using the methods of natural science to
study social relationships and human beings however, requires
that one to reify or make abstract and static living human beings,
necessarily distorting them from the outset. (Kirkpatrick,
Katsiaficas & Emery 1978:7)
A particular feature of the 10veLife programme's quantifYing discourses has been a
general lack of reference to source. Numbers are presented as 'stand-alone' with no
explicit linking of source documents and reports from which they may have
emanated. The matter-of-factness of unsourced quantifications in such discourses
clearly holds considerable power, to the extent that they are not readily critiqued (in
some cases, in spite of obvious inherent illogic). For example, the statement "more
than a third of babies annually are born to mothers under 18 years of age" which is
unreferenced in 10veLife 1999a, is an obvious impossibility, given that female child-
bearing age extends from the mid teens to the mid-forties and only a proportion of
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teenagers are sexually active by the age of 18 - yet this 'fact' has been sustained
through a number of iterations (see loveLife 1999a; 1999b; 2003b). Such data are
readily refuted, though critique of such inaccuracies is not readily inserted into public
discourse, and consequently the claim may survive numerous iterations - i.e. it
becomes 'true' as a product of uncontested reiteration.
In tracing this claim, its first usage can be found in an early loveLife publication - an
overview of the national adolescent-friendly clinic initiative, which states
"Adolescent child bearing is significant with teenage pregnancies representing one
third of all births - 330 per I 000 live births" (loveLife 1999b: 1). It also appears in
the programme's 2002 Communication Strategy (2003b), as "one in three women in
South Africa has given birth before the age of 18". In loveLife 1999b, the statement
is referenced to a government report on social development prepared for the World
Summit on Social Development (Republic of South Africa 1995). Whilst this paper
is not available in public domain, it draws on statistics published in the government
Green Paper entitled "Population Policy for South Africa" (Ministry of Welfare and
Population Development 1995). Here reference is made to the' teenage pregnancy'
rate as "330 per I 000 women under age 19", citing the Copenhagen report as its
source. The number is misquoted in loveLife 1999b as being all births amongst all
women, not the birth rate amongst teenagers, and then is further misrepresented by
shifting the age range from under 19 to under 18 years of age in loveLife 1999a, thus
adding ideological weight to the argument that teenage females are both irrepressibly
sexually active, and at the same sexually irresponsible.
The making of quantitative claims without reference to their historicity also allows a
range of other, more recent studies to be ignored. 3D In this way, statistics more useful
to supporting particular claims are foregrounded, whilst alternate statistics remain
outside the discourse frame over extended periods of time. Similar discourses, with
similar limitations, were identified in Parker (2003:3) - for example, the statement
that "10 million South Africans will die of AIDS in 5-10 years" and "rape, violence
and coercion are common features of adolescent sexual behaviour".
Unreferenced quantitative research data are common to loveLife discourses, and
create an apparent inherent authority - an authority that does not defer to the
academic and research practices of referencing data. Rather, the practice is to appear
all-knowing and beyond reproach by wielding numbers in an authoritative way,
30 For example, the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey, which provides a comprehensive
overview of reproductive health.
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building foundations for arguments that legitimate a particular patteming of solutions
_ and directing attention towards the pathways to solutions claimed up-front by the
10veLife programme. In this way 'truth-claims' are constituted as myth, which then
devolve to common-sense constructions of youth sexuality through reiteration.
Through the utility of quantitative data, there is an opportunity for multiple levels of
ideological masking. At the first level, underlying social processes are hidden
through quantification; at a second level, original sources of data are hidden from
view; at a third level, a particular vision of the context of mY/AIDS in South Africa
is mythologised/' at a fourth level, the 'reality' described is divorced from its
historicity, and at a fifth level, it is only the 10veLife programme that is positioned to
address this 'problem'.
For Barthes, such processes of mythologising remove the capacity to see beneath the
surface:
In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it
abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the
simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any
going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a
world which is without contradictions because it is without depth,
a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a
blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves.
(1993:143)
Discourses of quantification In the 10veLife programme also extend beyond
description of the present, functioning ideologically with references both to the past
and to the future. They are linked explicitly to ideological constructs of social
regulation led by the 10veLife programme. For example, interventions of the 10veLife
programme are positioned as having been set in motion with the aim of bringing
about change in youth sexuality that is constructed in its contemporary form as
imperilling the country as a whole. This is framed by the goal of "aiming to reduce
the incidence of my among 15-20 year olds by 50% over the next three to five
years" through a "brand driven, sustained multidimensional national programme"
(loveLife 1999a:2). It is worth noting that the goal itself, which has an obvious
appeal to funders and policy-makers, becomes the product of shifting iterations to
avoid having to address the failure of achieving a monocausal relation to such a
31 In this example, levels of teenage pregnancy are non-normative, teenagers are immoral and
irresponsible and their behaviour needs to be contained.
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narrowly framed outcome. In later iterations the goal is modified slightly: "loveLife
seeks to cut the mv infection rate among young South Africans by 50 percent"
(loveLife 2002c: 1), which excludes reference to the timeframe, and in an even later
iteration of the 10veLife brochure the goal is repositioned as being "to substantially
reduce the mv infection rate among young South Africans" (loveLife 2003a: 1) -
here without any reference to a 50 percent reduction in prevalence nor a timeframe.
32
In these reiterative but modified constructions, the pattern remains - it is always
some time in the future that the goal will be achieved, with later iterations being
marked by subtle shifts that mask the failure to achieve previously stated goals
within the set timeframes.
These modifications have clearly involved a conscious process during the production
of the 10veLife brochures. In the case of the latter two publications (and a later
iteration in 2004), the text and layout are virtually identical save for minor
modifications to specific sentences such as those described above. Although the 50
percent decline is clearly not readily achievable, attempts are however made in other
discourse genres to preserve the notion that 10veLife is an active causal agent in the
decline of mv in South Africa - for example, 10veLife director, David Harrison, is
quoted in the Sunday Times as stating: "The decline in mv prevalence from over
17% to 14% in teenagers attending antenatal clinics over the past three years,
coupled now with a flattening in incidence33 in 20 to 24 year olds, is encouraging"
(Sunday Times, 2003), whilst a similar construction is also employed in a paper by
Harrison where he compares two non-comparable datasets - antenatal clinic data and
the results of the population-based HIV survey conducted by the HSRC - to suggest
a decline in youth prevalence (Harrison 2003). In both instances, Harrison's analyses
misrepresent the studies to which he refers: The data for under 20 year olds in the
antenatal survey (Department of Health 2003:9) are as follows: 2000 (16.1 %),2001
(15.4%) and 2002 (14.8%) - not a decline of 3 percentage points from 17% to
14% as claimed - but rather a decline of 1.3 percentage points - i.e. less than
half the claimed decline, which Harrison finesses by rounding off percentages in
opposite directions. The Department of Health report also notes that there is an
apparent stabilisation of HIV prevalence between 2001 and 2002, but it does not
conclude that this is a statistically significant change (Department of Health
32 This same statement is repeated in a later version of the loveLife brochure in 2004 (IoveLife
2004a).
33 The claim to incidence reduction cannot be made, given that antenatal data reflect prevalence
only, and incidence is not readily calculated from the data at hand.
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2003:9) - i.e. no conclusion can be drawn from the differences in antenatal
percentages over time as presented in the Department of Health report.
In relation to the second claim, which compares antenatal data and population-
based data, the assumptions are poorly founded. Antenatal studies sample
pregnant females attending antenatal clinics, whilst population-based data sample
a population as a whole. Shisana et al (2002) note that a statistically significant
lower HIY prevalence was found when comparing the 2001 antenatal survey with
the 2002 population-based survey. This was found to be as a result of the survey
showing that: "not all young women are sexually active, as opposed to pregnant
women in the antenatal data, who are by definition practicing unprotected sex"
(Shisana et al 2002:59). In other words, pregnant females (the primary/only
sample in antenatal studies) constitute a risk group that is different to their non-
pregnant peers by virtue of the former being 100 percent sexually active and less
likely to be using condoms, whilst the population-based sample includes females
who are not sexually active, as well as contraceptive users and consistent condom
users - i.e. the surveys are not directly comparable.
Harrison's statement in the Sunday Times is linked to descriptions suggesting the
10veLife programme is contributing to HIY decline. In the paragraphs preceding
the H1Y data, for example, it is stated:
Harrison said of the 16 Y-centres across the country: "We believe
they have had a tremendous impact. Over 50 000 young people in
surrounding schools go through our programmes every year". He
said loveLife had done baseline surveys of self-reported sexual
behaviour and STI and HIV prevalence rates which would enable
them to track their impact. (Sunday Times, 2 November 2003)
Thus, given that 10veLife Y-centres are claimed to interact with 50 000 young
people, and that my prevalence is claimed to have gone down, the implication of a
causal link is established. Within the context of these claims, new frames of meaning
are established. Data on pregnancy amongst teenagers is reformulated and
represented to suggest that teenagers contribute one third of the total of all births, and
further, that it is teenagers under 18 (not 19) who constitute this 'reproductive
miracle'; a relatively small (and not significant) percentage point difference in
antenatal data over three years (16.1%-14.8% = 1.3%), is reformulated and
represented as 3 percentage points; and datasets derived through explicitly different
methodologies are reformulated and represented as directly comparable. These subtle
shifts are directed ideologically to support particular trajectories of claims-making,
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and the utility of quantitative data, by virtue of its implicit relation to scientific
rigour, allows for quantitative claims to be spoken authoritatively and to occupy
terrains that are beyond critique.34
A critical approach to analysis fundamentally requires a process of 'endemic
suspicion' as suggested by Hodge and Kress (1993). Such critique may operate as
much within a given paradigm (in this case, by critiquing claims made whilst
operating within the paradigm quantitative social research) as well as outside the
given paradigm (for example, by critiquing the limitations of the epistemological
underpinnings of quantification as an ideological construct). In the case of the
former, the 10veLife programme's quantitative discourses and assumptions can be
unpacked and unmasked through analysis of the relative 'truth' of numbers in
relation to the 'truthfulness' of their representation. Selective representations have
taken place that have been reproduced in tandem with manipulations of 'facts'
constituted and reiterated apart from their original referents - a process that services
the ideological process legitimation where consent is achieved through the common-
sense authority and implied legitimacy of quantification, combined with authority
derived from a lack of opportunity for antithetical discourses that enter the public
sphere in instances where misrepresentations might be identified. Equally, critique of
representations at this level are relative. In some instances, the difference between
'nitpicking' and serious scientific dispute needs to be borne in mind - i.e. the
differences between allegations of misrepresentation through small manipulations
and allegations of 'scientific fraud' or illegitimate claims-making.
Quantification has the ideological characteristic of appearing value free, of being
objective, of being sufficiently representative of a social totality, of existing in the
present-tense, and of concretising lived experience. Concepts of validity and
reliability in quantitative social research are derived from historical developments in
the 'science' of quantitative research, whereby a history of reflexive critique has
contributed to robust approaches to sampling, development of well defined measures
and indicators, approaches focusing on distancing observer and observed,
introduction of external checking systems, and replication of systems of statistical
analysis that allow for generalisation (Bryman 1984). Any deference to
quantification, ngorous or not, carries with it an assumed relation to scientific
practices of social research that are ideologically bound to systems that are
34 In relation to the shifting description of antenatal data, for example, within which discourse genre
and within which discourse forum would one insert a debate about the minutiae of statistical
distortions and claims?
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considered to be rigorous and methodologically sound. Use of quantification in the
discourses of the 10veLife programme thus carry an implicit relation to scientific
rigour and validity.
Reference to quantitative research is one of a number of quantifying discursive
strategies employed by the 10veLife programme that function ideologically. Forms
include the drawing of quantitative inferences: for example, 10veLife is referred to as
"South Africa's national HIV prevention programme for young people" (loveLife
2002c; 2002a), which infers that 10veLife constitutes the 'numerically' dominant
national response addressing youth prevention. This claim is in contrast to (and
masks) a range of national level programmes address a similar audience in relation to
mv prevention - for example, the Department of Health funded Khomanani
Campaign,35 Soul City,36 and the national school-based lifeskills programme run by
the Departments of Health and Education. Other quantitative inferences include
reach of the programme's activities - "loveLife television programmes broadcast to a
potential weekly audience of six million teens" (loveLife 2002c:4); "nearly four
million school students are eligible to participate in the 10veLife games" (loveLife
2003a:4); as well as current and future plans "loveLife will establish adolescent-
friendly health services in 200 public clinics by 2003, growing to 900 by 2006"
(loveLife 2003a:4). Such quantifications are obvious manipulations that claim
potential rather than actual reach ('potential weekly audience'; 'eligible to
participate'). Equally, future plans are not the same as current operational activities.
Quantification, as a meta-narrative, linked with reiterated quantitative constructions
of the past, present and future, constitutes an ideological frame in service of common
sense. Quantification offers an ideological advantage in that numbers can be utilised
to foster particular emphases and notions of lived experience, and nuanced to provide
ideological direction to particular arguments. This includes a capacity to suggest
cause and effect relations.
Discourses of causality
The science of epidemiology is grounded in concepts of biomedicine that follow a
mechanistic approach to disease. In the case of particular micro-organisms, disease is
35 See www.aidsinfo.co.za. Khomanani is a national campaign commissioned and funded by the
Department of Health, and targeting youth amongst other audiences.
36 Soul City receives some of its funding through government, targets youth, and operates
nationally. See www.soulcity.org.za.
89
reduced to a single causative factor (e.g. germ or virus), or may be attributed to
genetic factors that predispose individuals to disease. It is also recognised that
diseases extend beyond singular causes and that a chain of causality may extend to a
range of social and contextual determinants at the individual or population level.
These are assumed to be potentially demonstrable through empirical modelling
(Weed 2002:440). Although there is some deference to social factors,
epidemiological approaches are largely derived from biomedical assumptions, and
have been critiqued on the basis of having a weak or absent theoretical basis (Shy
1997; McKinlay 1998).
In relation to HIV/AIDS, epidemiology has focused on the concept of behaviour as
being the vector through which disease can be tracked and monitored. This approach
has been widely used to guide public health policy and to develop an understanding
of the impacts of HIV/AIDS interventions. Armstrong notes that epidemiological
criteria of causality emphasise cognitive-biological plausibility over social-
contextual plausibility with the result that, for example:
the rate of AIDS [H/V] is explained by how many sex partners a
woman has, [and] the biomedical perspective is that a woman
has ignorantly or foolishly exposed herself to multiple
opportunities of infection. According to the dominant paradigm, it
will not be considered causally relevant that unemployment and
wage levels of the local economy... mean that engaging in the sex
trade is a woman's best chance for supporting herself ..
(Armstrong 1999:28)
As a consequence of the predominance of this view, policies and interventions have
relied extensively on epidemiology, incorporating an emphasis on concepts of
volitional behaviour change rather than attempting to understand underlying
conditions of inequality and risk that contribute to HIV infection. In a similar way,
campaigns in South African workplaces, largely led by corporates themselves, have
been directed towards increasing awareness and knowledge amongst
migrantworkers, and interventions such as condom promotion and dissemination
whilst underlying economic systems that give rise to HIV risk in the first place are
not considered - notably, separation of families as a product of labour migration,
which structurally influence HIV infection. As Lurie notes:
Too often we have shied away from structural-level interventions
for fear that the problems are so systemic that we cannot have an
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impact. But South Africa needs to decide whether a system that
separates families for extended periods of time is one that should
survive in the new democratic era. Alternatives include
sustainable rural development programmes that offer local
employment opportunities thus mitigating the need to migrate in
the first place. At the same time mining companies in particular
should be making real attempts at providing family-friendly
housing - at present only about 2% of miners live in such
accommodation. (Lurie 2002:12i7
The concept of knowledge within individual behavioural approaches to programming
is also located within particular ideological assumptions - "knowledge means neutral
information with the magic power to change attitudes and behaviours by
'empowering' people to make what seem to be self-evidently wise decisions" (Patton
1990: 1). There is certainly no dearth of campaigns and related interventions
disseminating IIIV/AIDS 'knowledge' in South Africa, amongst other countries, but
as Patton further notes, such systems of knowledge explicitly foreground biomedical
knowledge, emphasising
science-logic over complex folk-logics [that] make people
dependent on the medical bureaucracy and leads to the idea that
information by itself is efficacious in producing behaviour
change... The new scientific knowledges associated with AiDS
research almost perfectly rationalize the systems of social control
which predate them, especially those which silence or distort the
speech and culture of 'minority communities'. (Patton 1990:1-2)
Siedel and Vidal (1997) refer to this as a medico-moral approach to health policy. In
the case of IllV/AIDS, individuals are constructed as ignorant and as being imbued
with an inability to overcome internal drives that result in indulgence in unhealthy
practices. Unhealthy practices are in turn, assumed to be overcome through
individual will as a product of knowledge provision. This is related to the notion of a
'healthy lifestyle' whereby individuals develop a tacit interest in their health and
moderate their activities and behaviours to conform to an ideal state of individual
well-being. This notion is put forward as a central concept within medical sociology:
37 This study explored the HIV status of miners and their partners and it was found that of the
serodiscordant couples (where one was HIV positive and the other HIV negative), a third of cases
involved HIV positive women who had HIV negative partners. This counters the dominant
discourses that construct migrant males as the only vectors of HIV infection, with women as
passive asexual' recipients of infection, whilst also highlighting the breakdown of the family as
an important factor in transmission of HIV.
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Health lifestyles are ways of living that promote good health and
longer life expectancy. Healthy lifestyles include contact with the
medical profession in the case of checkups and seeking of advice,
but the majority of activities take place outside of clinics and
doctors offices. These activities typically consist of choices and
practices concerning a proper diet and food habits, exercise,
weight control, rest and relaxation, and the avoidance of stress,
smoking, drug abuse and the excessive consumption of alcohol...
(Cockerham 1992:82)
The notion of health as a lifestyle has been drawn into 10veLife programme
discourses, and has been structured within an ideological framework that foregrounds
the relationship between knowledge, behaviour and lifestyle. The interface between
these concepts is then located in a range of interventions where it is claimed that
10veLife will (monocausally) halve or reduce HIV prevalence amongst youth. Survey
data is then utilised to bolster the programme's explanatory discourses - for
example, the inter-relation between knowledge and practice: "many still do not know
important facts about the disease and how it is prevented or treated. Moreover, many
sexually active teens are making unsafe choices and hold attitudes that put them at
risk of HIV infection" (IoveLife 2000c:2). Knowledge is put forward as the primary
means of mediating infection, and is further applied to youth as an undifferentiated
risk group who are all assumed to be at similar risk of HIV infection. This patteming
of health knowledge as consumption is problematised by Colquhoun (1997:450):
"[Traditional] research tends to portray young people as simplistic, unthinking
cultural dopes susceptible to the 'health messages' developed by health 'experts' and
consumer messages produced by advertisers". The concept of 'risk group' is noted
by Seidel and Vidal (1997:65) to involve a weak reductionist medico-moral
assumption that favours a singular notion of risk rather than addressing complex
social factors. The discourse of lack of knowledge is interrelated with discourses of
promiscuity and generalised 'inappropriate' behaviour that avoids deeper levels of
understanding of risk and its mediators. As Wallace notes:
Research onfactors influencing transmission of HIV infection has
tended to ignore questions of context, yet each individual
contracting the disease is deeply enmeshed in constraints defined
by socioeconomic, geographic, historical and other contexts.
These constraints may profoundly influence, or even determine,
behaviour patterns associated with risk of acquiring disease, and
can determine the magnitude and risk for a given population.
(1991 :847)
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That risk is sexually mediated, and that youth are predominantly sexually active, has
been a central thesis in 10veLife reports and brochures (loveLife 2000a, 2000c,
2001c, 2002c). These assumptions are related to epidemiological modelling exercises
that construct the idea that half of all youth will become infected with HIV in their
lifetime (loveLife 2000a). This type of modelling - future projection of HIV
infection - has been consistently employed in understanding HIVIAIDS trends, and
has as a result, entered the domain of common sense as a scientifically legitimised
form of crystal ball gazing that produces a range of 'what if scenarios, without
explicitly stating the assumptions made in constructing projections. The emerging
scenarios conclude that massive impacts will occur if immediate action is not taken-
and in this instance, ideological direction is given to the 10veLife intervention as a
primary solution to the problem. Long-term demographic modelling of this kind is an
inexact science at best, and any number of scenarios can be produced, depending
upon assumptions made at the outset. Although in the original study (loveLife
2000c), there is some discussion on the limited basis upon which to make
assumptions from antenatal HIV prevalence data,38 the notion of half of South
Africa's youth becoming HIV positive is widely utilised by 10veLife sans caveats in
subsequent discourses and iterations. Located within the context of the 10veLife
programme, such generalised projections also service the function of suggesting that
all youth are at similar levels of risk. In relation to such background claims, 10veLife
is positioned as the singular programme that can be monocausally linked to changes
in youth behaviour. This claim is regularly implied and reiterated - for example, in
the text and on the cover of a 2002 survey report it is claimed that:
o 62% of all young South Africans know about 10veLife;
o Of those who know about 10veLife 76% say 10veLife has made them more aware
of the risks of unprotected sex; 65% say 10veLife caused them to delay or abstain
from sex;
o 64% of those who know about 10veLife say it has created opportunities for them
to talk to their parents about HIV/AIDS;
38 The 2000 report itself introduces the caveat: "Children and the elderly who are at substantially
lower risk of HIV, are not captured by antenatal surveys. Even among adults in sexually active
age groups, the antenatal survey prevalence figures do not reflect the lower overall risk of men,
people who are less sexually active, and communities using the private sector. However, recent
studies indicate that fertility among HIV -positive women is substantially lower than among
uninfected women, in all but the youngest age groups, and this suggests that the antenatal survey
may in fact underestimate HIV prevalence in women of reproductive age in many communities."
(p.7)
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o Among sexually experienced youth who know about loveLife, 78% say loveLife
has caused them to use a condom; 69% have reduced their number of sexual
partners; 63% say they are more assertive in insisting on condom use (IoveLife
2002b).39
These claims extend to other reports, brochures, conference presentations and media
pronouncements as part of reiterative discourses. 4o The survey itself involves a
manipulation of a number of standardised approaches to evaluative quantitative
research. These include:
o failure to adequately describe or amplify details about sampling methodology;
o use of leading questions to construct a causal relation between 'knowing about
loveLife' and adopting particular points of view or practices;
o failure to contextualise findings in terms of the limitations of either the sampling
methodology or the relative unreliability ofleading questions used in this way;
o failure to contextualise the involvement of the funding body - the Kaiser Family
Foundation - as primary agents in conducting the survey, analysing data and
d · I' I' 41rawmg eva uatlve conc uSlOns.
Most national level surveys secure legitimacy by providing careful explanations of
how respondents were sampled to achieve representivity, how fieldwork was
implemented and how data was managed. This typically requires several pages of
explanation and supportive appendices. In contrast, the 2002 loveLife report limits
such explanation to a single paragraph, providing no information on fieldwork
processes, and including the caveat in relation to sampling that there is a "plus or
minus 2.3 percentage point sampling error for all youth" and for "subsets of
respondents the margin of sampling error is higher".42 This single paragraph
explanation constitutes a significant ideological power, given that the methodology is
untransparent and thus impossible to critique, except in relation to its lack of
39 Some of these statements are also reproduced on the cover of the 2004 10veLife brochure
(loveLife 2004a).
40 For example, this report formed the basis of 10veLife's presentation at the 2002 Barcelona
Intemational AIDS conference and was reported in local and international media. In addition, it is
foregrounded in the 2002, 2003 and 200410veLife brochures.
41 Whilst it is not uncommon for AIDS campaigns and organisations to conduct or to closely
oversee evaluation of their activities, such research necessarily needs to include some reflection
on the biases such an approach might introduce, and state how these were addressed - i.e. a
statement of the limitations of the study in regard to potential bias.
42 This practice occurs in other 10veLife studies as well (loveLife 2000c; 200Ia).
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transparency. Equally, the introduction of the caveat allows for any claim to be
made, given that the caveat can be raised in defence should an indefensible critique
be made. 43
No mention is made of the limitations implicit in research data being analysed by
KFF, the founding funder of the 10veLife programme. In relation to the causal
claims, a somewhat ingenious approach is adopted - asking young people aged 12-
17, in the context of a survey that is obviously about 10veLife, whether 10veLife had
caused them to change, rather than using indirect and comparative measures. This
effectively masks any reference to a multiple and complex chain of causality and
constitutes instead a series of 'leading questions' - i.e. questions that are biased in
that they suggest the preferred or desired answer within the structure of the question.
As such, no inference can ethically be drawn from such a finding (see Taylor-Powell
1998). Equally, the question is asked only of a causal relation to 10veLife, and not to
a range of other programmes also targeting youth (e.g. Soul City, Khomanani). No
reservations are put forward in the 10veLife survey report to indicate the ethical
limitations ofthe questions posed.
Such findings have utility beyond the framework of public discourse. For example,
they were contained in a proposal for $68-million for youth friendly clinics and
related programme activities made in the first round of proposals to the Global Fund
for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). Although reviewed by a panel
of technical experts in the form of a Technical Review Panel, it appears that the
limits of causal claims were not a matter of concern, given that the proposal was both
successful, and also amongst the top five highest grants made globally for mY/AIDS
in round one. Related arguments for massive levels of funding for the 10veLife
programme are put forward as being linked to the pressing need to move quickly
without needing to consider any absolute proof that the programme is effective:
LoveLife estimates that it requires $40 million per annum ($6.6
per 12-17 year old) to fund its national HIV prevention
programme at optimal levels and a conservative estimate of
economic benefit to economic costs is (1.4-1.9):1 ... Although
definitive proof of success is significant reduction in HIV rates
43 There were disproportionate levels of youth within the survey who had heard about 10veLife
through channels that were not widely available at national level - for example, 23% heard about
10veLife from a Y-centre, yet there were no more than seven functioning Y-centres located in
communities nationwide at the time of the survey. This imbalance suggests that it is highly
unlikely that the sample was nationally representative (Parker 2003).
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among young people, we cannot wait for final confirmation.
(Harrison and Steinberg 2002:4)
In this way causal discourses have a structural effect relating to dominance - in this
case, such claims are utilised to secure funding. Securing funding, in turn produces a
related structural power.
Discourses of youth, modernity and consumption
Capitalism and globalisation are intertwined - a process recognised by Marx and
Engels in the Communist Manifesto long before the term globalisation was put
forward: 44
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing
the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of
production, and with them the whole relations of society... The
need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the
bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.
(2000:5-6)
This world market IS translated into a system of exploitation that gives "a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country" that
redefines needs: "In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the
country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant
lands and climes... we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-
dependence of nations" (Marx & Engels 2000:6).
The ideological effects of mass cultures of consumption, which include
homogenisation and alienation through consumption of entertainment and
material goods, were explored by the Frankfurt School in the United States and
were linked to the decentring of class identity. As Berger notes, the purpose of
the culture industry was "to manipulate the consciousness of the masses so as to
maintain current social, economic and political institutions" (Berger 1995:45). It
is through the reification of consumer products that symbolic relations to
identity are constructed, and it is in this context that the focus on particular
forms of 'leisure' activity and the consumption of branded consumer goods,
44 In this instance, global capitalism is framed within the notion of bourgeois imperialism.
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which are marketed to elevate their relation to the status of the individual,
translate into alienation from lived experience:
The focus on leisure pursuits and private expenditures breeds
privatism, selfishness, and reluctance to take care of social needs
and to spend money in the public realm. Capitalism... is not
simply an economic system, but a kind of culture in which
everything is subordinated to consumption. (Berger 1995:55)
The loveLife programme explicitly fosters inter-relations between individualism,
materialism and consumption that are encapsulated within the concept of a 'healthy
lifestyle', with the assumption that HIV prevention and other social ills intersect
with, and are moderated by, aspiration to materialism:
Despite HIVIAlDS and other social problems such as poverty or
unemployment, surveys consistently show that young South
Africans are highly optimistic about their futures. 10veLife's
message reflects this powerful optimism, motivating young people
to accept sexual responsibility as an essential part of a healthy
lifestyle that will help them to achieve their goals and aspirations.
(loveLife 2003a:5)
In other words, armed with 'aspiration' and 'optimism' it is assumed to be possible
to float over the exigencies of HIVIAIDS, poverty, unemployment, and other social
problems to sustain a 'healthy lifestyle' (See Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Aspiration and consumption as represented in S'camtoPrint
45
This notion IS connected to particular constructions of health that locate
individualism at the centre, and this in turn, is constructed as something that can be
consumed. Cockerham, for example, outlines the concept of healthy lifestyle in terms
of Weber's categories: " 'Stiliseierung des Lebens' (stylisation of lifestyle),
'LebensjUrung' (life conduct), and 'Lebenschancen' (life chances)" (1992:83-84).
This view recognises that life chances are related to "the probability of fmding
satisfaction for interests, wants and needs", which are interconnected with being
located within upper and middle-level socioeconomic groups. The 10veLife
programme is implicitly located in a paradigm that foregrounds knowledge and
individual responsibility as primary areas of intervention building on youth
45 S 'camtoPrint (2002, September I) Spring in your step, p. 8.
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optimism46 irrespective of material conditions, and it is on this basis that the
programme incorporates a range of knowledge-based interventions that seek to
"encourage more open discussion about sexuality and the connection between sexual
behaviour and sexual health problems such as mv" (2002c:5). This conception is
located within a 'lifestyle' of consumption that blends interests in fashion and
branded consumer items with the concept of improving life chances. This is in
contrast to historical trajectories of South African youth. Township youth post the
Soweto uprisings of 1976, symbolised a so-called 'lost generation', who were both
deeply entrenched within the political struggle and deeply affected by it. They were
commonly represented as a generation for whom "violence and cruelty were the
norm, coupled with the destruction of their own education and prospects" (Everatt
2000). There has, however, been a rapid transition from this vision of youth to the
location of youth within paradigms of consumption, as 'the hottest target market for
advertisers'. As Everatt (2000) notes of the post-revolutionary period: "The
transformation was complete. The feared foot-soldiers of the revolution had been put
in their place and moulded to fit the new, consumption-driven capitalist South
Africa". Pessimism about youth was thus readily converted into an understanding of
their potential as a new market that could be integrated into a local economy that was
also, after years of economic isolation, being rapidly integrated into the global
economy.47 The implications of this consumer ideology - the mediation of existence
and consciousness in the present tense - divorces subjects from the developmental
potentials of historical reflection, promoting instead a view of the world that is
constantly looking towards the future through the lens of regulated commodity
fetishism.
The vision of South African youth as hedonistic consumers runs counter to
paradigms of youth framed by concepts of youth development. For example, in the
early post-apartheid era, a community-centred mobilisation through the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was intended to overturn the
inequalities of apartheid. The role for youth was envisioned as embedded within the
concept of community development and social purpose:
46 "Be there in 2010" is an example of a slogan linking the forthcoming world cup soccer event,
scheduled to be held in South Africa in 2010.
47 More recently, and in particular, through neo-liberal policies such as the New Partnership for
African Development (Nepad). As Taylor and Vale (2000: 413) note: " ... the neo-Iiberal
economic solutions which have been chosen for South Africa's future advance the single idea of
redistribution in the economy which continues to display the symptoms of white wealth and black
poverty, the same structure which marked the country's unhappy past".
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Youth development... must focus on education and training, job
creation, and enabling young people to realize their full
potential. .. It must restore the hope of our youth in the future, and
in their capacity to channel their resourcefulness and energy into
reconstruction and development. (ANC 1994:73)
The RDP however, was rapidly subsumed into a range of neoliberal economic
policies - notably the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR)
and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). As Peet notes, a
"drastic reorientation from growth through redistribution to redistribution through
growth as a process of colonisation: internal discursive processes articulated with and
were disciplined by external discursive, political and financial pressures" (2002:55).
Such shifts in discourses of economic development provided a space for the
affirmation of post-apartheid youth as consumers, connected to global visions of
youth:
... the idea of the global teen market - a kaleidoscope of multi-
ethnic faces blending into one another: Rasta braids, pink hair,
henna hand painting, piercing and tattoos... Global youth
marketing is a mind-numbingly repetitive affair, drunk on the
idea of what it is attempting to engineer: a third notion of
nationality - not American, not local, but one that would unite the
two, through shopping. (Klein 2001:120)
10veLife feeds directly into this global youth marketing discourse, arguing in its
promotional brochures and related reports that this form of identification provides a
logical path to my prevention, whilst at the same time intersecting with and actively
promoting the very same celebration of multi-ethnic homogenised vision of youth
consumption fashion, global brands, and Hollywood movies described by Klein
(IoveLife 2003a; Harrison and Steinberg 2002).48 It is also suggested that this vision
can be applied to all youth: "It's an amazing time to be a teenager growing up in
South Africa. We have it better than any previous generation of South Africans.
Better education, more opportunities and greater access to a huge and exciting global
community" (S 'camto Uncut 2004: 1).49 This view of South African youth transcends
geographic location or other heterogeneities: " ... a youth market that is more media
48 For example, predominantly Hollywood films are promoted via loveLife's partnership with local
distributor, Ster Kinekor (S'camtoPrint, 2003, February 2, p. 16); high cost fashions are
advertised directly as part of feature articles on fashion: "Ntombi wears a lace off-shoulder top
(R799) and denim skirt (R599) from Nicci Boutiques; and competitions feature brands such as
Diesel, Soviet and Revlon (S'camtoPrint, 2002, April 7; April 21). See also Figure 3.
49 loveLife (2004, February 10) S'camto uncut, Issue I.
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savvy and brand conscious than any prevIOus generation in an intensively
competitive national marketing milieu with penetration into the remotest parts of
South Africa" (loveLife website, 2003).50 The interlinked discourses of youth
homogeneity relating to consumption, sexuality and sexual choices that are combined
in the concept of a 'positive lifestyle' and which recur in various discourse genres,
mask the complexities of living in poverty as well as cultural and linguistic
diversities, disparities of relative power, and a range of structural conditions that
limit the capacity of youth to determine their future and their risk to mv infection.
As Kelly et al note:
In spite of whatever homogenising forces may impact on young
people, the mediators which underlie these differences [locality,
socio-economic status, educational level, age, gender and
physical capacity, amongst other characteristics), continue to
impact in a major way on HIV vulnerability and response.
(2002a:8)
The 10veLife programme's universal vision of youth and its intersections with global
culture may also be culturally alienating and unproductive for youth - particularly
youth living in conditions of poverty. For example, in a survey by Naidoo in Orange
Farm, where 10veLife has a Y-Centre one youth resident noted:
... already it is the adoption of American sports and then at the
same time now they start behaving like Americans... The whole
thing is actually destructive in terms of culture. Because at the
end of the day, you'll see people aping the very same Americans -
the language they speak and so on, irrespective of whether that is
the right word to say or whatever, the just say it because they are
trying to emulate someone else. (2003:15)
Epistemological critiques as method
There has been surprisingly little attempt in mv/AIDS sociological research, to
constitute critical theoretical frameworks for understanding the epidemic. Much
research remains grounded in epidemiological and public health approaches that rely
heavily on quantitative description with theoretical frameworks implicitly or
explicitly deferring to cognitive theories of behaviour, or generally positivist
modalities of thinking. A literature review exploring young people and mY/AIDS
50 www.lovelife.org.za. accessed 8 February 2003.
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conducted by Kelly, Parker and Oyosi (2002b), for example, reveals a predominance
of quantitative research, with qualitative studies centred largely within cognitive and
descriptive paradigms of human behaviour. As Kelly et alnote:
Many of the models which dominated the first decade of social
science research into AIDS are premised on the assumption that
individual reason is a necessary element in the chain of events
leading to behavioural outcomes... These models tend to
downplay the social and cultural character of behaviour.
(2002b:72)
Ideological framing of problems and solutions has devolved to a combination of
quantitative approaches largely located within paradigms of epidemiology, combined
with cognitive behavioural frameworks linked to consumption. These approaches
have become the dominant orthodoxies through which the emerging HJV/AIDS
epidemic has been understood, and emerging knowledge has consequently been
consolidated in a stepwise fashion within this ideological frame.
The relative power of the quantitative episteme is that it confers ideological power to
the point that numbers can be adapted to fit particular constructions - for example,
the heightened hyperbole achieved through misrepresentation that includes omission
of references to original sources,5l massaging of numbers upward or downward,52
and reframing of numbers when their temporal dimensions,53 are limiting. Similarly,
concepts of causality outlined and supported by 'evaluation' of the loveLife
programme reinforce assumptions of linear causal relations between interventions
and responses at the same time masking of all interventions targeting youth with the
exception of loveLife. Related constructions of the importance of an individualised
'positive lifestyle' as having a positive correlation with HJV prevention removes
from view the underpinning structural conditions of poverty and disempowerment
that mitigate against choice-making in relation to HJV prevention. 10veLife's
discourse of causality is also interlinked with the propaganda function of valorising
the programme - both at its outset where claims are made about what will be
achieved, and, as the implementation of the programme progresses, where claims are
made about 'impacts' and 'achievements'. Such claims work at the edge of particular
scientific discourses, obtaining validation and power from the historical
51 For example, teenage pregnancy rates.
52 For example, Harrison's subtle doubling of antenatal shifts from 1.3% to 3%.
53 For example, the reframing of loveLife's objective of halving prevalence in three to five years to
less explicit reductions over longer or unstated timeframes.
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developments of scientific disciplines (for example, the development and validation
of methodologies of sampling and survey research), whilst at the same time applying
simplification by representing methodological processes 'in summary' and claiming
causal impacts through the use of methodologically inadequate leading questions.
These claims run in parallel to discourses suggesting the programme has a deep
understanding of South African youth identity (which is presented as homogenous),
whilst at the same time constructing such identity through linkages with
consumption and globalisation and masking the structural conditions and




Legitimation is a rationalising process sustained through reiteration of reasonings
and ways of understanding a particular problem incorporating the framing of
particular solutions in response. It involves arguments for, and justifications of,
particular courses of action drawing on a range of strategies that have to do with
elevating particular ideas as valid. Foucault's concept of epistemic communities is
also related to legitimation. For example, elites who have an "authoritative claim to
policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas 1992:23) are an
important part of legitimating discourses:
Epistemic communities are conceptualised and defined as thought
communities (Denkgemeinshajt), made up of socially recognised
knowledge-based networks, the members of which share a
common understanding of a particular problem/issue or a
common world-view and seek to translate their beliefs into
dominant social discourse and social practice. These thought
communities might be local, national or transnational.
(Antoniades 2003:26)
In relation to social policy, epistemic communities assume authority to speak to
particular social conditions and to construct solutions. The concept of the episteme
then, can be applied to discourses occurring across genres and emanating from
sources including elite individuals and organisations, who/which reiterate similar
points of view. Legitimation is also conferred via particular orthodoxies - as has
been described, orthodox assumptions underpinning the validity of quantification as
a means for understanding the intersections of HIV/AIDS behaviour; concepts of
causality related to the relationship between knowledge and action; and the
naturalising of globalisation and consumption as pathways to a healthy lifestyle. In
this chapter the ideological trajectories of these orthodoxies are further explored.
Quantification, causality and constructions of youth intersect in a range of
legitimating ideological practices. Moral panic is an ideological approach that has
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the ideological function of framing causal pathways. It includes constructions of the
amoral 'other' and incorporates both quantitative and causal orthodoxies within such
constructions. Evaluative research is another ideological strategy that is equally
underpinned by logics that are interdependent with quantification and reifying
particular assumptions about causal pathways, whilst elite endorsements and
structural linkages integrate common-sense constructions with a view to influencing
public policy.
Hegemony involves two interconnected processes - the development of an
ideological bloc that consolidates power through structural linkages between elite
individuals and the groups they represent, and practices that are functional to
dominance. Hegemony through discourse however, is primarily related to consent,
whilst other ideological practices incorporate masking of contradictions through
reiteration or attempting to undermine counter-ideological discourses.
Moral panic and legitimation
The concept of moral panic involves construction of a causal relation to a social
'problem' that identifies a particular group as a threat to society. In Cohen's (1972)
terms, moral panic is a transitory phenomenon that relies on stereotypical
representations against which a range of elites position responses, and which may
lead to sustained processes of regulation. In Policing the Crisis, Hall et al (1978: 17)
note that regulation involves a "shift of attention from the deviant act. .. treated in
isolation, to the relation between the deviant act and the reaction of the public and
the control agencies to the act". Moral panic involves a disproportional emphasis on
a particular group or event whereby:
the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of
events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when
'experts', in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians
and editors perceive the threat in identical terms, and appear to
talk 'with one voice' of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and
solutions... (Hall et aI1978:16)
Moral panic includes convergence of events with various stereotypical constructions
of the non-normative 'other'. In Britain, for example, a relatively small number of
instances of mugging became conflated and amplified through state and media
discourses into converging representations of youth, race and crime:
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Where convergence between two or more social elements occurs,
the possibility is created for a process of amplification in which
the significance of the threat or danger is increased or
enhanced... The amplification engendered around mugging
resulted in a dispersed set of anxieties 'coming together'. 'Race'
became a major theme through which authoritarian responses to
issues of social order were articulated. Race figured in the
political vernacular since the muggings were committed, or were
presented as being committed, by black males. Race also became
associated with 'youth' since the offenders tended to be young
teenage males while their victims were elderly. (Hunt 1999:512)
Moral panic is a type of myth. It functions at the connotative level, separating
historical moments from their historicity, inflating particular aspects of the 'moment'
whilst masking others. Myth involves a "privation of history: [it] deprives the object
of which it speaks of all history. In it, history evaporates. It is a kind of ideal servant:
it prepares all things, brings them, lays them out, the master arrives, it silently
disappears ... " (Barthes 1993: 151). The ideological function of moral panic is
legitimation through the implication of truthfulness about particular social events and
moments in history, which in turn serve longer-term process of ideological
domination. The 'object' of moral panic may be derived from an event or analysis of
a singular social phenomenon that is rapidly devolved into generalisation.
Mythologies of moral panic construct preferred readings that are achieved both
through the mythological matter-of-factness of the descriptive construction of a
social problem, as well as through reiteration that gives rise to: "a specific cultural-
social formation in which strategies encoded into the text attempt to define the ways
audiences bring these texts to bear on their own social experiences - according to the
encoded preferred reading" (Grossberg 1984:403).
Moral panic serves as an ideological vehicle, a particular form of discourse, that
constructs problems through amplifying and reiterating certain perspectives whilst
masking others, incorporating discourses that direct attention towards particular
'solutions' or forms of social regulation. McRobbie and Thornton (1995:562) argue
that moral panics are vehicles of dominance which function hegemonically by
"orchestrating consent, by actively intervening in the space of public opinion and
social consciousness through the use of highly emotive and rhetorical language
which has the effect of requiring that 'something be done about it' ... The moral
panic then becomes the envoy for dominant ideology". Moral panics do not
necessarily bring about tangible changes within their historical moment, but they
106
may service processes of social regulation in the long run. In relation to Policing the
crisis, Hier notes that there is the development of
a more integrated understanding of moral panic as an envoy of
the dominant ideology, geared towards the consolidation of
hegemony conceived of through the discursive regulatory
apparatus of law and order, which taps into civil society anxieties
and which deflects attention from the real crises of the capitalist
mode ofproduction. (2002:321)
Analyses of moral panic have been widely applied to a range of social groups and
'behaviours' including, amongst others, constructions of mods and rockers (Cohen
1972), mugging (Hall et al 1978), ritual child abuse (Victor 1998), and paedophilia
(Chritcher 2002). Mass media (i.e. news media), are considered central to the process
of articulating moral panic - usually functioning in concert with social formations
including the state, civic groups and other elites. Moral panic is thus seen as "a
process [through] which politicians, commercial promoters and media habitually
attempt to incite" (McRobbie & Thornton 1995:560). It does not necessarily follow
however, that moral panic discourses specifically have to occur within the mass
media. In the context of HIV/AIDS, moral panic may be used to frame arguments
within discourse genres other than news media channels - for example, funding
proposals, reports, or brochures. Such genres have a greater potential to foster
legitimation, given that they are situated within self-contained (closed) spheres of
discourse as opposed to the (relatively) public sphere of mass media. The former
process is defined by Therborn (1999) as a 'delimited appropriation of discourse'
whereby there is a restriction on critique. In the public sphere, moral panic
discourses may be subject to 'aberrant' decoding and critique (Fiske 2000), whereas
closed discourse genres offer greater potential to fix meaning and limit aberrant
decoding.
Promiscuity and youth
Moral panic is, in essence, a method of rhetoric that serves the ideological function
of constructing a world-view in conjunction with a course of action. mY/AIDS and
moral panic have been linked through discourses of promiscuity and 'risk groups'
since the beginning of the epidemic. In the early 1980s, mv/AIDS was constructed
causally in direct relation to homosexual promiscuity. As the epidemic progressed,
discourses of promiscuity were extended to other 'risk groups' which were
homogenised by virtue of their social and sexual practices - notably prostitution,
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intravenous drug use, migrant work and truck driving as well as ethnicity. As Bolton
observes:
promiscuity stands out as the key concept, dominating and linking
together diverse genres of thought and discourse about AIDS.
Sometimes it is in the foreground, its presence explicit, even
shrill, constituting the core of the discourse, the central symbol or
variable around which the facts of AIDS are organized and
interpreted. At other times it is in the background, its presence
more subtle, sotto voce, quiet, implicit. (1992:145)
Promiscuity is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as "indis-criminate ...
having sexual relations not limited by marriage or cohabitation ... casual, carelessly
irregular" (1979:888). Historically associated with a non-normative sexual drive,
promiscuity has taken on a new weighting in the era of AIDS through an association
with individual risk. Promiscuous individuals are seen to widen the pool of infection
and are identified as the root cause of AIDS as a social problem. Since the early
1990s however, the 'risk group' aetiology ofHIV/AIDS has shifted from the margins
of particular contexts of infection to a focus on less homogenous groups. There has
. been a particular emphasis on youth, reinforced by the supposed propensities of
youth for risk-taking in general, and sexual risk-taking in particular. These discourses
are central to an explanatory model for youth vulnerability to HIV, and as Warwick
and Aggleton found, this construction is pervasive in research studies focusing on
youth and HIV/AIDS:
Most usually seek to identify in 'adolescents' (as young people in
these studies are invariably called), certain qualities which are
likely to render the person concerned particularly vulnerable to
HIV infection and AIDS. These qualities often include emotional
instability, a propensity to sexual experimentation, risk-taking,
alcohol abuse and an involvement with illicit drugs. These
attributes are often assumed to inhere quite unproblematically in
all 'adolescents', but more especially in street youth, working
class youth, college students and young people from minority
ethnic communities. (2000:89)
As a consequence, discourses about young people put forward a dangerous sexual
pathology that presents as "a priori and without question, the view that young people
as a group are unknowledgeable, irresponsible in their relationships with others,
immature and easily led" (Warwick and Aggleton 2000:99).
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Wit~in the context of the 10veLife programme, the moral panic rhetoric is regularly
invoked through conflation and exaggeration of teenage promiscuity. For example:
LoveLife's design responds to the fact that the sexual behaviour
of teenagers drives the epidemic in South Africa. This assertion is
based on the large proportion of the South African population
that are under the age of 20 years (40%), a significant number of
whom report high-risk sexual behaviour... (Harrison and
Steinberg 2002:2-3)
In this instance, the rhetoric of youth 'driving the epidemic' positions youth
culpability as a legitimate construction of causality in relation to mY/AIDS and
draws on statistics to reinforce this view. The statistical positioning above conflates
teenagers with all young people below the age of 20, described as 40% of the
population and three quarters of whom range in age from 0-14 and are highly
unlikely to be engaging in 'high risk sexual behaviour'. Even older youth are not
uniformly at risk during their adolescence. 54 As a moral panic construction however,
this conflation drums up the proportions of young people at risk, reinforcing the
notion that all young people can be lumped together irrespective of age and other
demographic, economic and cultural factors. 55
The notion of widespread generalised risk, with similar conflations, is also invoked
in other discourses. For example, the notion that 50% of youth will become my
positive reinforces youth as a 'driving force' of the epidemic and underpins
10veLife's 'Be there for 2010' campaign (Figure 4) through the inference that 'being'
there is a product of not having died of AIDS. The campaign suggests that my risk
is massive and that half of young people will be dead or HIY positive by the time of
South Africa hosts the 2010 soccer World Cup:
Practically every South African in this sports crazeee (sic)
country of ours would love to be there... but by 2010 more than 8
million South Africans are likely to be HIV infected, and about 5
million will already have died. If you are under 20 years of age
54 For example, loveLife's own survey shows only 48% of South African youth aged 15-19 stated
that they had ever had sex (Pettifor et aI2004:37).
55 Risk to HIV infection is relative to exposure to sexual partners who are HIV positive, and this is
more likely to be related to exposure to older persons who have had more sexual partners and
have been sexually active over longer periods of time - i.e. older youth and adults. Young women
in South Africa have been noted to generally have partners older than themselves (Kelly & Parker
2000; Pettifor et a12004) and the mean age difference between females and their most recent
sexual partner was found in one study to be four years older, and 6% of females had a partner 10
or more years older than themselves (Pettifor et aI2004:44).
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today, odds are even that you will be one of the 8 million HIV
infected in 2010 ... (S'camtoPrint, 17 August 2003: 17)
Figure 4: 'Love to be there' campaign poster
This construction of widespread risk to youth under 20 is based on modelling of the
HIV epidemic commissioned by loveLife.56 As has been noted, modelling is relative
to underpinning assumptions, and optimistic or pessimistic slants and assumptions
can be incorporated into any modelling exercise. In the examples discussed above,
quantification used to justify constructions of the scale of 'the problem' and its
consequences - a characteristic of moral panic discourses highlighted by Hall et at
(1978). In the case of mugging in Britain, statistics were decontextualised and
manipulated within the framework of moral panic and has Hall et at (1978:10-17)
observe: "We think it requires to be explained why and how the weak and confused
statistical evidence came to be converted into such hard and massively publicised
facts and figures".
Moral panic discourses are argued to be short-lived, largely invoking debate at a
particular point in history, and then subsiding (Goode and Ben-Yahuda 1994; Ungar
2001). However, moral panic may also be reiterative over time. For example, in
2003, a national billboard campaign utilised the image of black male torso embraced
by multi-hued arms and hands was presented alongside the slogan "Everyone he's
56 This study is referred to in Harrison and Steinberg (2002), but is not available in the public
domain.
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slept with, is sleeping with you" whilst another positioned females as sexually
predatory "One roll-on all women want" (Figure 5). In both instances, the myth of
youth promiscuity is reinforced, with attribution of blame oriented towards male
youth (specifically black male youth in the first instance) and a black female in the
second and females as irrepressibly sexually wanton in both. These themes and
images resonate with constructions in the early part of the loveLife programme, and
are regularly reiterated through research and other discourses over time. Moral panic
thus services an ideological end of legitimating the 10veLife programme by
positioning 10veLife as regulating irrepressible youth sexuality.
Figure 5: loveLife billboards
One roll-on all women
want
Evaluation and legitimation
The process of evaluation involves assessment of concepts and interventions with a
view to establishing the potential or actual relationship between activities and their
outcomes. Approaches to evaluation include formative evaluation, which explores
goals and assumptions of the intervention; process evaluation, which involves
ongoing analysis and reflection during the period of intervention; outcome
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evaluation, which involves analysis of the consequences specific to the intervention
in relation to specific indicators; impact evaluation, which analyses the degree to
which the programme's objectives have been met; and economic evaluation, which
involves cost-benefit analysis of the intervention (see Mantell, DiVittis & Auerbach
1997, Gentry, Gilliam, Hotgrave & Sy 2002). Evaluation is directly linked to policy
and strategy, and provides guidance as to whether activities and programmes are
meeting stated objectives, whether they should be continued in their present form, or
whether they should be modified or discontinued. In relation to mv prevention
programmes, policy questions include behavioural impacts (short and long-term),
mv incidence reduction, replicability, generalisability, cost effectiveness, emphasis
in relation to spending on other diseases or emphasis on particular communities
versus others (Holtgrave 2002). In the early phases of the HIVIAIDS epidemic there
were often only a limited number of interventions addressing mv prevention. These
interventions engaged relatively well-defined and geographically contained 'target'
groups, with the result that it was possible to define, monitor and evaluate
interventions directly against programmatic inputs, and to draw conclusions
accordingly (see Mantell et a11997; Gillies 1998).
In the context of a generalised mv epidemic however, there is a wider complex of
mechanisms that relate to individual perceptions of the epidemic, and over and above
interventions there are other discourses and experiences that frame individual
constructions and responses to the epidemic. These include internal psychological
processes; interaction with others through dialogue; sense-making that includes a
location in socio-cultural responses to the epidemic; knowing a person who is mv
positive or who has died of AIDS; being mv positive oneself, and so on. This is
described in Table 1 below, in relation to communication.
112
Table 1: Forms of HIVIAIDS communication
ACTIVITY COMMUNICATION COMPONENT EXAMPLES
Mass Media HIV/AIDS · Television programming and Typically conducted by government and NGOs,
Campaigns (purposive) advertisements but including purposive activities of broadcasters
· Radio programming and and other media formations
advertisements · HIV/AIDS related advertisements
· Print articles and advertisements · HIV/AIDS related dramas, documentaries,
Outdoor signage
features· · HIV/AIDS related columns, talk shows· HIV/AIDS related sloqans, sonqs
Mass Media content · Television programming · HIV/AIDS content within news dramas,
(non-purposive) · Radio programming documentaries, features· HIV/AIDS content within columns, talk shows,· Print articles letters pages
HIV/AIDS small media · Leaflets, brochures, booklets, Typically produced as part of HIV/AIDS campaigns
books or awareness activities
· Exhibitions, flip charts, stickers, · HIV/AIDS related leaflets, brochures, booklets,
posters, signs, murals books
· HIV/AIDS related exhibitions, flip charts,
stickers, posters, signs, murals
HIV/AIDS events · Events, meetings, gatherings Typically conducted by government and NGOs
· Theatre, drama · HIV/AIDS related events, meetings, gatherings· HIV/AIDS plays, puppet shows, story telling
HIV/AIDS policy · Announcements Typically conducted by organisations working in
discourses · Conferences, meetings, the HIV/AIDS field including government, NGOs,
workshops foundations, donor agencies, Charities, policy
· Events agencies, research organisations, lobby groupsand elites. Includes communication about:
· Journal articles, reports HIV/AIDS Research·
· HIV/AIDS Policy and legislation
· HIV/AIDS related campaigns and programmes
HIV/AIDS public · Announcements, press releases, Statements emanating from government officials,
relations discourses press conferences or persons in organisations as well as other elites,
· Conferences, meetings, public and/or popular figures. May include
workshops statistical claims, claims to impacts, statements
· Public relations events including about the past, present or future.
launches, press conferences
HIV/AIDS icons and · Photographs, images, Artworks Items that may include aesthetic and/or utility
artefacts · Quilts, memory boxes value such as photographs, AIDS quilts, memory
Utility items
boxes·
HIV/AIDS structured · Structured interactive Typically conducted as !!Jart of campaigns andinteractive communication programmes
communication · HIV/AIDS related school-based lifeskills(conversation-based) programmes
· HIV/AIDS related helpline services, socialservices
· HIV/AIDS related counselling, structured
dialogues
· HIV/AIDS related workshops
Social action and Communication as a product of · Wearing/using HIV/AIDS related utility itemsmobilisation involvement in HIV/AIDS activities · Attending meetings, gatherings, rallies· Formal or informal HIV/AIDS work including
prevention, treatment, care and support
activities
Interpersonal dialogue Conversations, arguments, Wide-ranging communication relating to contextual
discussions experiences of HIV/AIDS
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Table 1 outlines the complexity of sources of mY/AIDS information via discourse.
Purposive mass media campaigns form only one aspect of a wide range of
communication related to the epidemic. These discourses are also not necessarily
consistent in terms of content and include a range of purposive and non-purposive
constructions. The notion therefore, that causal pathways can be established by
particular content (for example, emanating from 10veLife) inserted into one or more
discourse channels, is problematic.
Approaches to monitoring and evaluation by 10veLife have largely focused on reach
of the programme - for example, quantifying the number of billboards, the number
of advertisements broadcast, print media coverage,S? or calls58 made to the national
helpline (IoveLife 2003b), as well as knowledge of, and interaction with, programme
elements, and causal claims (IoveLife 2002b, 10veLife 2004b). This approach does
not take into account the potential impacts of parallel mY/AIDS interventions, let
alone the complex of factors that might influence my prevention amongst youth.
In the early phases of the 10veLife campaign, evaluation activities were mainly small
scale. These were summarised in a report (IoveLife 2001a) and in a journal article by
researchers connected to the programme (Stadler & Hlongwa 2002).59 The summary
report includes information on a number of research studies, and is characterised by
the provision of only limited information on research methodologies and sampling
approaches. In this report there is information relating to a number of 'surveys' that
were conducted to assess brand equity; overall effectiveness [of the campaign] and
message take-out. Two brand equity 'surveys' were conducted and both are
described under the following premise: "In order to assess the brand equity and
overall effectiveness it was necessary to generate data that was random and from
57 Which includes the outcomes of public relations activities by the loveLife programme.
58 An emphasis is placed here on counting calls to the line whether they were answered or not, as
well as omitting information on the qualitative nature of the call - specifically whether it was a
'genuine' or hoax call. Hoax calls are a significant problem for South African toll free helplines,
sometimes reaching levels of 80% (see Parker et ai, 2003b).
59 The article by Stadler and Hlongwa entitled 'Monitoring and evaluation of loveLife's AIDS
prevention and advocacy activities in South Africa' appeared in an apparently peer-reviewed
academic journal, Evaluation and Program Planning, which provided added legitimation to the
findings. This particular issue of the joumal was, however, a special issue produced in partnership
with UNAIDS and loveLife funders UNICEF and was not peer reviewed through the normal
process. Instead, articles were selected and reviewed by UNAIDS and UNICEF. Personal
communication, lonathan Morell, Editor: Evaluation and Program Planning, 15 March 2004.
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which generalizations can be made. Two national surveys served this purpose"
(loveLife 2001 a: 16).60
The 'national' surveys were conducted by Research Junxion (Survey One) and
Kaufman, Levine and Associates (Survey Two) respectively, and are described as
having sample sizes of 'n=1000' and 'n=141 '. Survey One comprised 600
adolescents aged between 12 and 17, and 400 adults over 25 years of age 'stratified
by gender, race and settlement type' who were interviewed using a 'closed
questionnaire interview'. Survey Two is described as 'random sample of 70 taxi rank
adults and 92 school children' comprising 'short interviews of five minutes' in
schools and at taxi ranks (age ranges are not mentioned). Expanded information on
methodologies including sampling representivity, are not provided.
Findings are presented in narrative form, and are supported by tables and pie charts.
Results are presented as percentages. Survey One: "The national survey... revealed
that more than half(57.5%) of the total sample population had heard about 10veLife.
Black urban respondents reported higher rates (66.7%) of exposure than white (only
urban) respondents (45.7%)" (loveLife 2001a:17). And in Survey Two: According to
Research Junxion's national survey almost half of the respondents (41.8%) perceive
10veLife's aim to 'encourage safe sex', while 23.4% felt that it aimed to prevent
mY/AIDS and 35.2% felt that it was to warn about the risks associated with sex
such as teenage pregnancy." (loveLife 2001a:19). The third survey employed 'theatre
techniques' with white (n=110) and black (n=107) respondents between 12 and 50
years" (loveLife 200 I a:23).
In these studies, a claim is made to national representivity, in spite of small
unrepresentative sample sizes, as well as unclear methods of sampling. In claiming
national representivity, and then masking actual numbers by focusing on
percentages, a form of ideological direction takes place whereby skewed and
insubstantial research is represented as being true of the whole of South Africa and
generalisable nationally. This is further reinforced through the prominent use of
tables, bar graphs and pie charts (see Figure 6).
60 Italics added.
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Rgure 13: Interpretations of the loveUfe campaign overall
_ (Source: Impact Information)
Leading closed ended questions are also used in these studies - for example: "The
message provides important information on how to avoid HIV/AIDS (42.7%)"; "The
message caught my attention and made me think about issues of sex (35.2%)"; "The
message caused me to talk about sex and HIV/AIDS to others" with only one
extreme negative option "The message used crude language and was embarrassing
(3.1 %)". Successes are claimed sans caveats, and inferences to national
representivity and impact are reiterated:
In just under 12 months loveLife has succeeded in creating
national recognition among close to 60% of the population. And
over 90% of people who know about loveLife can accurately
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identify it as a safe sex campaign promoting healthy living for
young people. More than 80% of people surveyed rated loveLife
as an effective new approach that has caused them to think and
talk about sex and HIVIAIDS. loveLife has had a remarkably
balanced impact across age groups and regions, but has
definitely had greater impact among black South Africans than
whites. (loveLife 2001a:25l1
Sustaining monocausality
Key to the 10veLife's causal argument is the negation or masking of potential
impacts of other campaigns, even though in some instances this information may be
gathered as part of survey activities. For example, as part of a 2003 evaluation of the
10veLife programme, questionnaires included references to Soul City and the Red
Ribbon Campaign. Figure 7a shows an initial draft copy of the survey.62 This
information was omitted from the final report (see Figure 7b).63 This suggests that an
intentional process of ideological masking has taken whereby deference is given to a
monocausal construction of the 10veLife programme's reach.
61 Bold text added.
62 The initial draft report was not made available in the public domain, but was provided on
condition of anonymity.
63 See Pettifor et al 2004.
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Figure 7a: 2004 Draft Survey
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Although jus under two-thirds of youth reported knowing of any na lonal HIV
programmes/campaigns, when they were specifically asked if they had heard or seen
particular HIV prevention programmes, 85% of youth reported hav heard or seen
loveLife, 91% of young people reported having heard of SOUl City and 90% had heard
or seen the Red Ribbon Campaign. There were no sign' cant dilTerences in awareness
of any programmes by age or gender.
For all three national campaigns, more youth liVing In u formal areas reported being
aware of them compared to youth living in farm areas; for example, 93% of youth living
in urban formal areas compared 0 65% of youth /tving in farm areas had heard or seen
Iovelife. .... ..
Knowledge of Three National HIVlAIDS















1!tI.... ,s.." ~ 1.... ,..". '50". ~.00,...____ ....... f.1'lIo flIl\, 5,.. n."" 70,., 5Il'1o '<.'!O"Io




".114 $'" IZ1l ~Z. ~'" !MO ll~' ~U, z~n
Al~1 h ~hlld IMrll 'd~oryo lhre ed ~ro or~lIoiI~ona.l 41'o11'o(!i,l mp;N flo;ly
weto Spo.:i'lcaIy 3~.ecll' tIWly ~ 110 d t l:.&Gn lho '6lUo yO "ptO\'oo'iOn cam gn 3~ IlinuJtanoor.J
~ ....," tt"<o loo'J. e5'~ vf youlil\ ~ocl hcrvftll ord Of GOOn bvoLeo. Trcro .... no c;io;llllnc.ll1l dr!loron"Ofi in
.J....~~o! IOYtU'o by OgoQr90I'lCIOr.
118
As has been previously noted, 10veLife's evaluation research has fostered claims-
making with regard to causal relationships between knowledge of 10veLife
intervention and responses of sexually active youth to (leading) questions that
suggested 10veLife had brought about condom use (78%) and reduction in sexual
partners (69%) at national level (IoveLife 2002b). The later 2003 survey was
considerably more rigorous, and included a comprehensive approach to sampling that
generated a final sample size of 11 904. The survey questionnaires and
methodologies were reviewed by various research experts, as was the final report.
Although, as is noted above, key information was left out of the final report, the
section on perceptions of the 10veLife programme contradict previous assertions of
massive impact:
While being aware of loveLife and partlclpating in its
programmes is an essential element, it is hoped that through this
interaction youth will change their behaviour or act in some
positive way as a result. Among all youth, 24% reported that they
had done something as a result of what they saw or heard about
loveLife. Fifteen percent of all youth report having talked to
someone about loveLife as a result of what they saw or heard.
Fewer reported looking for more information on sex, sexuality
and relationships (4%), looking for more information on loveLife
(3%), or calling ThethaJunction (1%). Sixty-one percent did
nothing as a result, and 16% had not heard of loveLife. When all
youth were specifically asked whether they had communicated
with others about loveLife, 33% reported having talked to
someone about it. Of the 33% of youth who reported talking to
someone about loveLife, the majority (74%) reported talking to
friends. Fewer indicated they had talked to a teacher or
classmate (11%), a partner (8%), a sibling (7%), or their parents
(5%). (Pettifor et al 2004:71)
Although the inclusion of this finding is surprising, it does not necessarily follow that
suggestions of negligible impact by the programme would be incorporated into
subsequent discourses or into other discourse genres. Instead previous constructions
were reiterated in other discourses. In the 2004 10veLife brochure (2004c), which
was launched at the same time as the survey, for example, previous causal claims
from the 2002 survey were prominently reiterated in the text. This ideological
direction extends to the brochure's cover, continuing the practice of inferring that
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loveLife is an impactful programme, and failing to defer to the later findings reported
in 2004 (See Figure 8).
Figure 8: 2004 brochure cover
Over-emphasis on quantification in evaluation research is noted to be problematic as
it masks individual experiences of health interventions. MacPhail and Campbell
(1999) note that quantitative approaches essentialise the notion that individuals
control and determine their health through improvements in knowledge, awareness
and 'self-efficacy' whilst masking the complexities that underpin individual
responses. As Springett points out:
In the promotion of health, we are looking at complex social
phenomena requiring complex interventions. Those interventions
may take the form ofa project or programme but equally could
take the form ofa policy or an innovative social change. There is
no 'magic bullet', but multiple strategies producing multiple
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outcomes, some intended and some not. There is also no clear
linear relationship between input and outcome. Any given
outcome is usually the product of complex interactions between
factors and concepts. Any evaluation framework needs to be
flexible enough to capture this. (2001 :141)
Given that evaluation research is "the process of determining the worth, merit, or
significance of entities, and evaluations [reports] are the outcome of that process"
(Scriven 1998:80) there is a need for sound methodologies and objective distance.
Emphasis on evaluation as a framework for 'proving' interventions rather than
'learning' about interventions is problematised by Springett (2001), who points out
that pre-determined measures and indicators give little consideration to the
perspectives of the subjects upon whom the intervention has been imposed.
Evaluation research cannot be divorced from the range of interests that exist around a
given intervention. Poor performance against objectives is likely to have negative
consequences for further funding of programmes, and may also prove embarrassing
to stakeholders who have endorsed the programme. In the case of 10veLife, there is
much at stake, and there is a need for the organisation to tread carefully by balancing,
on the one hand, a stated commitment to comprehensive monitoring and evaluation
(loveLife 2002c; 2003a), and critical reflection of the programme's impacts and cost
effectiveness. Internal commissioning and control of monitoring and evaluation
processes ensures that critical questions and analyses are not pursued (with the
notable exception of two paragraphs in the 2004 report); that other interventions are
excluded from the frame of reference (i.e. the omission of references to Soul City
and the Red Ribbon campaign); and that the conditions underpinning youth
vulnerability to my are masked by the causal assumptions tied to the 10veLife
programme (i.e. knowing only about 10veLife).
Research and evaluation reports are complex documents, and there is a need to
ensure that interpretations are not skewed by misunderstanding - particularly when
reports are released to the media. This requires careful management of the process of
inserting research findings into the public domain. In the case of the 2004 report,
Health-e, a Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) funded news service, was utilised to
actively support the launch of the report. Five media reports were produced and
released to the media. 64 This allowed for particular interpretations of the report to be
represented - for example: "A major new survey found that 'younger teenagers' are
64 See www.health-e.org.za (7 April 2004).
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mostly mv negative", with additional commentary by loveLife CEO Harrison: "If
we can enable them to stay that way, we can turn off the oxygen tap constantly
fuelling the flames of the epidemic" (The Star, 7 April 2004:3).65 Other articles
incorporate commentary from Harrison, loveLife researchers and other individuals.
All five press releases emphasise the first section of the report that dealt with HIV
prevalence amongst youth, with no reference made to the finding that loveLife's
impacts were negligible. In effect, a preferred reading was inserted into the public
sphere through the capacity to control discourse production processes via KFF
funded Health-e. Furthermore, the potential for a critical reading by other journalists
was reduced - for example, it was unlikely that editors would commission an
independent journalistic review of the report (including seeking commentary from
independent researchers) when five pre-packaged articles were available. This level
of control is enhanced by active partnerships between Health-e and various
newspaper groups who benefit economically through not having to produce or pay
for news articles, as well as partnerships and contracts between newspaper groups
and loveLife, which limit the likelihood of critique. Repetition (see Therborn 1999)
of the same interpretations of the findings is used extensively across the five Health-
e articles - for example, shifting discourse towards identifying gender
disempowerment as a 'driving force' underpinning HIV prevalence: "According to
David Harrison ... one of the key factors driving this gender disparity is the fact that
women are exposed to a greater degree of coercion" (The Star, 7 April 2004).66
Harrison also fosters the construction of new 'folk devils' - "For Harrison, the
country's 'violent culture of death' associated with violent crime, the high road-
accident rate and the cheap cost of life contributed to this nihilistic attitude" (The
Star, 7 April 2004:7).67 These strategies constitute shielding (see Therborn 1999)-
whereby particular discourses are protected, and critiques are kept outside the
discourse frame.
65 Ndaki, K. (2004, April 7) AIDS survey shows teens are future's hope, The Star. Ndaki is an
employee of Health-e.




Structural linkages, communicative power
and hegemony
Whilst legitimation is a product of the orthodoxies underpinning particular
discourses in combination with claims-making, the ideological processes of
legitimation may also incorporate structural linkages and associations between
groups and/or elites. In the case of 10veLife, these forms of legitimation occur both
globally and locally. Structural linkages and elite endorsements are functional to
processes of hegemonic consent, given that ideological power is both concentrated
and expanded through such linkages. The establishment of an ideological bloc by a
group through leadership is related to hegemonic direction. To understand hegemony
therefore:
It is not enough to say that [a groupJ exerts its dominance over
other groups. We should look at how the group must also have
behind it the economic, political and cultural conditions that
allow it to put itselfforward as leading (Joseph 2000: I 83)
Constructing a bloc of this nature is a political project that involves the building of
strategic alliances. In the case of 10veLife, it is the 10veLife programme that is the
object of political focus, with linkages designed to foster the programme as object.
The more structurally embedded an ideological project, the more power it is likely to
have at its disposal - i.e. external threats are diminished by the collective ideological
weight of the bloc of alliances. This produces and reproduces the power to "get
things done" (see Therborn 1999). Agency is achieved, both through leadership, and
through access to communicative power. In relation to 10veLife and communicative
power, the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) includes structural linkages,
partnerships and associations. For example:
o Partnerships: with United Nations and with UNAIDS;
o Linkages: with a range of researchers incorporated within the Global my
Prevention Working Group;
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o Linkages with organisations and individuals on a sustained or ad hoc basis in
relation to discourse fora such as conferences.
In South Africa such linkages are managed via the partnership that constitutes
10veLife - the partnership between the Reproductive Health Research Unit (RHRU),
Health Systems Trust (HST) and the Planned Parenthood Association of South
Africa (PPASA) - which is managed as a separate entity (the loveLife programme).
These structural linkages, partnerships and associations include:
o Direct economic relationships: For example, with funders including the South
African government; the Nelson Mandela Foundation; Anglo American
Chairman's Fund; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Global Fund for
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria.
68
o Co-operative economic relationships: For example cost-sharing or supportive
arrangements with South African corporates including media groupings such as
SABC, Independent Newspaper Group, Sunday Times, Ster Kinekor and
Primedia, as well as other corporates such as Spoornet, Avis and Mondi Paper.
o Elite associations: For the most part involving direct linkages via the loveLife
Advisory Board, and which includes elite individuals located within corporates
such as Tokyo Sexwale (Mvelaphanda Holdings) and Saki Macozoma (Nail);
individuals located in government such as Manto Tshabalala-Msimang (Minister
of Health); media representatives such as Marcel Golding (e-TV) and Moegsien
Williams (The Star); religious leaders such as Njongonkulu Ndungane (Anglican
Bishop) and Molefe Tsele (South African Council of Churches); and media
'personalities' such as Penny Lebenyane (radio presenter) and Kim Engelbrecht
(actress). Elite associations also extend to other involvements - for example
endorsements by Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, and Nobel Laureate, Desmond
Tutu, as well as local entertainers. 69
68 Funding partners, UNICEF and Old Mutual dropped out by 2002, as did implementing partners,
MTC and Advocacy Initiatives. The relationship with the Global Fund is managed via the South
African government through the Country Co-ordinating Mechanism (CCM).
69 Note that the South African Advisory Board comprised more than 30 individuals by 2004
including a number of changes to the initial board established in 1999. Other members include:
Beatrice Marshoff (Premier, Free State); Kaiser Nyatsumba (Vice President Corporate Affairs,
Anglo American Corporation); Zindzi Mandela (CEO, ZEE-ZEE Productions); Maria McCloy
(Black Rage Productions); Bamey Pityana (Vice Chancellor, Univ. of South Africa); Njabulo
Ndebele (Vice Chancellor, Univ. of Cape Town); Connie September (Member of Parliament);
Molefe Tsele (General Secretary, South African Council of Churches); Buti Tlhagale (Bishop of
Johannesburg Diocese); Irene Mennel (Trustee, Nelson Mandela Children's Fund); Mercy
Makhalemele (Tsa-Botosogo Community Organisation); Anu Nepal (Commissioning Editor:
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Informal and ad hoc associations also occur, constituting temporary linkages that are
of value in relation to ideological legitimation - for example visits to the 10veLife
programme by a range of elite figures including former US presidents Jimmy Carter
and Bill Clinton, entertainers such as U2 singer Bono, and actors such as Kevin
Spacey and Chris Tucker.
These structural linkages are inter-related with a range of discourses affirming and
endorsing the 10veLife programme, and intersect with processes of ideological
representation through access to communicative power. They are also dependent
upon, and interdependent with, the foundational ideological arguments upon which
10veLife is constructed - i.e. epistemological underpinnings that are manifest in
moral panic, quantification, concepts of causality and constructions of youth identity.
It is these underpinnings that have allowed the positioning of 10veLife as a common
sense entity with a right to claim an ideological position as the national HIV/AIDS
campaign for youth in South Africa. The foundational constructions of the 10veLife
programme thus allows for young people in the context of HIVIAIDS in South
Africa to be corn modified, shifting the 10veLife programme into an ideological realm
whereby it too becomes an object that has a 'use value'.
The KFF and the 10veLife programme, by virtue of a range of initial structural
linkages and associations, was in a position to assume leadership in relation to youth
and HIVIAIDS in the late 1990s. This positional leadership was also assumed in
relation to the epidemic globally, and has been consciously resourced by KFF.
Parallel ideological discourses have been helpful to this process, for example, the
concept of public-private partnerships (PPPs) as it has been applied to HIV/AIDS.
This strategy, which has been primary to UN discourses generally, as well as being
applied to HIVIAIDS. 70 PPPs have been positioned as ''the policy innovation of our
time" (Hayes 2001:4). Wait (2000; 2001) notes that this concept is interconnected
with globalisation. In relation to health, this has allowed decentring the importance
of states in health response in favour of relations with the corporate sector and other
trans-border actors. Corporates and other entities stand to benefit from PPP concepts
- particularly the notion of partnerships with entities such as the UN, which allow for
SABC 3); Paul Mnisi (Radio Presenter); Angela Ludek (Television Presenter); Penny Lebyane
(Radio Presenter); Eugene Mthethwa (Musician); Kim Engelbrecht (Actress); Smanga Mnisi
(Student); Shanti Aboobaker (Student); Hemphyl Matjeke (Student); John Roos (Student).
70 See for example, the global strategy framework on HIVIAIDS (UNAIDS 200 I a), which notes
that core actions and commitments should include: "To seek out and actively support the
development of partnerships required to address the epidemic among the public sector and civil
society, including the private sector" (200Ia:15).
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potentials to influence of global policy, promotion of image by association, and the
like. A further benefit, is that the PPP concept is poorly conceived in relation to
accountability and transparency:
The policy paradigm of pursuing public-private 'partnerships'
has created a new political culture - a culture that carries a high
risk of UN agencies ignoring public interests or embarking on
unacceptable trade-offs of public interests in favour of business
interests. (Richter 2003:10)
As Bruno (2002) observes in relation to the UN, PPPs have allowed corporates the
opportunity of 'blue-washing' - "wrapping themselves in the blue flag of the United
Nations", with little requirement to do anything else. Linder (1999) notes that the
PPP concept is ideologically legitimated as a "political symbol and policy tool" via
common-sense associations with notions of wartime solidarity working in
conjunction with neo-liberal doctrines that reinforce privatisation and free market
concepts related to globalisation, allowing for masking of vested interests such as
profit (for corporates), or technical expertise and support (for non-corporates).
Richter (2003) points out that there are a number of issues at stake in relation to
vested interest - for example:
o Commercial actors using the interaction to gain political and market intelligence
information in order to gain political influence and/or competitive edge;
o Business actors using the interaction to set the global public agenda;
o Business actors using the interaction to 'capture' intergovernmental public
agencies;
o Developing an internal climate of censorship and self-censorship in UN agencies;
o Weakening efforts to hold transnational corporations publicly accountable (p. 15).
These same concerns may be applied to the relationship between foundations and
UN structures. In the case of the KFF, this rhetoric has been useful for securing
intersections and structural relations with the UN which have in turn, allowed for
ideological positioning of a range of KFF's interests.
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Ideological strategy and the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation
(KFF)
The founding agency of 10veLife, the Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), is a
private foundation based in Washington with funding resources of over $500-
million. The Foundation's orientation is closely aligned with an explicitly ideological
approach and is described by the organisation's president, Drew Altman, as follows:
o Information: First, we are in the information, not the grant-making business.
While most foundations see their principal product as grants, we see ours as
information from the most sophisticated research to basic facts and numbers ...
We try to inform decision-making on major issues that affect millions of persons,
especially the most vulnerable and disadvantaged ... ;
o Audiences: Second, we have a clear sense of our three audiences: policymakers,
the media, and the general public. We put the fruits of health services and health
policy research into formats that these three audiences can readily digest. .. The
Kaiser Family Foundation places a special premium on communications and uses
a range of strategies to cut through the information overload in health ... ;
o Profile: Third, we have sought a somewhat higher profile than other foundations
have ... ;
o Style: Fourth, to accomplish our goals, we have developed a somewhat unusual
operating style. While we are part grant-making organisation, we are also part
policy institute, with a substantial in-house analytic capacity in some areas ... ;
o Media partnerships: Fifth, to reach the general public with information about
health issues, we have developed a broad range of partnerships with commercial
media organisations, from The Washington Post and US News and World Report,
to ABC and NBC, to MTV and even Glamour magazine. In no case do we fund
these organisations. Rather, these are joint ventures that combine our research
capacity, subject knowledge, and ability to provide information through toll-free
numbers and worldwide websites ... ;
o Programme in South Africa: Sixth, since 1988 we have operated a major
programme in South Africa, our only international involvement. .. In South Africa
we do many of the things we do in the United States. The work is directed to
helping that nation to develop a more equitable health care system and a
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successful democracy. Our South Africa enterprise receives about one-fifth of our
funds and is work to which we are deeply committed (Altman 2002). 71
What Altman is describing are the underlying assumptions that relate to an
ideological role for KFF that emphasises a relation to shaping US and global health
policy. A foundation that is 'in the information business' is atypical of foundations
generally. Whilst most foundations operate from a set of ideological assumptions,
this orientation is more typically driven through grant-making processes whereby
grants are provided to organisations whose activities are consistent with the
foundation's aims and objectives. An orientation towards simplifying information for
policymakers is explicitly ideological. 'Partnerships with commercial media
organisations', defined as joint ventures are explicitly oriented towards providing
such formations with KFF's research and policy perspectives,72 and particular
ideological discourses are fostered through linkages to dedicated 'worldwide'
websites and toll free numbers. This process has as its focus, the maximising of
access to, and entrenching of, communicative power. Particular strategic direction is
given to leveraging power over expenditure in US healthcare (amongst other
orientations). As Altman notes:
71 With regard to South Africa, KFF claims commitment to "developing a more equitable health
care system" and to "deep commitment" to the country, and the organization has links with
government, NGOs and other entities. KFF's website claims that the organisation has: "developed
a national initiative that is geared towards reducing the HIV rate of infection amongst young
people by 50% (i.e. 10veLife. The concept of 'geared' here suggesting that it is not simply an aim
of the organisation to achieve a 50% HIV reduction, but that it is presently structured in such a
way that it might do so); provided the essential information on which government health policy
and program plans are based; instigated the decentralization of health management nationally;
helped in the training of most top-level health officials in the country; established key national
resources in reproductive health, child health and health systems development on which
government relies heavily; supported development of a charter of patient's rights which
government has adopted." South African partners are listed as 10veLife, Health Systems Trust,
the Reproductive Health Research Unit (RHRU) and Planned Parenthood Association of South
Africa (all 10veLife partners), Health-e, the Treatment Action Campaign, Oliver Tambo
Fellowships, the Child Health Policy Institute at the University of Cape Town, the Mandela
Award and the Global HIV Prevention Working Group and the Health Systems Development
Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand. http://www.kff.org/about/southafrica.cfm, retrieved 7
August 2004.
72 In 2004, for example, KFF partnered with The Washington Post and Harvard University to
conduct a survey on "South Africans at ten years of democracy". This survey explored opinions
of South Africans, with the final report presenting frequencies on a range of opinion related
questions which were all compared on the basis of race: for example, approval of political
leaders, or opinions about HIV IAIDS. This racial construction reinforces that notion that there is a
primary causal relation between race and opinions of South Africans in relation to 'democracy',
masking other socioeconomic and contextual factors that might be related to opinion. The
findings of this survey were then utilised to produce a number of articles about South Africa in
The Washington Post. See http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/SouthAfrica.cfm, retrieved October
2004.
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This was the challenge we confronted when the Kaiser Family
Foundation was substantially remade in the early 1990s. At that
time we asked one over-riding question: "how can we best have
an impact with about $30-$40 million in grants to award each
year in a rapidly changing, trillion dollar health-care system?".
With little more than half a billion in assets, compared to the
billions available to several larger foundations, we believed that
adding another $30-$40 million a year in conventional grants to
such a vast healthcare system was not a recipe for playing a
national role. (Altman 2002)
This approach is concomitant with the practice assuming ideological leadership and
is specifically to do with positioning and perpetuating concepts of what is 'right',
what 'works', and what must thus be reproduced. As an organisation functioning
ideologically, KFF thus seeks influence over public policies through the strategic
application of' modest' resources.
Altman also acknowledges that KFF operates on the margins of normal systems of
accountability:
Foundations are not accountable in the traditional sense. They do
not make a profit or loss that can be evaluated by investors.
Unlike government agencies, they are not constantly scrutinized
by the press or by legislative bodies that must approve their
programmes and budgets. This difference gives foundations their
freedom to take risks and to try new things not generally possible
in the commercial or public sectors. But it also means that
accountability is essentially self-imposed; the evaluation of
performance and impact is a judgment call that must be made by
thefoundation's board and staff (Altman 2002)
Accountability as a concept is linked to the notion of limiting the abuse power in
contexts of governance - i.e. power at the level of public policy: "Accountability is
about restraining the exercise of public power, it is inextricably linked to justice and
legitimacy in politics" (Woods 2002:70). It includes systems of checks and balances
that ensure that vested (private) interests are made transparent, and that decision-
making is guided by the concept of public interest. As a consequence, operating
outside of the normal framework of public scrutiny, KFF is free to pursue agenda's
of its own choosing. Inserted into the framework of US and global health policy,
alongside claims of being 'non partisan', KFF is able to wield considerable
ideological direction and entrench communicative power and influence. Furthermore,
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KFF is able to achieve this without deferring to systems that would ordinarily limit
the wielding of such power - i.e. self-imposed accountabilities are very different
from public ones.
Structural foundations of loveLife
The primary structural-economic relation to 10veLife is that of the founding funder,
the KFF. KFF's involvement in South Africa extends back to the late 1980s when it
provided funding to the Health Systems Trust (HST) and the National Progressive
Primary Health Care Network (NPPHCN) - both of which were aligned with the
then Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). KFF also conducted health-related
research in the country during this period.
The funding of NGOs alongside conducting policy-related research facilitated links
with a number of African National Congress (ANC) members in the progressive
health movement in the 1980s and 1990s, and smoothed entree into the political and
economic elites that emerged post-1994. 73 During this period, KFF continued its
support to HST and also produced a number of research-based analyses of the
healthcare environment including a household survey; an analysis of donor
involvement; an analysis of linkages between South Africa and the United States;
and a survey of public perceptions on political change in entitled 'Reality check:
South African's views of the new South Africa', which was produced in partnership
with Independent Newspapers. 74
It was in the post-transition period that KFF began conceptualising the 10veLife
programme.75 In March 1999, Michael Sinclair, Deputy Vice President of the KFF,
and Judi Nwokedi, a former employee of NPPHCN and member of the closed
corporation Advocacy Initiatives, met with Dr Welile Shasha of the Department of
Health, to put forward the concept of a new youth-oriented mv campaign. The
briefing document noted that:
73 Personal communication, Jerry Coovadia (2003).
74 KFF. (1999). The Second Kaiser Family Foundation Survey ofHealth Care in South Africa,
Washington: KFF; KFF. (1998). The African Renaissance: Opportunities and Implications for the
U.S. and the World, Washington: KFF; KFF. (1996). Transforming Southern Africa: An Overview
ofAmerican Supportfor Southern Africa's Development, Washington: KFF; KFF. (1996). Private
Sector Involvement in South Africa, Washington: KFF; KFF.(1996). V.S. Independent Sector
Involvement in South Africa, Washington: KFF; KFF. (1995). A National Household Survey of
Health Inequalities in South Africa (2 volumes), Washington: KFF.
75 loveLife was at first entitled the National Adolescent Sexual Health Education Initiative
(NASHI).
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Over the past 18 months the KFF has undertaken an extensive
investigation of the best models internationally of public health
education campaigns designed to effect behaviour change. The
most salient lesson from the substantial international experience
in this field is that single message (e.g. use a condom or get
AIDS); single medium (e.g. television) campaigns have only
limited impact. The Foundation's investigation has included
analysis of the HIVIAIDS prevention efforts already tried or
underway in South Africa. Although there are about 400
organisations working in HIV/AIDS education nationally, their
work is mostly parochial and of only limited impact. (Advocacy
Initiatives 1999/6
This positioning outlines how readily KFF was able to assume authority based on its
relation to strategic research on heath in South Africa. Notably, the organisation
assumed authority in relation to assertions about existing interventions without
necessarily backing these up - for example, concluding that there was little merit in
existing interventions by simply inserting this bald 'fact' into their fax backgrounder
to the meeting with Shasha. The notion that interventions were confined to television
programmes or condom messaging was particularly ill informed. Soul City was at
the time, a multimedia intervention conveying diverse information, and Soul City
activities extended to providing support through the provision of educational
materials and other activities nationally. The Beyond Awareness Campaign, which
was first initiated in 1997 and which constituted the government's overall
communication response to HIY/AIDS at the time, was specifically structured to
extend beyond mass media and to provide communication resources and training to a
range of governmental, non-governmental and grassroots organisations. There were
also other national and provincial communication campaign activities including a
government led school-based lifeskills programme. In sum, a diverse range of
approaches to HIV prevention that extended considerably beyond condom promotion
or single media use.
This act of legitimating KFF's perspective by alluding to unreferenced research
findings is patterned elsewhere in KFF's activities - and in this instance, is an
assertion that allowed for the positioning of a KFF-Ied intervention as something
appropriate, worthwhile and filling a supposedly glaring gap in HIVIAIDS response
in relation to youth. Outlining plans for a "broad based, sustained (3-5 years), multi-
dimensional co-ordinated effort", KFF indicated a commitment of Rl5-million for
76 Facsimile transmission to Dr W Shasha from Judi Nwokedi, I March 1999.
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the first two-year phase - noting that there was an expectation of co-funding from
other sources. The new intervention would be sustained for five years, it would be
"upbeat, optimistic and fun", and it would be informed by ongoing research and
evaluation (Advocacy Initiatives 1999). In essence, the intention was clear. With the
blessing of the Department of Health, KFF was set to move ahead with its plans,
irrespective ofthe validity of its underpinning research without any consultation with
organisations working in the HIVIAIDS field beyond the national health department.
Initial partners in the venture, which was at first named the National Adolescent
Sexual Health Initiative (NASHI), were Advocacy Initiatives (media and
entertainment), the Media Training Centre based in Cape Town (print and radio), the
Planned Parenthood Association of South Africa (services and outreach), the
Reproductive Health Research Unit (research and evaluation), and Health Systems
Trust (financial administration).77 10veLife was launched at Gallagher Estate in
Johannesburg on 15 September 1999, with first lady, Zanele Mbeki as convenor.
Initial partnerships with the media sector included SABC (who were to broadcast
Jika Jika, a youth talk show; S'camto a youth documentary magazine programme;
and 'Codi: loud and clear' aimed at 6-12 year olds), YFM, 5FM, Metro FM, Vukani,
Bushbuckridge radio, and The Sowetan newspaper. The first board comprised 25
members, including various ANC stalwarts, media executives and entertainers. 78,79
The range of funders, partners, board members and activities extended deeply into
political, media, corporate and international elites, allowing 10veLife to become
entrenched and legitimated with backing extending to diverse political and corporate
'will'. The direct linkages via the advisory board to this group of elite representatives
allowed for the establishment of an 'in' group who offered both endorsement and
protection, whilst formations that might threaten or imbalance this arrangement were
excluded - for example, individuals with expertise in the HIV/AIDS field (i.e.
researchers and academics were absent).
In securing funding for 10veLife, KFF was able to offer other funders 'matching
grants' - a process that allowed KFF to expand and retain control over financial
resources through strategic investments. For example, in 2000, the Bill and Melinda
77 Media Training Centre dropped out of the programme in 2000, and Advocacy Initiatives, in the
persona of Nwokedi also dropped out when she was appointed to a senior position (public
broadcasting) at SABC.
78 See Chapter One.
79 By 2002, the consortium was comprised of RHRU, PPASA and HST with loveLife functioning as
an independent entity headquartered in Johannesburg.
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Gates Foundation provided a $7-million as part of a 'matching grant to fund
10veLife' (United Press International, 2000, July 12).80 In 200 I, an agreement
directly framed as a public-private partnership between KFF and government was
established involving a R25-million per annum commitment to 10veLife by
government over three years with matching funding of RI00-million per year being
provided by KFF. 81 This process took place beyond the framework of the normal
tender procedure, and precluded equal access to such funding by any other
organisations active in the HIV/AIDS field. 82
Funding relationships between corporates and the 10veLife programme also intersect
with a range of mutually beneficial ideological interests. For example, in 2003 Anglo
American announced a R30-million grant to loveLife. 83 This elicited a range of
discourses mutually supportive to the complex of partnerships underpinning
10veLife. For example, the 10veLife partner, the Sunday Times, offered the rationale
for naming Anglo's Tony Trahar 'Business Times Business Leader of the Month' as
follows:
.. .it is more recent developments that have prompted the naming
of Trahar... including Anglo's partnership with loveLife, a
national HIV prevention programme. Besides providing R30-
million to loveLife via the Anglo American Chairman's Fund, the
group - which was the first in South Africa to provide
antiretroviral therapy for its employees in November last year -
has committed itself to working with loveLife and other partners
to bolster public-sector primary healthcare clinics. (Sunday
Times 2003, 12 October)84
Similarly, Executive Director, Richard Feachem, of one the Global Fund for
HIVIAIDS, TB and Malaria, which also funds loveLife, noted of the Anglo deal:
80 United Press International (2000, July 12) Gates Foundation pledges $1 OO-million to fight
HIV/AIDS.
81 See Office of the Presidency, 200 I, July 19, Address by Deputy President Zuma at the launch of
the public-private partnership in support of 10veLife,
www.anc.org.zalancdocs/historylzumal200Iljz0719.htm. retrieved July 2004.
82 For example, in a discussion with Susan Goldstein of Soul City, it was noted that they were
unable to access funds through the same mechanisms that had been utilised by 10veLife (personal
communication, November 2002).
83 Anglo announces new community HIV/AIDS initiative in partnership with 10veLife,
http://www.loveLife.org.zalcorporate/news/article.php?uid=340, retrieved August 2004.
84 Sunday Times, 2003, October 12, Anglo's top man goes to the heart of transformation.
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This is an exciting example of how the Global Fund's investments
can help leverage in-country partnerships and resources. This
initiative will provide a strong model in Africa of a nation-wide
effort to establish comprehensive HIVlAiDS services, including
prevention, treatment and care in public clinics. ,,85
Trahar was also keynote speaker at the 2003 Mandela Award ceremony, which
allowed the opportunity to provide an overview of Anglo's HIV/AIDS policies and
to reiterate constructions of the value of public-private partnerships, 10veLife and the
Global Fund. Anglo also went on to win a leadership award presented by the Global
Business Council on HIV/AIDS for its partnership activities, again allowing the
opportunity to reiterate particular constructions of 10veLife, but also to valorise the
partnerships underpinning it - particularly the concept of PPPs:
The program has brought together a broad-based coalition of
international foundations, South African media and government
agencies, and members of the private sector to fight the
HIVlAiDS epidemic through nationwide media campaigns and a
network of youth centers. 86
These various positionings and valorisations provide an example of the circular
nature of ideological discourse when it is embedded within structural linkages and
associations. At every turn, the opportunity to legitimate and valorise the 10veLife
programme is taken. This is achieved by virtue of the construction of a hegemonic
bloc of structural relations and associations that allow such reiteration to occur
within a framework of common interests. In this example, it involves legitimations of
the concept of PPPs intersecting with interests in relation to 10veLife, which allows
this process to occur internally within the bloc, masking underpinning associations,
in a way that is ideologically beneficial to entities within the bloc. This process is
followed through a range of other structural mechanisms, and in relation to access to
other fora.
This phenomenon is somewhat related to the concept of epistemic communities
whereby there is an intersection between organisations that includes:
85 loveLife press release, 10 October 2003, Anglo American announces new community HIY/AIDS
initiative in partnership with loveLife. www.lovelife.org.za. retrieved January 2004.
86 The Global Business Council on HIY/AIDS, Awards 2004,
www.businessfightsaids.org/pdf/2004_Awards_Book.pdf, retrieved October 2004.
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o Shared normative and principled beliefs, that provide a value based rationale for
social action;
o Shared causal beliefs, which are derived from analysis of practices leading to, or
contributing to, central problems;
o Shared notions of validity that are intersubjective and that validate knowledge;
o A common pol icy enterprise (Haas 1992).
Epistemic communities have however tended to be defined somewhat apolitically
within international relations literature, and what can be usefully added to these
concepts, is the process of masking underlying conditions. For example, by
foregrounding 10veLife, a contradiction is created in the masking of other
interventions, also active in the same sphere. Similarly, in the case of Anglo, the
mining corporate's culpability in sustaining labour migration, which has been linked
to my vulnerability, is also masked (Lurie 2002).
The Mandela Award
With regard to structures over which KFF holds sway, the Mandela Awards have
served as an important site for legitimating and reiterating claims about 10veLife. The
Award was instituted in March 1993 by KFF and named in honour of Mandela on
the basis of his "universal standing as a symbol of the struggle for equity and
democracy in South Africa and in appreciation of his personal interest in the work of
the Foundation" and noting that
the idea for the Award arose out of conversations with Mr.
Mandela shortly after his release from prison about underscoring
the importance of health to South Africa's future... Mr.
Mandela's idea for the Award was that it should place on a
pedestal the efforts of individuals who make extraordinary
contributions to improving the health and health care of the most
disadvantaged sectors of the population. It was also his idea that
the Award recognize similar efforts in the U.S. underscoring




The Award has been utilised to support linkages between KFF and other institutions,
and to promote the 10veLife programme. In the example further above, Anglo's
Trahar is given the right to speak by virtue of KFF's control over the Mandela
Awards. This has the ideological effect of underpinning entree into other discourse
fora - for example, the Global Business Council on mY/AIDS - and such entree
incorporates opportunities to introduce 10veLife into such discourses.
The Mandela Award is also used to foster other linkages and processes of ideological
endorsement. For example, linkages between KFF and the UN were cemented in
2001 when Secretary General Kofi Annan presented the Mandela Award to UNAIDS
Executive Director, Peter Piot, in recognition of "his outstanding leadership in the
global struggle against mV/AIDS", simultaneously valorising KFF's involvement in
the epidemic and noting the importance of structural linkages via PPPs:
Let me also express my warmest thanks to Drew Altman and the
Kaiser Family Foundation... for their leadership, vision and
generosity in our comn:zon fight against HIV/AIDS. Your
participation is a model of the sort of public-private partnership
we need to win this fight... The United Nations family looks
forward to building further on that partnership as we step up our
struggle from now on." (Kofi Annan, 25 June 200118
Piot, in turn, provided endorsement to 10veLife, stating during the ceremony:
"[loveLife] is one of the greatest programmes I've ever seen because the driving
force is young people themselves" (Piot, 25 June 2001).89 This statement is
subsequently preserved over time through its insertion into 10veLife's brochures
(IoveLife 2002c; 2003a). Other recipients of the Mandela Award have also had links
to 10veLife - for example, Nobel Laureate, Desmond Tutu and South African High
Court Judge, Edwin Cameron have both provided support to 10veLife. Tutu
promoted the 10veLife parent campaign, and Cameron sits on the organisation's
advisory board.
90
Mercy Makhalemele, who received the award in 2004, is also a
member of 10veLife's advisory board. 91 She has also provided direct support to the
programme - for example, visiting the UK-based AIDS Consortium along with
David Harrison of 10veLife and Michael Sinclair of KFF to put forward "loveLife's
88 www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/200l/sgsm7861.html. retrieved 14 April 2004.
89 www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/200l/sgsm7861.html. retrieved 14 April 2004.
90 www.kff.org/southafrica/20000829a-index.cfm, retrieved March 2004.
91 http://www.kff.org/southafrica/mandela2004.cfm retrieved 7 August 2004.
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strategy and progress and to engage with participants on the challenges of HlV
prevention amongst youth globally".92
Other structural linkages in South Africa
Over the duration of the 10veLife programme, numerous PPP linkages with corporate
partners have been pursued. In many instances these have been positioned as 'in-
kind' relationships that involved some form of resource commitment to 10veLife. For
example, at the launch of the 10veLife Groundbreaker programme in Orange Farm in
2002, it was noted that these partnerships, valued in excess ofR50-million, included:
o Airtime provided on television and radio by SABC;
o Cost-sharing provided by the Independent Newspaper Group and Sunday Times in
the production of ThethaNathi and S'camto;
o Cost-sharing provided by Mondi Paper -loveLife's 'exclusive paper supplier';
o Cost-sharing on outdoor media production by Custom Group Holdings;
o Extension of entertainment opportunities to youth in underserved communities by
Ster Kinekor;
o Support to 10veLife broadcast facilities by Sentech;
o Support to the 10veTrain by Spoomet;
o Raising public awareness of 10veLife by SAA;
o Support to groundbreaker training by Vodacom;
o Support to an information and communications network by The Digital
Partnership;
o Support to fitness and health promotion at Y-Centres by Medscheme (IoveLife
2002d:3).
Structural linkages provide opportunities for endorsements of the 10veLife
programme but also offer other ideological intersections. In relation to the concept of
PPPs, structural relations are positioned as benign intersections framed by mutual
92 Consortium meetings 2003, www.aidsconsortium.org.ukfmeeting03.htm. retrieved November
2004.
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interests in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa - for example, as
expressed by Independent Newspaper Group's Ivan Fallon:
Independent Newspapers has pledged its commitment in the fight
against the HIV pandemic by signing a five-year contract with
LoveLife... Chief executive Ivan Fallon said: 'The group is aware
of the toll HIV is taking on the country and wanted to be much
more proactively part of the national effort. We believe a key to
reducing the impact of the HIV epidemic in South Africa is to
slow the rate of infection among young people.' (The Star, 3
October 2001)93
These structural linkages however also extend to underpinning contractual
arrangements that involve alignments of power that offer competitive structural and
ideological advantage to 10veLife over other HIV/AIDS programmes. Contractual
arrangements between the Independent Newspaper Group and also the Sunday Times
involved obligations in relation to the publication of 10veLife's youth magazines,
ThethaNathi and S'camto, extending to the inclusion of restrictive clauses regulating
the arrangement in 10veLife's favour:
For the duration of this agreement, the Company
[Independent/Sunday Times] will not, either directly or indirectly,
engage in any way, either on its own behalf, or on behalf of
others, in the provision of content of such a nature as would or
might be likely to compete or interfere with the publication of the
product.94
Additionally, Independent Newspaper Group were required to "incorporate the
ThethaJunction (IoveLife Helpline) as a tag line on all mv stories in all its titles"
and to "routinely promote the Product with front-page main body leads in issues
carrying the product, masthead inclusion in the Tonight section and street posters in
major centres promoting each issue of the product".95 The contractual obligation to
promote the ThethaJunction helpline number was specifically structured to
undermine the promotion of the national toll free AIDS Helpline - an intervention
funded by the national Department of Health. Up to that time the Independent
Newspaper Group's daily, The Star, had routinely published the AIDS Helpline
93 The Star (2001, October 3) LoveLife and South Africa's Independent Newspapers Join to Fight
HIV/AIDS.
94 This appears as clause 4.8 of the contract with the Independent Newspaper Group, and clause 6.3
of the contract with Sunday Times.
95 See clauses 4.6 and 4.4 in the contract with Independent Newspaper Group.
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number alongside AIDS-related articles on a pro-bono basis. The contractual
requirement to replace this practice with the insertion of the ThethaJunction helpline
had the ideological effect of delegitimating the national AIDS Helpline, whilst at the
same time having the related effect of reducing awareness of a service more relevant
and useful to the readers of The Star. Specifically, the AIDS helpline provides
services to all age groups rather than being focused on the narrow age range serviced
by ThethaJunction. Additionally, at the time that this contractual obligation was
being aggressively pursued, the ThethaJunction Helpline was considerably less
efficient than the AIDS Helpline. In August 2002, for example, two dummy calls
were made to the AIDS Helpline and ThethaJunction respectively. Two scenarios
were constructed on the basis of the inclusion of the ThethaJunction number
alongside a story in The Star on antiretroviral drugs.
In one dummy call, the caller identified herself using the phrase 'PWA' meaning
person living with HIY!AIDS, to which the ThethaJunction counsellor responded:
"What is a PWA? Is it a drug?" (and to which the caller responded "No. It is
someone who is living with the virus"). As the discussion proceeded the caller asked:
"To get the drugs, do I have to have a prescription from a doctor?", to which the
ThethaJunction counsellor responded: "I am not sure about that, what I can do is to
give you the AIDS Helpline number, they can know more because their deal with it








From the paper they have also written something about the
Treatment Action Campaign [TA CJ, I would also like to know how to
get hold ofthem. Do you have their numbers?
Usually when they write something in the paper they also write their
numbers and website.
No, they did not, the number that is written in the paper is the Thetha
junction number.
Thetha junction, why? Please hold I would like to ask others around











Please hold again. I want to ask others here because I do not
understand why they wrote Thetha junction number and not TAC if
the story is written by TAC.
The story is not written by TAC, its about TAC, now I want to get
hold ofTAC.
No one knows the number for TAC. Have you tried Telkom 1023.
No
Please hold, I want to ask this person if this person does not know
the number, I would suggest that you call the AIDS Helpline. It seem
like there is no one who knows the number for TAC. Please phone
the AIDS Helpline it's afree number as well.
In this instance it is clear that there was little co-ordination between 10veLife's
ideological requirement that the ThethaJunction helpline number be displayed in
Independent Group titles, and the actual delivery of an efficient helpline service.
Furthermore, the lack of competence on the 10veLife line involved referral to the
AIDS helpline in any event. This was not a singular occurrence. In the second call to
ThethaJunction, this time introducing a question about the use of the drug Nevirapine
for pregnant women, the same situation occurred, with the counsellor stating: "I am
sorry I can't really give you very many details, and I don't know why they put our
numbers, but let me give you the AIDS Helpline number and I am sure they will be
able to give you more information about this".97 In contrast, the two dummy calls to
the AIDS Helpline employing the same two scenarios, elicited direct and considered
assistance. The caller enquiring about Nevirapine was referred to a doctor, whilst in
the other scenario the concept of 'PWA' was understood and the number for the
TAC was provided.98
10veLife's partnerships with entities that have control over discourse genre's follow
similar emphasis on securing competitive advantage - for example, the partnership
with SAA includes a monthly column in SAA's Sawubona magazine on 10veLife.
Articles typically reinforce 10veLife's quantitative claims alongside claims to being
South Africa's national mv/AIDS programme for youth.99 The arrangement with
Ster Kinekor involves placement of 10veLife posters at Ster Kinekor cinema's and
97 CADRE (2002, August 7) Transcript of call to ThethaJunction.
98 CADRE (2002, August 7) Transcript of calls to the AIDS Helpline.
99 See Sawubona, October 2004; November 2004.
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inclusion of 10veLife information on popcorn boxes. This relation also extends to
exclusivity in relation to advertising within the cinema's - for example, the Society
for Family Health was unable to secure rights in 2002 to flight its public service
advertisements promoting condoms at Ster Kinekor cinemas. loo
Elite rhetorics and the loveLife programme
Elite rhetorics function differently to structural relations. They involve associations,
often once-off interactions, that are magnified through media representations at the
time, but also in other genres over time - for example, 10veLife's brochures reiterate
quotations by a range of elite figures with the effect of claiming ongoing knowledge
and endorsement of the programme by the elite individual in question. In 2002, for
example, former US President, Jimmy Carter, accompanied William Gates Senior
(Bill Gates' father) on a tour of South Africa where Carter stated:
loveLife encourages young people to talk about AIDS - how it's
transmitted, how to protect themselves, and how to talk with
others. If there is any leadership vacuum at the .national level, it
is more than offset by the leadership among young people. Today
we saw the future of South Africa - bold teenagers ... unafraid to
speak out about HIV/AIDS. These are the heroes of the new South
Africa. (Jimmy Carter 2002/°1
This statement is reiterated in all three editions of the 10veLife brochure (loveLife
2002c; 2003a; 2004a). Similar statements, disassociated from their original contexts,
have also been employed to secure ongoing legitimation. For example, Richard
Holbrooke, CEO of the Global Business Council on HIY/AIDS ("loveLife is one of
the best examples of good practice in the world today"), Peter Piot, UNAIDS
Director ("loveLife is one of the greatest programmes I've ever seen because the
driving force is young people themselves"), Stephen Lewis, UN Envoy for
mY/AIDS in South Africa ("loveLife is an inspired combination of a hard-hitting
media campaign and services to youth, bringing together an absolutely forthright
discussion of all of the most difficult issues"), as well as local elites such as Jacob
Zuma, Deputy President ("we see 10veLife as a hugely creative, rather daring and
audacious, forceful youth-focused programme") and Molefi Sefularo, Minister of
Health in the Northwest Province ("loveLife is beginning to help the youth and
I00 Personal communication, Rob Eiger, Director: Society for Family Health, November 2002.
10 I Dispatches from Africa (2002, March 7) slate.msn.comlid/2062757/entry/20629521 retrieved July
2004.
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government of South Africa to turn the tide oflllV in this country"). More often than
not, these affirming statements are derived from contexts constructed by
KFF/loveLife in the first instance - the Carter statement is in the context of an
arranged visit to 10veLife; the statement by Holbrooke is made at the 2002 Nelson
Mandela Award ceremony;102 Piot's statement occurs when receiving the 2001
Mandela Award; 103 and Zuma's statement is made at the announcement of the PPP
between 10veLife and the South African government. 104
Again this process is a circular ideological process. Originating discourses are In
essence 'set up' by KFF as a product of constructing and resourcing the original
events, a process that confers 'right to speak' on selected individuals. That right is
inter-related contexts that pre-determine what is spoken about - i.e. the 10veLife
programme. Further, the temporal relation is shifted by the capacity to magnify and
reiterate such endorsements and legitimations over time - for example, within
10veLife's organisational brochures.
Ideological control and discourse genres
KFF has secured communicative power by specifically focusing on processes of
ideological reproduction. The Mandela Awards are only one aspect of this
ideological matrix. Other elements include the utility of websites that are related to
the promotion of global health policy, as well as fora such as conferences and
meetings.
KFF's communicative power has been particularly reinforced via the development
dedicated internet-based communication system - Kaisernetwork.org - which
includes daily news reports, webcasts, e-mail updates and the like, and includes
direct linkages to global fora - for example, US-based and global health and
HIV/AIDS conferences. Individuals and organisations can receive regular
information as well as host components of the website (e.g. daily news briefs) on




Nelson Mandela and 10veLife Launch National Youth Corps to fight HIV IAIDS in South Africa,
http://www2.kff.org/contenU2002/20020207c/, retrieved October 2004.
See further above.
Elite endorsements recur in other fora - for example, at the launch of a 10veLife Y-Centre in
Orange Farm in September 2002, Bill CIinton and Nelson Mandela were in attendance as were
Hollywood actors Kevin Spacey and Chris Rock. In May 2002 rock star Bono toured South
Africa with US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and visited 10veLife, where Bono asked David
Harrison "What can we do to help. Is it drugs we should bring, or do you need a bigger budget?"
The Star (2002, May 24) Bono left speechless by Soweto AIDS Clinic.
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as being non-partisan and independent: "The mission of the Kaiser Family
Foundation is to provide timely, reliable, and non-partisan information on national
health issues to policymakers, the media, and the general public",105 its function
incorporates a complex of ideological trajectories.
In 2004, the kaisernetwork.org was selected to provide officially endorsed internet
support to the ISdl International AIDS Conference held in Bangkok 106 and this
relation provides an example of the ideological advantages that a centralised
dissemination system offers. Linkages to, and implicit endorsements by the
International AIDS Conference have a legitimating effect, given that this biannual
conference is the largest conference of AIDS researchers, policy-makers and activists
globally. The general website of the conference - www.aids2004.org - directs users
to www.kaisernetwork.org for conference webcasts and other reports.
Kaisernetwork's home page on the conference in turn, directs users to a range of
reports - many of which are oriented towards KFF's own analyses. For example,
users are prominently directed to a 'Bangkok Notebook', which features five
transcripts - four of which are reflections on the conference proceedings by KFF
Research Fellow, Jackie Judd. Related links on the website sidebar direct users to
KFF projects including 10veLife's home page, KFF's section on mY/AIDS, and
KFF activities in Bangkok. 'KFF Activities in Bangkok' include references to
numerous 'satellite' sessions at the Bangkok Conference sponsored by KFF and
other 'partners' - a number of which feature affirming discourses about the loveLife
programme. In addition to highlighting KFF satellite sessions in the side bar, the
website provides links to various KFF produced 'fact sheets', poster sessions and an
Exhibition Booth - all of which focus exclusively or partially on 10veLife and which
include further links to webcasts and transcripts. Users are also provided with an
opportunity to link to a page entitled 'South Africa', which in turn offers overviews
of, and sublinks to, 10veLife and the Mandela Award (See Figures 9 and 10 below).
105 The extend mission includes: "To advance that mission, the Foundation established
kaisernetwork.org in November 2000. Kaisernetwork.org is the premier online resource for timely
and in-depth coverage of health policy news, debates and discussions. This free and
comprehensive multimedia service connects users to the events, people, information, and research
that shape health policy." See http://www.kaisernetwork.org/static/about.cfm, retrieved 7 August
2004.
106 See hUp://www.kff.org/hivaids/bangkokactivities.cfm, retrieved 7 August 2004:
"kaisernetwork.org was the official webcaster of the XV International AIDS Conference.
kaisernetwork.org provided daily coverage of the conference - including webcasts, interviews,
news summaries and more - allowing individuals to 'virtually attend' the conference via
www.kaisernetwork.org/aids2004."
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Figure 9: Kaisernetwork.org Bangkok Conference Home Page
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Conferences are important ideological discourse genres, providing opportunities for
expanded reiteration via websites and news media. They are ritualised fora that
involve the ideological construction of knowledge through the reification of experts
and expertise, who secure the right to speak by virtue of particular expertise and
training, association with particular elite organizations, and more particularly, access
to financial resources that allow attendance in the first place. As a consequence of
functioning within a framework of ideological positioning that is assumed to foster
research, scientific advancement and public policy, conferences readily mask vested
interests and accountabilities. Whilst the right to speak may be secured somewhat
independently through calls for abstracts and related selection, a less transparent
strategy is that of hosting a sponsored 'satellite session'. At the International AIDS
Conferences, and other conferences, satellite sessions are offered to interest groups
wishing to sponsor presentations or workshops during the conference. This facility
provides an additional source of revenue to conference organisers, whilst providing
interest groups an opportunity to present their perspectives without having to submit
abstracts for scientific review. In Bangkok, for example, satellite session proposals
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were evaluated by the conference organising committee on the basis of "content
merit, overall quality and organisational plan in order to ensure consistency with the
scientific and ethical standards of the Conference". 107
At a range of KFF sponsored (and/or co-sponsored) satellite sessions in Bangkok, a
number of individuals spoke on behalf of and/or endorsed the loveLife programme.
The sessions included: '08
o "Towards an HIV-Free Generation: Lessons and Experiences From Large-Scale
Youth HIV/AIDS Prevention Programming Research"; 109
o Meet the Leaders: Showcasing Media Partnerships - The Global Media AIDS
Initiative;
o The Power of the Media in HIV Prevention: Hype or Help? Recent Evaluations of
Three Media-Based HIV Prevention Campaigns. IIO
The session entitled "Towards an HIV-Free Generation" was moderated by Ward
Cates of Family Health International and was structured around a presentation made
by Judith Auerbach of Amfar.'" Both individuals are directly associated with
107 www.AIDS2004.org, retrieved 7 August 2004.
108 http://www.kff.org/hivaids/bangkokactivities.cfm, retrieved 7 August 2004.
109 Hosted by the UN Foundation, Kaiser Family Foundation, the African Youth Alliance and the
UNAIDS Interagency Task Team on Young People, this session reviewed 'leading' prevention
efforts, focusing on four programmes operating primarily in Africa, and addressed ways to scale
up prevention efforts and measure their effectiveness.
110 A transcript of this session was not available. The summary notes: "The Kaiser Family
Foundation co-hosted this panel with YouthNetlFamily Health International, MTV U.S. and MTV
International in cooperation with the UNAIDS Interagency Task Team on Young People
(IATTIYP). The session reviewed recent evaluations of three of the leading public education
campaigns that focus on HIV/AIDS -loveLife (South Africa), MTV International's Staying
Alive (Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa), and MTV USA's Be Safe/Fight For Your
Rights: Protect Yourself (U.S.A.). All three campaigns use the media extensively to build
awareness and educate as well as connect individuals to services. The Kaiser Family Foundation
is a primary partner in each of the campaigns. www.kaisernetwork.org, retrieved August 2004.
III Relations to loveLife by the session chair and keynote speaker were masked: Judith Auerbach,
Vice President of Public Policy at the American Foundation of AIDS Research (Arnfar) and Ward
Cates, President of Family Health International are both members of loveLife's Technical
Advisory Group yet this relationship was neither stated at the meeting, nor noted in the
accompanying speaker biographies. Speaker biographies available at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/heal th_cast/hcasUndex .cfm?display=detail&hc=1221, retrieved 7
August 2004. This practice also occurs elsewhere. For example, Auerbach appeared as a speaker
at an August 2004 event hosted by the World Bank entitled "HIV prevention amongst young
people: Measuring the impact", which focused specifically on loveLife. The meeting, which is
positioned as being independently hosted by the World Bank, was chaired by Debrework Zewdie,
Director of HIV/AIDS Programmes at the World Bank. Zewdie is also a member of loveLife's
Technical Advisory Board. See
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10veLife. The session was sponsored by four organisations: African Youth Alliance
(AYA); The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation; the UN Foundation and the UN
Interagency Task Team on Youth. The session was positioned as a "review of
leading prevention efforts, address ways to scale up prevention efforts, and ways to
measure the effectiveness of prevention programs,,112 with Auerbach's presentation
setting the scene by providing a review of four 'large-scale youth interventions' -
10veLife, the Southern African Youth Initiative or SAY, the Africa Youth Alliance or
AYA, and YouthNet. This was followed by presentations from representatives of
each organisation. All four interventions are linked to the session sponsors, and thus
the positioning of 'leading prevention efforts' is an ideological construct that flows
from the vested interests of the session sponsors.
Auerbach begins her presentation by referring to a "recent meeting convened by the
World Health Organisation" which she refers to as the 'Talloires Group,113, which
set out to "assess the evidence for policies and programmes to achieve the global
goals and targets for young people and HI VIAIDS." The goal of this meeting, she
notes, was to begin to identify youth HIV prevention programs that were ready to be
scaled up and implemented more widely (kaisernetwork.org 2004a:5-6). The
Talloires meeting, which took place on 25-28 May 2004, was described as a 'global
consultation' organised by WHO, UNAIDS, UNFPA and UNICEF, under the aegis
of the UNAIDS Interagency Task Team on Young People along with 'other
partners'. The ideological slant of this global 'consultation' was strongly weighted
towards international organisations, with very little representation from regions most
affected by the epidemic or indigenous campaigns, 10veLife being the only campaign
represented. 114 In Bangkok, Auerbach situates the 'consultation' as a rigorous review
of global programmes:
http://www .kaisern etwork .org/heal th_castlhcasUndex.cfrn?displ ay=detai I&hc=1263, retri eved
October 2004.
I 12 http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_castlhcasUndex.cfm?display=detail&hc= 122 I, retrieved
August 2004
113 This is incorrectly transcribed as the Toulouse Group and I have reverted to the correct spelling
above. The meeting is given this name by virtue of having been convened in Talloires, France.
114 Other partners are listed as the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; The Liverpool
School of Tropical Medicine; The Alan Guttmacher Institute; Population Services International;
American Foundation for AIDS Research; Colombia University; Education, Training, Research
Associates, US; Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, US; Department for International
Development, UK; the Global Fund; Deutsche Gesellschaft fUr Technische Zusammenarbeit;
Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp; International Labour Office; International Planned
Parenthood Federation; Johns Hopkins University; 10veLife; Ministry of Finance, Uganda;
Medical Research Council, UK; Population Council; United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization; University of Windsor; University of Zimbabwe; US Agency for
International Development; the World Bank; YouthNet. With the exception of the Uganda
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Participants at that meeting systematically reviewed evidence
from school-based, media, health services and community level
interventions to determine what works best with respect to
increasing knowledge and skills, reducing vulnerability and
decreasing HIV prevalence among young people in developing
and to a lesser extent, developed countries. The Talloires Group
took into consideration a number of factors in this assessment,
including the threshold of evidence, the quality of intervention,
knowledge of the process of the intervention, the quality of the
outcome measure that were looked at and the context in which the
intervention occurs. 115
Auerbach then directs her review towards four programmes that merit 'scaling up'
including the loveLife programme. The rhetorical pattern adopted within her
discourse involves a series of poorly founded assertions and claims. In her
introductory remarks, for example, she asserts that "in South Africa for example,
virtually all 13 and 14-year olds are my negative". This assertion contradicts
findings of the Nelson MandelalHSRC survey (the only study to review H1Y
prevalence in the 13-14 age range), which found prevalence amongst 2-14 year olds
to be 5.6%.116 Auerbach then proceeds to reproduce the argument that youth are the
driving force underpinning HIV prevalence in South Africa:
South Africa has a particularly large young population - 42% are
under the age of 20. So according to some modeling projections,
the significant change in the sexual behavior of young people on
the order of about a 20% reduction in risky behaviors across a
spectrum of sexually active teenagers could trigger declines in
HIV incidence among young people by between 20 and 50%,
which in turn, could contribute to a drop in overall prevalence
rates for the population. ll ?
Ministry of Finance, and University of Zimbabwe, all are non African groups with international
interests and programmes.
115 Kaisernetwork.org.(2004a). Towards an HIY-Free Generation: Lessons and Experiences From
Large-Scale Youth HIY IAIDS Prevention Programming Research, session transcript, 15th
International AIDS Conference, Bangkok, 13 July 2004, pp. 6-7.
116 The Nelson Mandela/HSRC survey (Shisana et a12002) does not provide HIY prevalence levels
for single ages - i.e. 13, 14. All other surveys of HIY - notably the national antenatal survey and
the RHRU/loveLife survey of 2004 both exclude children under 15.
117 Kaisernetwork.org. (2004a). Towards an HIY-Free Generation: Lessons and Experiences From
Large-Scale Youth HIY IAIDS Prevention Programming Research, session transcript, 15th
International AIDS Conference, Bangkok, 13 July 2004, pp. 4-5.
148
She thus reiterates the claims made elsewhere by loveLife in brochures and reports
(IoveLife 2001a; 2001c; 2002c; 2003a), and by Harrison and Steinberg (2002)
providing a foundation for assumptions and arguments that suggest single large-scale
interventions might contribute monocausally to massive declines in prevalence. This
point, and subsequent arguments, are central to arguing for the relevance of scaling
up the programmes she reviews in her presentation. With regard to loveLife, she
proceeds through a series of assertions, affirmations and arguments as follows:
o Affirmation of the notion that loveLife needs additional funding to meet its goals:
"With respect to unpredictable cost changes, in the case of 10veLife, the
weakening of the US dollar over the past two years has actually reduced the
10veLife annual income by about 40%. Although by 2006, promised money from
the Global Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria will help fill the shortfall, 10veLife will
still need additional funds to sustain its current programs in 2005 and to expand
its reach to include the most marginalized population ofSouth African youth who
'd'fi dd I ,,118reSl e m arms an eep rura areas .
o Affirmation that loveLife is rigorously evaluated: "A strong monitoring and
evaluation strategy employed from the beginning of a program allows for
meaningful and valid assessment of program outcomes. 10veLife, for example,
included in its evaluation plans and has carried out a nationally representative
household survey with both behavioral and biomedical or biological measures,
including HIV testing, as well as measures of exposure and involvement in
10veLife programs ". //9
o Affirmation that loveLife performs considerably better than other programmes:
"... over 2.4 million calls were received by 10veLife's call line, which is
compared to 12,000 received by the government's hotline ".120
118 Ibid, p. 19.
119 Ibid, p. 22. Auerbach follows this with the false assertion that the 2003/4 RHRUlloveLife survey
was conducted two years after implementation, when in fact the survey was four years into the
programme. "While not a true baseline in the sense that the survey occurred 2 years into the
implementation of the program, it does provide a baseline from which to compare the future
impact of the program ... " (p. 22). Constructed as a 'baseline' the survey and the 10veLife
programme are ideologically shifted away from the temporal reality of little impact against stated
goals (e.g. 50% HIV reduction), and financial reality of multi-million dollar expenditures with
little demonstrable impact, into a new space framed as an intervention that is still in its infancy
and that will bring about considerable impacts.
120 Ibid, p. 25. See also Parker 2003, which points out that this comparison is made between total
calls received by the 10veLife helpline, in comparison to calls that have been filtered for relevance
(excluding hoax calls, calls not answered, calls shorter than I-minute). 10veLife's analysis of calls
fails to recognise the importance of measuring only calls that are answered and that include a
dialogue that is relevant to the purpose of the line.
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o Conflation of statistical association between awareness of 10veLife and
monocausal influence: "And I should mention that 10veLife has about an 85%
exposure rate. 121 So most youth in South Africa have been exposed, to some
degree, to 10veLife. But those who have been exposed, compared to those who
have not, 9% are more likely to have talked to their parents about HIV, 6% are
more likely to have talked to someone other than their parents about HIV, and
16% are more likely to believe that they could do something to avoid HIV... And
there are also analytic data from the 10veLife national household survey showing
a greater proportion of those exposed to or involved in 10veLife reported risk
reduction behaviors than those not exposed to the program. So those exposed or
involved were 11% more likely to have changed their behaviors to avoid getting
HIV They were 6% more likely to have been tested for HIV and they were over
8% more likely to have used a condom at last sex. ,,/22
o Emphasis on quantification and quantitative assertions of impact and reach: "And
10veLife has certified 106 NAFC - National Adolescent Friendly Clinics - which
averaged 200-300 visits per month in 2002. Over 7,500 youth received clinical
services in the Y center in the 4th quarter of 2002 - 40% were new visits,
doubling from 2001. And again, the proportion of male clients in NAFC clinics
increased to 11% of all visits, from 2% the year before. So we've
l23
increased
access to health services ... And over 380,00012 to is-year olds and 2.8 million
16-year olds and over, were reached by the 10veLife games in South Africa, which
promote positive lifestyle and healthy living to ameliorate disease
vulnerability. "J2.I
121 See further above for reference to similar levels of exposure achieved by Soul City and the red
ribbon campaign, which were excluded from the final RHRU/loveLife 2004 report.
122 Ibid, p. 27. This assertion reflects a simple association between loveLife and particular reported
patterns. It cannot, however, be used to demonstrate a monocausal influence. Youth exposed to
loveLife may also be exposed to other interventions, and such youth may also be considerably
different in a range of respects to youth who were not exposed - i.e. reduction to percentages and
claims to impact are methodologically unsound. Equally, simple exposure - i.e. awareness - is
highly unlikely to be causally linked to change. Auerbach also omits the observation made in
Pettifor (2004), that illustrates limited impact of the programme.
123 Ibid, p. 29. A Freudian slip with respect to Auerbach's association with the loveLife programme?
124 Ibid, p. 29. The notion of 'reach' referenced here is somewhat questionable as a measure of
engagement. Attending a single event can hardly be equated with a likelihood of significant
impact, or be assumed to place attendees on a particular behavioural pathway with respect to HIV
prevention. In particular, the notion of 'ameliorating disease vulnerability' through an event
locates the construction of the loveLife programme as an intervention that, in whatever form, has
an overwhelming impact by virtue of little more than once-off exposure, and that it is this and not
the context within which people live that determines vulnerability.
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o Claims to monocausal impacts on my prevalence: "So, moving to the big
question about HIV prevalence itself-at this point, only 10veLife has data linking
its programs to HIV infection rates./25 And these are preliminary. The 2003
national household survey detected a 10% HIV prevalence rate among 15 to 24-
year olds in South Africa. And when viewed along with data from the 2002
Department of Health survey and the HSRC national survey, this does suggest a
slight decline in HIV prevalence among 15 to 19-year olds and a leveling off
among 20 to 24-year olds ... The survey furthermore found that young people who
participate in 10veLife programs are significantly less likely to be HIV positive.
And this is participation, not merely exposure to the programs. Female
participants are 40% less likely to be HIV infected and male participants are 30%
less likely to be HIV positive than non-participants. 10veLife's quasi experimental
community study found that young people in communities with Y centers and with
the NAFC clinics, had lower HIV STI and pregnancy rates than their
counterparts in matched communities that didn't have the programme. ,,/26
Auerbach's points were further embellished in a follow-on presentation by a former
10veLife groundbreaker, Sibulele Sibaca who states: "I'm not going to talk stats. I'm
not going to talk about the impact 10veLife has had in South Africa as a whole. I'm
going to talk about the impact 10veLife has had in my life and how much it has
invested in me as an individual".127 She goes on to speak about how she lost her
parents to AIDS, and how 10veLife had changed her life and how she was looking
forward to the 2010 soccer world cup - a reference to a 10veLife campaign that
recurs in other discourse genres, notably billboards and 10veLife's youth magazines.
125 HIV prevalence is not strictly speaking a measure of 'infection rate'. Infection rates have to do
with HIV incidence - i.e. the number of infections occurring over a given time period.
126 Ibid, p. 29. This claim is highly contentious. Firstly, there is very little concrete evidence to draw
the conclusion that HIV prevalence amongst youth is declining from the sources referenced.
Antenatal data is not particularly sensitive to declines at an aggregate level (i.e. where all data
from sentinel sites around the country is aggregated) and the declines referred to are not
considered to be significant. There is no time-based comparison with regard to the 2002 Nelson
Mandela/HSRC survey (i.e. a decline can only be potentially shown in a repeat study using a
similar sampling methodology), whilst the RHRUlloveLife survey (Pettifor et al2004:3), which
was conducted a year later (and used a similar sampling methodology), actually showed higher
prevalence in the 15-24 year age group in comparison to the Mandela/HSRC survey - 10.2% vs
9.3% with higher variations for females (15.5% vs 12%) (Pettifor et al 2004:3 I). With regard to
10veLife programme participation - this is a comparison made from a single cross-sectional study,
not over time, so no such conclusion can reliably be drawn - it is simply a measure of association.
HIV prevalence is highly variable in communities so the nation that a 'quasi-experimental' model
can take into account such variances in current prevalence and risk is also methodologically
problematic.
127 Ibid, p. 47.
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The ideological pattern in Auerbach's argument, supported by Sibaca, follows a
particular logic and structure that directs listeners towards particular conclusions.
This logic and structure is reiterated elsewhere in 10veLife discourses and can be
outlined as follows:
o Premises: That youth are the driving force underpinning the epidemic; that
10veLife is South Africa's national my programme for youth; and that 10veLife
has a strong monitoring and evaluation plan;
o Justifications (often devolving to orthodoxies such as quantification): 10veLife is
more impactful than other programmes; 10veLife has proven causal impacts on
youth sexual behaviour and my prevention (and failing to mention the wide
range of other programmes that exist in South Africa);
o Testimonies: whereby lived experience of youth testimonials in the context of
events are portrayed as having a stand-for connotative relation to the lived
experience of South African youth in general;
o Goal orientation: whereby 'ideological' reproduction ('scaling-up', including the
need for additional funding) of the object (loveLife) is prioritised within the
discourse.
The linkage between ideology and hegemony in this instance is the interrelation
between the process of agency and the assumption of 'authoritative' leadership,
incorporating structural relationships to other groups, masking of vested interests and
relationships, and concretisation of the goal orientation. Communicative power is
singularly vested in KFF, who provide the resources to access the discourse forum
itself, and who determine the 'right to speak'. Auerbach's apparent independence as
a senior representative of Amfar (and by omitting reference to her longstanding
linkage to the 10veLife programme as a member of the Technical Advisory Group)
also serves a legitimating function.
Auerbach's discourse is characterised by processes of ideological masking in the
sense that what is conveyed is the logical flow of the argument directing the
viewer/listener towards a preferred set of meanings - in this case, that 10veLife is a
legitimate, effective programme that merits replication (i.e. reproduction of the
object) - while masking a range of contradictions including the notion of
monocausality (which is further reinforced by not referencing the complex of my
programmes reaching youth in South Africa, as well as assumptions that it is only
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intervention that fosters mv prevention behaviour), and conflation of reach of the
programme and associative quantitative findings, with actual impacts.
With regard to the validation of discourse, McKerrow (1983: 198) notes: "Ideological
discourse is validated, not by timeless truths or the inexorable progress of necessary
laws, but by the historically situated community in which it is expressed". The
construction of ideology is a material practice that includes "rituals, practices and
actions that constitute the process of interpellation" (Boswell et al 1999:360). The
ritualised spaces of conferences, workshops and presentation, include a power
relation that governs the right to speak, with audience members positioned as passive
listeners, sometimes with limited rights to ask questions within a limited time frame.
Auerbach's discourse echoes some of the characteristics of propaganda identified by
Black (2001), namely, reliance on authority figures (Auerbach), physical
representations (youth testimony), a finalistic view of institutions (loveLife is
markedly better than others working in the field, there are no other 'competitors'),
and reduction to caus~ and effect relations, ignoring multiple causality (IoveLife's
claimed causal impacts). The conference space can also be understood as a ritualised
space which includes a relation between speaker and audience within which
discursive authority is vested in the speaker - i.e. the conference space is a ritual that
affirms the notion of authority (and authorised voice) of the speaker. In the case of
satell ite sessions, the processes of vesting authority in particular speakers - a process
determined by session sponsor KFF - is masked. Additionally Auerbach's direct
links to the 10veLife programme are kept outside the discourse frame.
At another Bangkok presentation, "Showcasing Media Partnerships", UNAIDS
Executive Director, Peter Piot, provides an introductory endorsement to the 10veLife
programme by referring to it as a "very pioneering programme" (kaisernetwork.org,
2004b:6)128 - a reiteration of other endorsements of the programme by himself. This
session focuses on the UNAlDS/KFF 'Global Media Partnership' which was
founded under the auspices of UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan earlier in 2004, in
partnership between KFF and the UN. The partnership specifically constructed
between large-scale global and national media corporates with an emphasis on
broadcast media - for example Viacom, BBC, MTV, SABC and Time Warner.
Formations that have historically addressed the relationship between media and
mY/AIDS have been excluded from the coalition. These include the United
128 Kaisernetwork.org. (2004b). Showcasing media partnerships: The global media AIDS initiative,
session transcript, 15th International AIDS Conference, July 13,2004.
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Kingdom-based PANOS organisation, SafAIDS (based in Zimbabwe) and Journ-
AIDS (based in South Africa), as well as indigenous responses by mediaworkers
themselves - for example, Journalists Against AIDS - JAAIDS (based in Nigeria),
the Association of Journalists Against AIDS in Tanzania - AJ AAT.
129
At the
Bangkok session, neither this gap in participation, nor the longstanding historical
responses by these organisations is masked. Instead, emphasis is given to the notion
that media responses to HIV/AIDS are something new:
In an attempt to accelerate the scale of awareness, on January
15, 2004, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan convened a
meeting of media leaders from all over the world. The purpose of
the gathering was to explore how the media can join the fight in a
more coordinated and effective way. This groundbreaking
meeting organized by UNAlDS and the Kaiser Family
Foundation with additional support from the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation sought to change the way the industry thinks of
itself when it comes to contributing to the global response to the
epidemic .130
Over and above being positioned as a new response, media interventions in relation
to HIV/AIDS are positioned as needing to be driven from the top down by corporate
heads.
The structural linkage to the Global Media AIDS Initiative provides KFF access to a
range of discourse fora, whilst at the same time offering opportunities to reiteratively
position the loveLife programme. For example, in the founding report disseminated
at the launch of the initiative in January 2004, there are a number of references to
loveLife including the reiteration of claims to impact:
Respondents in a national survey of youth reported changes in
their sexual behaviour, including greater abstinence, delay of
sexual debut and increased condom use, as a result of this
programming. More than three quarters said 10veLife had made
them aware of the risks involved in unprotected sex. (UNAIDS
2004a:20)
KFF's Altman also punted loveLife at the coalition's launch event:
129 See www.panos.org; www.safaids.org; www.nigeria-aids.org;
www.comminit.com/africalpds52004/s1d-1757, www.joum-aids.org.
130 Kaisernetwork.org. (2004b). Showcasing media partnerships: The global media AIDS initiative,
session transcript, 15th International AIDS Conference, July 13,2004.
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loveLife is a South African campaign to educate young people
about HIV/AIDS using a combination of media, community
initiatives and centres and a hotline... Our evaluations are
showing that significant percentages are reporting delaying sex,
practicing safer sex and going and getting tested for HIV as a
result of that multi-media approach. 131
The insertion of the 10veLife name into discourses about the Coalition also occurs
elsewhere - for example in November 2004, a media announcement about a 'creative
expert' meeting in New York, it is noted that the discussion will include
"participation from 10veLife, South Africa's largest youth campaign, which works
with media, schools and youth groupS".132
The Media Coalition's Bangkok satellite session was sponsored by KFF and BBC
World Service Trust, and included a presentation made by Angela Stewart-
Buchanan, Media Director of 10veLife. Buchanan introduces a number of poorly
grounded claims - "250 000 calls [are made] on a monthly basis" to the
organisation's helpline; "99% of households have access to radios" and that
television programmes "are getting through to 90% of households".133,134 In this
instance, Piot's validation of the 10veLife programme at the outset has the
ideological effect of providing legitimation to Stewart-Buchanan's subsequent
claims, reinforcing both Stewart-Buchanan's right to speak as well as conferring
ideological authority and legitimation to the content of her discourse.
The Bangkok Conference satellite sessions provide opportunities for expanding
discourses about the 10veLife programme to other fora. This is achieved in the first
instance via insertion of such discourses into media releases and promotional
activities at the conference itself, as well as via kaisernetwork.org. Discourses about
10veLife were also inserted into KFF's mY/AIDS policy information briefing
documents released at the time of the Conference. 135 Similarly, UNAIDS documents
131 http://www.kff.org/hivaids/phipOI1504oth.cfm, retrieved August 2004
132 First ever global HIV/AIDS creative meeting at the United Nations brings together creative
experts from 35 media companies. Biz.yahoo.com/pmews/041123/nytu036_2.html, retrieved 29
November 2004. The source of the press release describing this meeting is Viacom, another KFF
partner.
133 Kaisernetwork.org. (2004b). Showcasing media partnerships: The global media AIDS initiative,
session transcript, 15th International AIDS Conference, July 13, pp. 49-50.
134 Shisana et al (2002:93) found that 82% of youth aged 15-24 had access to radio a few days a
week or more, and 66.7% to television at the same rate of access.
135 For example, A global policy briefing on youth and HIV/AIDS, only mentions one intervention
by name (IoveLife): "Many of the strategies identified in the context of prevention are also
important for care and treatment of young people. For example, South Africa's National
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released during the Conference included claims-making reifications of the 10veLife
programme. UNAIDS' 2004 Global Epidemic Report, for example, provides
overviews of HIV prevalence around the globe, and includes summative discussion
about key focus areas. In a section of the report addressing HIV/AIDS and youth, the
work ofloveLife is highlighted:
In South Africa, a survey found that the innovative media
approaches and messages of 'loveLife', the national young
people's HIV prevention programme, have been helpful in
breaking down social taboos regarding adolescent sexuality,
promoting responsible sexual behaviour and increasing use of
comprehensive health services. Working through 900
government-run clinics to promote youth-friendly health services,
'loveLife' has 'Y-Centres' or youth centres that provide HIV
education and sexual health services in a recreational
environment. (UNAIDS 2004b:97)
This claim to operation in 900 clinics is considerably more than numbers claimed in
other contemporary accounts. Auerbach refers to 106 clinics (see above), whilst an
RHRU presentation reporting on the NAFCI initiative at the Bangkok Conference
refers to the programme being implemented in 69 clinics,136 and KFF president,
Drew Altman, claims 200. 137
It is through the intersections of structural alliances and elite discourses, wider
ideological reiteration is achieved. For example, association with the UN through
links to PiotlUNAIDS and Kofi Annan, organisations such as Amfar, FHI and the
UN Foundation, and media entities such as the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) and MTV. Laclau and Mouffe (1982) note that meaning in ideology depends
on inter relations within an ideological bloc. Association and formal partnerships
with UN structures provides for legitimation, and also nuances how meaning is
achieved. Meanings with the legitimatory support and implicit endorsement by elite
Adolescent-Friendly Clinic Initiative (NAFCI), a part of loveLife, the national HIV prevention
program for young people, is being expanded to incorporate antiretroviral treatment and
monitoring as the country rolls out treatment to its HIV positive population. Kaiser Family
Foundation (2004, July) HIV IAIDS Policy Fact Sheet.
136 See Dickson K.E., Ashton, J., Smith, J.M. & Pettifor, A. (2004). Improving the quality of care in
South African public sector clinics to enhance HIV prevention for adolescents, Abstract
TuPeE5407, 15th International AIDS Conference, Bangkok, July 2004.
137 See Kaisernetwork.org. (2004c). Youth and Health: Generation on the Edge. Plenary: Tuned In,
Turned On: The Impact of Media and Marketing on Youth Behavior, Global Health Council,
Washington, June 2, p. 10. See also further discussion in the following chapter in relation to
loveLife's accounting to the Global Fund for HIV IAIDS, TB and Malaria.
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representatives and 'partners' strengthen the contribution such discourses make to
fostering hegemonic consent: "Hegemony is not an external relation between pre-
constituted social agents, but the very process of discursive construction of those
agents" (Laclau & Mouffe 1982: 100). Whilst for Laclau and Mouffe (1982), such
interrelations are noted at a broader structural level - for example, race, gender, class
- such articulation may also occur between organisations and groups and it is this
process that is functional to consent-making.
This strategy is replicated in a wide range of other communicative activities
undertaken by KFF and has been in place since the inception of the 10veLife
programme. It has followed both similar discursive strategies, and similar patterns
within discourses - specifically formulaic structuring of argument and claims-
making combined with legitimatory linkages and spoken by apparently independent
'experts', by officials from 'partner' organisations (whose direct relations are
sometimes hidden), and supplemented via video clips and personal testimonies by
South African youth who are part of the 10veLife programme. Some examples of
these practices are discussed below.
The Global HIV Prevention Working Group
The Global HIV Prevention Working Group is a KFF initiative (co-convened with
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) that is linked to the UN. UNAIDS Executive
Director, Peter Piot is included in the 'working group', and the groups activities
include UN endorsement during launches of reports and within other discourse
genres. 138 The group is described as follows:
The Global HIV Prevention Working Group is an international
panel of nearly 40 leading public health experts, clinicians,
biomedical and behavioral researchers, and people affected by
HIVIAlDS. The Working Group seeks to inform global
policymaking, programme planning, and donor decisions on HIV
prevention, and advocate for a comprehensive response to
HIVIAlDS that integrates prevention and care./39
The Working Group is chaired by Helene Gayle (Gates Foundation), JVR Prasada
Rao (Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare), David Serwadda (Makerere
138 For example in Bangkok, the launch of the 2004 report is included in the summary of United
Nations convened 'Press Events' in Bangkok. See
http://www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/docs/BKKMA_UNevents.doc, retrieved 21 August 2004.
139 http://www.kff.org/hivaids/hivghpwgpackage.cfm, retrieved August 2004.
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University, Uganda) and co-convened by Drew Altman (KFF). It includes a number
of 10veLife associates - for example, Judith Auerbach, Tom Coates, William
Makgoba, and Debrework Zewdie, all of whom are on the 10veLife Technical
Advisory Group.140 Although the listing of group members includes the note:
"Organizational affiliations are provided for identification purposes only, and do not
indicate organizational endorsement", the Iisting of organisation names provides
necessary legitimation to the functioning of the group.141 Over and above topics
directly addressed by the Group, each of reports emanating from the Group provide a
mechanism for positioning the 10veLife programme as an important and relevant
programme that can be utilised to inform mY/AIDS policy and strategy at a global
level:
o Global Prevention Working Group (2002: 10) - South Africa's national HIV
prevention program for youth, known as 10veLife, seeks to empower young people
in South Africa to protect themselves through a multi-component program that
includes saturation of youth-oriented media with HIV awareness messages;
expansion of adolescent health services in South Africa's 5,0001-12 public health
clinics; creation of a national network of youth centers that provide health
services in a non-clinical setting; and mobilization of a national corps ofyouth
140 Members in 2003 are listed as follows: Judith D. Auerbach, National Institutes of Health, USA;
Mary Bassett; Seth Berkley, International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, USA; Jordi Casabona,
Hospital Universitari Germans, Trias i Pujol, Spain; Tom Coates, Center for AIDS, Prevention
Studies, University of California, San Francisco, USA; Awa Marie Coli-Seck, Minister of Health,
Senegal; J. Peter Figueroa, Ministry of Health, Jamaica; Geeta Rao Gupta, International Center
for Research on Women, USA; Catherine Hankins, UNAIDS, Geneva; Salim Abdool Karirn,
University of Natal, South Africa; Milly Katana, Health Rights Action Group, Uganda; Susan
Kippax, University of New South Wales, Australia; Peter Lamptey, Family Health International,
USA; Kgapa Mabusela, 10veLife, South Africa; Marina Mahathir, Malaysian AIDS Council,
Malaysia; William Makgoba, Medical Research Council, South Africa; Rafael Mazin, Pan
American Health Organization, USA; Michael Merson, Yale School of Medicine, USA; Philip
Nieburg, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, USA; Jeffrey O'Malley, International
HIY/AIDS Alliance, United Kingdom; Peter Piot, UNAIDS, Geneva; Yadim Pokrovsky, Russian
Center for Aids Prevention and Control, Russia; Tim Rhodes, Imperial College, University of
London, United Kingdom; Zeda Rosenberg, International Partnership for Microbicides, USA;
Bernhard SchwartIander, WHO, Geneva; Yiming Shao, National Center for AIDS/STD
Prevention and Control, China; Moses Sichone, UNICEF, Zambia; Mark Stirling, UNICEF, New
York; Donald Sutherland, Centre for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Health Canada,
Canada; Paolo Teixeira, Ministry of Health, Brazil Ronald O. Yaldiserri, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, USA; Mechai Yiravaidya, Population and Community Development
Association, Thailand; Catherine Wilfert, Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric Aids Foundation, USA;
Debrework Zewdie, World Bank, USA. See Global Prevention Working Group (2003).
141 See http://www.kff.org/hivaids/hivghpwgpackage.cfm, retrieved 7 August 2004.
142 This ambitious plan was reiterated in the early phases of the 10veLife programme, although the
subsequent proposal in 2002 to the Global Fund for HIY/AIDS, TB and Malaria, plans were only
put forward for 900 clinics (at a cost of $68-million over five years) - see further below. As noted
above, the claim already be operating in 900 clinics is inserted into the UNAIDS Global Epidemic
Report 2004.
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peer outreach volunteers. 10veLife has been widely embraced by youth in South
Africa, and nearly 70 percent of young people who have heard of 10veLife say
they have reduced their number ofsexual partners as a result ofthe program.
o Global HIV Prevention Working Group (2003:9). Taking Youth-Oriented
Prevention to Scale in South Africa [heading). Although research has identified a
broad range ofprevention projects that appear to produce significant behavior
change, few such projects have been brought to scale. In South Africa - where
the future course of the epidemic will largely be determined by the sexual
behaviors of the 40 percent ofSouth Africans under age 15 - a central challenge
is to convert smaller-scale prevention projects into broad-based programs
capable ofreaching millions. 10veLife - a partnership between the South African
government, more than 100 community-based organizations, US foundations, and
the corporate sector - is scaling up on a nationwide basis a comprehensive
package ofproven prevention approaches, with the goals ofreducing by one-third
the number ofyoung people who engage in high-risk sex and of encouraging a
substantial percentage ofyoung people to delay initiation ofsexual activity. ... A
comprehensive evaluation of the program is underway to determine its impact on
young people's sexual behaviors and on the incidence ofHIV and STDs.
o Global HIV Prevention Working Group (2004:9). South Africa's national HIV
prevention program for youth - 10veLife - supports development ofHIV service
delivery in government clinics around the country. In partnership with the South
African mining company Anglo American, 10veLife is working to integrate
prevention and HIV treatment programs in communities where Anglo American
has its main operations
The findings of these reports are further reiterated in other discourse genres and fora
- for example, via media releases and conferences, and within a wide range of UN,
other websites and in the news media. 143 Patterns include 10veLife being positioned
as "South Africa's national HIV prevention programme for youth", claims to causal
impacts (e.g. 70% reduction in number of sexual partners correlated with hearing
about 10veLife); assertions that 10veLife should be scaled up; and the notion that the
course of the HIV epidemic is underpinned exclusively by youth behaviour.
143 For example, those of UNAIDS, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as various news
reports.
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Ideological positioning of loveLife at other events and
conferences
The ideological elements of the discourses outlined above follow similar discursive
strategies to promote the 10veLife programme in previous years. These activities
extend as far back as 2000, when the 10veLife programme was in its early phases.
Many of these activities have a US and/or European orientation, including events
with linkages to the UN system, but incorporating conferences and other events that
have a global orientation such as the biannual international AIDS Conference.
The approach to discourse typically combines 'expert' discourses, video
presentations and testimonies by South African youth or members of the 10veLife
programme. Promotional activities are also intensified around global AIDS
conferences and gatherings - for example, the International AIDS Conferences in
Durban, 2000; 144 Barcelona, 2002; and Bangkok, 2004; as well as the UN General
Assembly on mY/AIDS in 2001. In the month prior to the 2004 Bangkok
Conference, a conference session entitled "Youth and Health" Generation on the
Edge" was held in Washington, and included a plenary session featuring KFF
President and CEO, Drew Altman, and Mandla Sibeko, assistant to CEO of 10veLife.
Altman starts out by noting that 10veLife provides an example of "the effective use
of media to reach young people" and that:
... its purpose is to connect young people to the services provided
by the program, which include thousands of peer counselors -
they call them GroundBreakers - across the country, youth
centers called Y-centers which are the most exciting youth venues
I've ever been to, 10veLife's national adolescent friendly clinics
- a network of now 200 clinics, but eventually it will be 900
clinics - which are being transformed into places young people
might actually want to go to. I can report to you the strategy of
using media to connect young people to services seems to be
working, so for example, 300,000 145 young South Africans every
144 The Durban conference received funding from KFF/loveLife and SABC in support of the
conference launch event. Spin-offs at the launch included prominent 10veLife branding (banners
and flags), and each delegate received a pack of brochures and reports on 10veLife during the
launch event. As a consequence, 10veLife was immediately inserted into the frame of reference of
a wide range of researchers and opinion leaders globally, and was positioned as an intervention
that was going to make massive impacts on HIV prevalence amongst youth in South Africa.
145 Claimed number of callers to the line vary in iteration. Auerbach refers to 2.4 million calls which
translates into 200 000 calls per month. It is unclear how closely based in fact such numbers are,
but in any event the total number of calls to the line are not representative of the number of
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month - not every year, but every month - are now calling the
loveLife Hotline because of the media campaign that got them
interested in it. 146
Shortly after Altman's presentation, a video presentation is shown that ends with a
clip of Nelson Mandela stating "HIV-AIDS is one of the greatest wars facing
humanity in the world. It is a war against humanity, and that is how we should fight
it" to which Altman quips - "Now, one of my best rules is: I never follow Nelson
Mandela, so thank you very much.".147 The latter reference illustrates a further
legitimating strategy - association of the Mandela name with discourses about
10veLife. Mandela appears on video a number of times during the session referred to
here, and is further referenced by Sibeko. Sibeko starts with a video clip that includes
Mandela saying:
We have to speak frankly about HIV/AiDS. This is exactly what
we did when we fought apartheid. That could only be done by
being outspoken. To talk frankly about sex in order to save the
lives and future of our children will not destroy, but will
[inaudible] destruction of our country. We love our children
enough for us to talk about sex. l48
Sibeko goes on to claim that more than 50% of the population in South Africa are
under 15 149 and then makes a number of assertions about the media environment in
South Africa:
In fact, South Africa is proud to have been given an award for the
past three years of having young readers, the only country in the
world that has young readers who read newspapers. Ninety
percent of young South Africans listen to radio. A higher
percentage also watches television. 15O It has created an
opportunity for loveLife to position itself in the heart and heads of
callers. The concept of hoax calls, which is common to all toll free lines in South Africa is also
not addressed in making this claim.
146 Kaisernetwork.org. (2004c). Youth and Health: Generation on the Edge. Plenary: Tuned In,
Turned On: The Impact of Media and Marketing on Youth Behavior, Global Health Council,
Washington, June 2, p. 10.
147 Ibid, p. 4.
148 Ibid, p. 28.
149 See further above, where Auerbach draws attention to this proportion, but puts the number at 42%
under 20.
150 In the following month in Bangkok, Stewart-Buchanan wields different numbers.
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young people around where our young people are at, which is
really through television, newspapers, and radio. 151
His presentation is rounded off by reiteration of the programme's links to Mandela
and Bill Gates, and the need for 10veLife to be scaled up:
I think this brings me back to the conclusion of my presentation,
and once again, this is a very good example of a message that
Nelson Mandela sent out in September last year in a forum with
young people with Bill Gates. He said the fight against AIDS will
indeed require another social revolution. Once more the youth of
our country are called upon to play a leading role in a social
revolution, as they did so heroically in the revolutionary struggle
against Apartheid. That is an important message. It basically says
that programs that are small like loveLife have got to become big.
It's got to be in the heart and headspace of young people in order
to change and have the normative behavior change ... 152
These patterns also occur elsewhere. In September 2000, UNAIDS, UNICEF,
UNFPA, 10veLife/KFF, and UNDP hosted a 'town hall' meeting at the United
Nations in New York entitled 'Men make a difference'. The meeting followed a
discursive format of questions and discussion from the floor, and the overall
programme was centred around reflections and testimonies provided by 10veLife
officials Judi Fortuin and Mandla Sibeko, and youth participants - David Schneider,
Joel Makitla and Mashapa Machaba. 153 Introducing the meeting, President of the 55th
UN Session General Assembly, Harry Holkeri, observes that "young people between
the ages of 15 and 24 are a the greatest risk and that they represent over half of the
newly acquired infections".154 Opportunity is then given to Sibeko and 10veLife
youth participants introduce the 10veLife programme.
At the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), which was held in July
2001, KFF and 10veLife were prominent on the programme. A special event was
held to promote 10veLife, and KFF conducted a number of press briefings on the
overall HIV/AIDS epidemic as well as specifically about the 10veLife programme.
151 Kaisernetwork.org. (2004c). Youth and Health: Generation on the Edge. Plenary: Tuned In,
Turned On: The Impact of Media and Marketing on Youth Behavior, Global Health Council,
Washington, June 2, p. 29.
152 Ibid, p. 33.
153 Kaisernetwork.org. (2000a). UNAIDS town hall meeting - AIDS: men make a difference, United
Nations, New York, I September 2000.
154 Ibid, p. 2-3.
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The 10veLife event at UNGASS included presentations by various KFF and 10veLife
representatives, a video presentation showing its activities in South Africa, and
various supportive statements from 'loveLife' youth who had been flown to New
York for the event. UNAIDS and KFF also co-hosted a media briefing on the global
epidemic, which ran back-to-back with a media briefing on 10veLife. In reviewing
the epidemic, Altman notes in his introduction:
There is consensus everywhere on the need for a comprehensive
and integrated approach... prevention efforts must give priority
to young people. Over half of all new HIV infections globally are
among young people under the age of 26. That is why we are
spotlighting South Africa's loveLife programme here today./55
In the briefing on 10veLife, Michael Sinclair ofKFF notes:
In starting out I want to offer three reasons [why you should be
paying attention to loveLifeJ. In the first instance loveLife offers
an unprecedented and unique effort in the world to operationalise
on a national scale a comprehensive campaign with a five to ten
year perspective... At the current rate of infection among
teenagers in South Africa, roughly half those under 15 will
become infected with HIV in the next 5-10 years. About 40
percent of the population is under 15 at the moment, roughly 12
million people, so 6 million young South African lives are at
stake. /56
Sinclair continues, claiming that 10veLife "has adolescent-friendly services in 5 000
government cl inics ... ", 157 that it "is a network of 15 Y-centers around the
country ... ",158 and that it has "a toll free telephone service providing sexual health
counseling and referral, receiving something like 80 000 calls per month".159
The briefing included four youth participants Mandla Sibeko (referred to as aged 22
and a 10veLife advisory board member), Michell Bowers, Nongamso Koza and
155 KaisernetlVork.org. (2001 b). The future of global prevention, 10veLife press conference, 26 June,
p.2.
156 Ibid, p. 1.
157 Ibid, p. 2. There were considerably less NAFCI clinics than claimed here. Only 51 had been
established and were active at the end of 2002 (see 10veLife 2003b:47).
158 There were considerably less Y-Centres than claimed here. Only five Y-Centres were established
in 2000, and only 15 were established by the end of 2002 (see 10veLife 2003b:47).
159 See previous discussion about the number of helpline calls, which were shown in internal
monitoring reports to average around 28 000 calls, of which considerably less where actually
answered.
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Edwin Thabethe. Sibeko claims that 10veLife is "a youth-driven initiative" and that
"young people have given 10veLife the go ahead. They have given it unprecedented
support seven million South Africans tune into our television programmes and five
million listen to our radio programmes". 160 This point is reiterated by Sibeko later
in the discussion and also by Koza who says "It's designed by youngsters and it's led
by youngsters".161 Koza also evokes Mandela ("I'm from Eastern Cape, where
actually our former President, Nelson Mandela comes from,,).162
The UNGASS event encompassed considerable communicative power. Promotion of
the 10veLife programme through a special event UNGASS in combination with
interlinked press briefings run by KFF in partnership with UNAIDS, and supported
by prominent individuals and organisations working in the field, allowed KFF and
10veLife to secure both authority and legitimacy, 163 as well as fostering opportunities
to enter other discourse fora - i.e. the US and international media.
164
Further to this,
there was an intersection with awarding UNAIDS' Peter Piot the Mandela Award at
the same time as UNGASS, which included his direct endorsement of the 10veLife
programme - and which preceded subsequent endorsements. For example, in an
interview in 2002 he notes: "One needs to use the culture of youth, the language, the
role models and so on. The best way of getting the message across is by using the
young people themselves ... LoveLife is trying very hard to do that, they are getting
the youth involved;165 later in that same month he is quoted as saying: "South Africa
is quite a democratic country with strong debate and a strong civil voice and that is a
SO\lrce of inspiration. I have learnt to appreciate that there are many good things
going on here. There are excellent prevention programmes such as 10veLife which
serve as a good example for other countries".166 Piot's endorsements are interlinked
with resourcing the 10veLife programme - for example, the fundraising website
NetAID (www.netaid.org), states: "UNAIDS Executive Director, Peter Piot, has
called 10veLife 'the most innovative programme in the world'. We don't argue with
160 Kaisemetwork.org. (2001 b). The future of global prevention, loveLife press conference, 26 June,
p.4.
161 Ibid, p. 4.
162 Ibid, p. 8.
163 In a similar way, the UN had provided a forum for KFF and loveLife through the 2000 UNAIDS
'Town Hall' meeting co-hosted by UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNFPA, KFF.
164 Articles about loveLife appeared in Reuters, the San Francisco Chronicle and the Baltimore Sun.
See www.afronets.org/archive/200106/msgOOI35.php, retrieved IS April 2004.
165 IRIN, 2002, September 2, Interview with Peter Piot, UNAIDS Executive Director.
www.aegis.com/news/irin/2002/IR020901.html. retrieved 14 April 2004.
166 Health-e. (2002, September 19). Still fighting for HIY/AIDS, www.health-org.za. retrieved 14
April 2004.
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him." According to the site in 2004, $32,656 was raised for the 10veLife Helpline
and $32,951 for 10veTours (NetAid.org 2004).167
Ideological expansion
One of the features of ideology is the exercise of dominance through expansion. The
complex of conferences and reports, which allow the insertion of claims related to
the 10veLife programme into the global sphere, are oriented towards influencing
global health policy as it pertains to youth and mv/AIDS. In the latter half of 2002,
KFF invited a range of individuals working in the area of health communication to
attend a meeting in Geneva, with an explicit focus on the replication of 10veLife and
co-hosted by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, World Health Organisation and
UNAIDS. In the invitation letter to participants from Michael Sinclair of KFF it was
noted that:
Reducing the rate of HIV infection amongst young people is
fundamental to the global effort to curtail the HIV pandemic. The
purpose of the meeting is to review key issues in scaling up,
evaluation and replication of HIV prevention programmes for
young people based on the experience of loveLife - South Africa's
national HIV prevention programme for youth. These issues are
central to advancing understanding of more effective behavioural
interventions for HIV prevention among young people worldwide.
The scope and scale of loveLife's comprehensive approach
provides a unique real world experience against which to
examine these issues. The Geneva workshop will examine both
the technical and practical aspects of large scale behavioural
interventions with a focus on evaluation and potential impact. 168
At that stage no invitations were made to other mv prevention programmes focusing
on youth, nor to organisations and individuals not related to 10veLife in South Africa.
Replication of 10veLife was the central focus of the proposed agenda including, on
day one, reviews using 10veLife as the case example in the following areas: what
works best; initial results of 10veLife's evaluations; cost effectiveness analysis of
10veLife; and HIV modelling with reference to 10veLife, with similar central
positioning on the second day. As preparations progressed, some of the US-based
invitees queried the lack of inclusion of other South African programmes, notably
167 www.netaid.org/projects/projecUndex.pt?projecUd=:1 0238, retrieved 14 February 2004.
168 Letter of invitation by Michael Sinclair, 2002, October 22.
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Soul City. This prompted the convenor, Ties Boerma of WHO, to invite Garth Japhet
of Soul City, and also, following referral, an invitation was extended to myself.
Discussions with Boerma by Japhet and myself on the relative merits of the 10veLife
programme ensued, culminating in our refusal to participate on the basis of points
including:
o That the notion of replicating 10veLife was premature;
o That a meeting in Geneva was an inappropriate context to evaluate the 10veLife
programme;
o That 10veLife was only one of many interventions in South Africa;
o That the programme's intention to reduce HIV by 50% lacked baseline data from
which to prove this claim downstream; and
o That it was problematic that WHO, UNICEF and UNAIDS had proceeded with
the meeting without any consultation with South African organisations.
These concerns, amongst others raised globally, announcing the postponement in the
meeting being postponed. In his letter to prospective participants, Sinclair noted: "it
is also clear from the level of interest in the meeting and its relevance to international
efforts to prevent HIV infection among young people, that it is critical to ensure a
strong technical basis to inform deliberations. We feel that this would best be served
by commissioning additional technical background documentation.,,169
In 2004, KFF initiated a similar meeting, inviting a smaller group of participants
from WHO, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and various US
universities, amongst others. The meeting comprised a one-day roundtable
discussion entitled "HIV prevention among young people: Measuring the impact,,170
which focused specifically on presenting 10veLife's evaluation, followed by a two-
day extended discussion. The latter programme included further presentation of
10veLife's evaluation data, and concluded with a review of cross-institutional
collaboration and a fundraising strategy.l7l
In both instances, KFF was able to leverage resources and UN organisational
partners to legitimate a high level global meeting to promote the replication of the
169 Letter of postponement by Michael Sinclair, 2002, October 22.
170 Programme of roundtable discussion, 2004, September 8, mimeo.
171 Programme entitled "Review of loveLife evaluation and research programme", 2004, September
9-10. The purpose of the Talloires meeting referred to by Auerbach is also positioned as being to
do with replication.
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10veLife programme. The positioning of KFF, as a foundation functioning in health
policy globally, and as a funder of the 10veLife programme, allows for appropriation
of mY/AIDS in South Africa in relation to pursuing ideological interests. These
include reiterative elements, but more specifically, have to do with establishing the
10veLife programme as a model for replication in other contexts.
A structural relation with the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, TB and
Malaria
KFF's relation to the UNGASS activities was preceded by other intersections with
the UN - notably global realignments of mY/AIDS policy in 2001 that had to do
with the establishment of a Global Fund for mY/AIDS. In the week prior to
UNGASS, a 'leadership forum' was organised and convened by KFF, the Gates
Foundation and the Ford Foundation in New York entitled 'Curtailing the my
epidemic: The role of prevention'. It included more than 130 high-powered
delegates: Heads of state (including Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Festus Mogae
of Botswana); ministers of health (including Anna Abdallah from Tanzania, Richard
Anane from Ghana, Eriya Kategaya from Uganda and Manto Tshabalala Msimang
from South Africa); officials from WHO, UNAIDS (including Peter Piot),
representatives from various national AIDS councils, embassies, AIDS research
units, foundations, funding agencies, drug companies and the media. Presentations
included keynote addresses and roundtable discussions with the main thrust of the
meeting oriented towards global mY/AIDS strategy and the emerging Global Fund.
The Fund concept was initially put forward by UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, at
a meeting of the Organisation for African Unity in Abuja in April 2001.
Recommendations from the later KFF sponsored meeting included the foregrounding
of the need for $9.2 billion for mv prevention - of which only $1.8 billion was
currently available; that funders should substantially increase their contributions the
mv/AIDS programmes (particularly to the emerging Global Fund); that prevention
programmes should be based on approaches that were proven to work; that there was
a need for a comprehensive global strategy; that prevention efforts should give
priority to young people; that stigma should be addressed; and that structural barriers
should be removed. 172 The foregrounding of prevention and youth, alongside massive
resourcing of prevention programming intersect with later discourses about 10veLife
that position the programme as addressing these needs. This positioning also appears
172 KFF. 22 June 2001. Key recommendations at the Leadership Forum on H1V prevention, , mimeo.
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to have been thought of in terms of downstream structural linkages and resource
possibilities: One of the presenters at the New York meeting was Rand Stoneburner,
an epidemiologist and researcher who had been courted by KFF to assist with the
evaluation of 10veLife, along with a colleague, Daniel Low-Beer. Stoneburner notes
that at an informal meeting at the time, which was attended by himself, Low-Beer,
Altman (KFF) and Sinclair (KFF), that Altman made a statement to the following
effect:
Kofi Annan is ill advised if he thinks that we are going to put
money into the fund and give it to developing countries. We're
going to put our money in and take it out at the other end. m
This appears to have been the case. Little over a year later, the 10veLife programme
received a five-year commitment of $68-mil1ion for a proposal submitted through the
South African Country co-ordinating mechanism. There are also related structural
linkages between KFF's strategic partners and the Fund, as well as between KFF and
the Fund. For example, in 2001, prior to 10veLife receiving funding, the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation made a donation of $100-million to the fund for
'innovative mY/AIDS prevention efforts,.174 Gates Foundation's Director of mv,
TB and Reproductive Health, Helene Gayle, was also appointed as board member to
the Fund. Global Fund Director, Richard Feachem, also had links to both the KFF
and the Gates Foundation. For example, prior to his appointment, Feachem attended
a KFF motivated meeting with US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on PPPs and
mv/AIDS. At the meeting Gates' Helene Gayle noted somewhat cryptically:
Since you brought up Global Fund, I just do want to say I think
this is another area where we are not yet where we need to be.
But I think we're gonna get there because we recognize how
important having that be a different kind of mechanism than
we've had before. One where we can kind of come together
around the table, pool our different interests, and again, be
complementary in the way we act. I think it's going to make a big,
big difference in the way we move with the Global Fund. So,
173 Personal communication, Rand Stonebumer, 13 April 2004.
174 WHO. (2001). WHO welcomes Gates Foundation pledge to Global Fund, 19 June 2001. By the
end of 2002, this donation still constituted 5% of the total resources pledged to the Fund (see
Resource mobilization framework: A report by the secretariat, Global fund document GF/B4/6b.
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we're all excited about Richard [Feachem] joining [the Fund]
soon (Helene Gayle, 24 June 2002).175
KFF was also party to other linkages with the Fund. In September 2002, a meeting
hosted by Anil Soni, Senior Advisor to the Director of the Global Fund, noted in
response to the question "How can we get more involved?":
The Fund may receive financing from Kaiser foundation to set up
a 'Friends of the Fund' group in DC (Washington). If this were to
happen, CORE, GHC, CCIH, /76 and other organizations would be
able to get more involved. m
KFF is also noted to have provided direct 'in kind' support to the Fund in the form of
"staff time and expertise, physical and web-based resources to support the Fund's
communication needs".178
In January 2002, the Global Fund announced that it was calling for proposals for
first-round funding and requested countries to establish national level country co-
ordinating mechanisms (CCMs) through which to review and channel proposals to
the Fund. At that time it was unclear as to whether South Africa would participate in
this funding process. Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, stated at the World
Economic Forum that South Africa did not need the money and that the problem lay
more in government's ability to deliver. In essence, no application was going to be
made to the Global Fund. 179 This perspective on the Fund was however, not
sustained for long. On 6 March, a meeting was convened in Pretoria by the
Department of Health's national HIY/AIDS, TB and STI Directorate to discuss a
submission to the Fund. Representatives were included from the Directorate, Soul
City, the Centre for AIDS Development, Research and Evaluation (CADRE),
175 See The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in the Global Fight against HIV/AIDS,
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/11384.htm.retrieved14ApriI2004.This meeting also featured
various claims about the loveLife programme that were put forward by KFF's Altman, including
that loveLife was the world's biggest youth prevention programme. Additionally, the concept of
PPPs in relation to loveLife was also put forward: For example, loveLife is a partnership between
U.S. foundations, leading South African NGOs, it is itself an NGO, the South African
government, which has been a partner from the start and a major funder, and South Africa's
largest media companies. And most recently, the Mandela Children's Foundation has joined with
a $3 million commitment and a major commitment has just been made richer by the Global Fund,
which is just critical, indispensable to the future of this program."
176 CORE - Child Survival Collaborations and Resources Group is a US-Based NGO and GHC is
Global Health Council. It is unclear who CCIH are.
177 Meeting minutes, The Global AIDSfTB/Malaria fund discussion, led by Anil Soni, Senior advisor
to the Executive Director of the Global Fund, 25 September 2002.
178 Resource mobilization framework: A report by the secretariat, Global Fund document GF/B4/6b.
179 Barber, S. (5 February 2002). Manuel will not dip into AIDS fund, Business Day.
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10veLife and the Directorate's Khomanani Campaign. At this meeting a proposal by
10veLife for youth friendly clinics was put forward, and organisations represented
were requested to develop proposals linking to 10veLife. Soul City agreed to
integrate a proposal for funding of their television series, Soul Buddyz, with the
10veLife proposal, whilst other organisations elected to develop separate proposals.
It was also unclear at the time, as to whether South Africa had constituted a CCM.
Nono Simelela, chief director of mY/AIDS in the health department, was however
quoted as saying that a proposal was being prepared by the Department, and this was
"phase one of our approach to the fund. Because of the March 10 deadline (for
applications) it was very difficult to get everyone on board, so we went with
applications we already had half-cooked at SANAC', said Simelela" (The Star, 5
March 2002).180
Some months later the Global Fund announced a grant to the South African Country
Co-ordinating Mechanism (CCM).181 It transpired that only two components were to
be funded by the Global Fund - 10veLife and Soul Buddyz, the former to an amount
of $68-million - one of the highest commitments made globally - and the latter, to
an amount of$2,35-million for one year only.
Soul City were mortified to discover that only a one-year budget had been submitted
on their behalf by 10veLife's David Harrison, who had retained control over the
development of the proposal and budgets. This was partly due to the haste in which
their proposal component was prepared, which included only a one-year budget. At
no point however, had Harrison indicated that five-year budget information was
required.
Although proposals to the fund are subject to assessment by a Technical Review
Panel, it remains unclear how such a large amount was committed to 10veLife.
Although TRP reports are not available in the public domain, portions of the report
pertaining to South Africa's proposal were unintentionally included on the Global
Fund's website. 182 A number of important concerns were highlighted by the TRP: 183
o the proposal was unsigned;
180 Cullinan, K. (5 March 2002). Government prepares submission for AIDS fund, The Star.
181 See Hickey, A. (2002). How South Africa fared in the first round of grants from the Global Fund,
Budget Brief NO.I 08, Cape Town: IDASA.
182 Although pages relating to detailed discussion of the loveLife proposal were missing, there are
references to loveLife in the remaining pages.
183 Global Fund (2002) Annex 4, South Africa, p. 1.
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o there was very little NGO, PLWHA and academic representation on the South
African National AIDS Council (which was acting as the country CCM);
o the plans to scale up from the existing 20 clinics to 150 in one year and to 900 in
year 5 were noted to be "rather ambitious and could result in a drop in quality.
However RSA does have the capacity to scale up rapidly, especially through a
franchise system";
o The budget for the 10veLife component was $82,794-million, but was
contradicted by a request for $68-million for that same component in the overall
funding request in the proposal;
o Under the heading 'Specific Observations' it was noted that the CCM should
include "broader representation" and further, that there was "a lack of co-
ordination between proposal components";
o Under 'recommendations' it was noted: "This proposal needs to be resubmitted
with a comprehensive review of the HIV and TB situation in South Africa. There
is need to justify the programme gaps for which funding is required including a
thorough review of existing available resources" .184
It is surprising that the proposal for 10veLife could have been approved at all - given
that 10veLife's budget contradicted the amount requested (and granted) - i.e. $68-
million, and that it was recommended that the proposal needed to be reworked. The
10veLife proposal included reference to their 2002 research that claimed that "More
than 60% of respondents who are familiar with 10veLife have positively adapted their
behaviour as a result of their exposure to the programme", with further claims
including "Among sexually experienced youth who have heard of 10veLife, 78%
report 10veLife has caused them to use condoms when having sex; 69% say 10veLife
has caused them to reduce their number of sex partners" and that "63% of sexually
active girls report that 10veLife has caused them to be more assertive in insisting on
condom use".185 It is unclear whether these findings were accepted at face value by
the TRP, as not all pages of the report were available. 186
184 It has been noted via an anonymous source that the TRP referred the proposal to a higher level
within the Fund for review, and that at this level the review process was chaired by Helene Gayle
of Gates Foundation.
185 Section Cl, Proposal to the Global Fund, South Africa, 2002.
186 Access to the full report was requested from Duncan Earle, Global Fund Country Representative,
in May 2004, but this request was refused on the basis that this information is not available in the
public domain.
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Other concerns are worth noting. For example, the requirement for this massive level
of funding was premised on the notion that Adolescent Friendly Clinics were an
urgent requirement. This notion skirts the findings of the 1998 Demographic and
Health Survey (Department of Health 2002), which notes that only 10% of young
women were dissatisfied with services provided at government clinics. A similar
finding was made by 10veLife in their 2001 research - of youth who had visited
government clinics, 72% found the service 'good or very good', and only 9% found
it 'poor/not good at all' (loveLife 2002b:32). In essence, 10veLife's proponents were
well aware that they were requesting funding to address a problem that was neither
extensive, nor pressing. Additionally, in a study of the provision of clinical services
to youth by the Population Council (2001), it was found that the 10veLife cl inic
referenced was providing injectable contraceptives to 98% of clients, with only 2%
being provided with condoms (Erulkar et al 2001: 18) - a practice that can be
considered to be conducive to promoting unprotected sex amongst teen clients, and
increasing my risk considerably.
Ideological reproduction and structural links
Reiteration and legitimation are elements of both ideological and hegemonic bloc's,
but it is the complex of reiteration via a diversity of sources across fora in
combination with structural linkages that provides for a transition to hegemony. It is
this process that fosters the construction of common sense by virtue of intra and
inter-structural legitimations that are inserted into the public sphere. Drawing
together partner organisations and associates and prominently inserting particular
discourses into the public sphere, involves an agential communicative power that is
derived from the ability to access financial resources. It is this process towards which
KFF expends resources - for example through funding satellite sessions and
participation at a range of events. Positioning discourses within high profile events,
interlinked with parallel discourses in reports by ostensibly independent groups - for
example UN organisations, scientists and researchers - masks underlying linkages.
Equally, the prestige of the events themselves, alongside linkages with elites and
dominant organisations such as the UN, allows for the direction of discourse
elements to wider audiences via the news media. 187 Complementary to this process is
the support provided by kaisernetwork.org.
187 See references to media briefings at http://www.kff.org/hivaids/bangkokactivities.cfm, retrieved 7
August 2004.
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Structural linkages allow power to be cumulative - including expansion and
consolidation of communicative power. Such linkages are interdependent with a
commonality of ideological positions and vested interests. As Joseph (2003: 136)
points out, "[Ideological] projects may therefore be considered in terms of their
formal adequacy in matching the interests of particular groups with the facilitation of
the conditions for social reproduction". Ideological processes become concretised
hegemonically through structural relations that are a product of, and that give rise to,
agential power, from which dominance flows. The function of such dominance is the
ideological purpose of reproduction - of ideas and social practices. As Cox puts it, in
critiquing the economistic orientation of production:
Production... is to be understood in the broadest sense. It is not
confined to the production ofphysical goods used or consumed. It
covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the
social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to
the production ofphysical goods. (1989:39)
When production and reproduction are understood in relation to ideology, it is not
necessarily the economic reproduction of the capitalist order, but economic
reproduction of the ideological object that is relevant. Ideological energies are
oriented towards reiterative discourses about the 10veLife programme that seek out
consensus through positioning the programme as a legitimated object worthy of
reproduction. This combined process includes local and global ideological
discourses, interlinked with alliances that are functional (i.e. in discourse) or
structural (i.e. via direct or indirect linkages), which serve in the final instance, to
reinforce communicative power and dominance. These discourses also involve
circular forms of legitimation - for example, over and above references to 10veLife,
references are made to other organisations within the bloc, with the effect of
collectively valorising these other organisation's and their intra-organisational
linkages. Thus, a broad range of ideological positions are put forward, and broad
range of interests are accommodated and served.
Entree into wider discourse fora is secured by virtue of the events incorporating
participation of journalists, purposive media releases and media briefings, and also
parallel dissemination via kaisernetwork.org. This process is interlinked with agency
- for it requires agency to assume leadership, and it is through communicative power
that leadership is assumed. It is this process that locates power in the hands of the
few in the service of ideological and pragmatic interests of the few.
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The process of consent, which is integral to hegemony, exists in discourse. It is
however separate from a liberal pluralist notion of discourse, given that agency is
weighted towards particular discourses and ideological reiteration as a product of
structural power. Ideological reiteration is a product of access to discourse fora, in
combination with reiterative power derived via structural links to parallel ideological
formations. Conversely, oppositional discourses are not readily inserted into such
discourse domains, and are thus decentred. The complex of prominent global
meetings outlined above, in combination with structured rhetorics valorising the
10veLife programme in the public sphere, offers direction towards preferred
ideological meanings, whilst at the same time limiting alternate perspectives. Many
of these events are similarly structured - often to the point of appearing
choreographed.
The structured discourse patterns are replicated across events, with emphasis being
given to making particular points in favour of the 10veLife programme, and
embedding quantitative discourses alongside concepts of monocausality with a
direction towards situating such claims as common sense. It appears sufficient that
these arguments be reiterated in form rather than content and there is little effort to
ensure that the claims made are exactly consistent between spokespersons or fora.
There are, for example, considerable variances in numbers utilised by agents of the
10veLife programme, such as shifting claims to numbers of youth friendly clinics.
Other numbers also shift between events and spokespersons - for example, youth
infection rates and rates of household media access in South Africa. This suggests
that validity of numbers is less important than being in a position to make a
particular quantitative assertion in deference to the logic of the argument. Form in
this instance, is of greater importance than content. The numbers, whatever they
might be, have more import in terms of the layering of argument and direction
towards constructing common-sense conceptions.
With regard to structural linkages, ideological legitimation is continuously evoked
through reference to parallel entities and 'partners' - for example, co-sponsoring
conference sessions - as well as evocation of linkages to authority such as the names
and titles and organisations represented by endorsing speakers. This extends to
regular evocation and consequent legitimation via mentions of linkages to, or
discourses emanating from, Nelson Mandela. In relation to such discourses, South
Africa is appropriated as a site of AIDS struggle with little reference to organisations
or activities outside of the frame of reference ofloveLife and KFF's special interests.
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The audiences to whom KFF/loveLife address their arguments are kept ignorant of
the diversity of local responses other programmes working with youth in South
Africa. It does not necessarily follow that subjection at the level of discourse fora
such as conference presentations is of ultimate importance (although it is obvious
that members of the audience may often include policy-makers and leaders over
whom ideological reiteration is intended to hold sway). The greater ideological value
lies beyond the forum, within in the multilayered legitimations that accrue as a by-
product of having made particular representations in particular fora, and being
positioned to extend these discourses into other genres - for example, media reports
and websites. This value is also secured through partnerships and structural relations.
Hegemony is interdependent with alliance-building and expansion - expanding the
basis of support through partnerships, whilst at the same time drawing on the
resultant legitimations to enhance the capacity to foster common-sense
rationalisations and consent, as well as discourses related to replication of the
10veLife programme. It is within these relations that hegemonic blocs are
constructed, and it is within the functioning of the groups that constitute the bloc that
opportunities for antithetical critique are excluded. Discourse fora are tightly
controlled, and statements, edicts and reports emanating from such fora occur in
unidirectional ways - from speaker to audience. Location in global fora is also
beyond the immediate view of local interests or critique. Equally, the ostensibly
philanthropic goals underpinning the notion of a foundation, in combination with a
resourceful foundation such as KFF, which is eager to help at every turn - for
example, by independently conducting research, by hosting meetings that are directly
supportive of UN needs, by forming and resourcing coalitions such as the Global
Media Coalition, or assisting the Global Fund through resourcing Friends of the
Fund, or providing communication expertise - all help KFF to entrench its particular
vested interests. Related discourses about the merits of PPPs are directly supportive
to this process.
UN organisations are distinctly vulnerable to external lobbying by, and partnerships
with, groups such as KFF. Such processes have raised concerns about the interface
between globalisation and health, which is seen as perpetuating marginaJisation, and
in the case of global governance, a proliferation of non-state actors have been noted
to be shifting balances of power (WaIt 2000:4). KFF's methodology is an example of
a convergence between non-state actors and UN agencies in the form of PPPs -
notably with corporates and foundations entering the sphere of global health
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governance. As a consequence, representation and accountability may be
compromised. As Wait describes it:
UN organizations such as WHO derive their legitimacy from near
universal membership [of statesJ in their governing bodies.
Liberal democratic governments are responsible, in the final
analysis to their electorates. Global public-private partnerships
cannot claim such representation, and indeed, often developing
country recipients of programmes, are not included in
government boards or even necessarily involved in early
planning. Accountability is also problematic in public-private
partnerships... there is a huge distance between global partners
and their beneficiaries. They also raise questions about who is
setting the global health agenda. (Walt 2002:5)
It also appears that it is possible for KFF to position its activities In relation to
philanthropic goals that are apparently directed towards the public good whilst at the
same time masking internal ideological agendas. Consequently, linkages are readily
forged between KFF and entities such as the UN or UNAIDS, as well as a diverse
range of other organisations - many of which are structurally dominant in economic
and/or ideological terms. As outlined above, at virtually every turn, discourse is
employed to achieve the construction of common sense through reiteration, with a




Gramsci's concept of consent is related to the notion of spontaneous affirmation of
the dominant political group. This ruling group then offers direction through
leadership, moderating dissent through making non-fundamental concessions without
resorting to coercion. At some level, consent is embedded within the structures of
society, and within ideological apparatuses that frame what may be known. It is
however also related to power in the sense that dominant groups are far more readily
able to define the boundaries of discourse, although in general, there is an openness
to the system that allows for domination to occur through a continuous process of
addressing oppositional discourses by avoiding overt confrontation.
Consent is identified by Gramsci (1971) in relation to the macro-level concepts of
ideology and hegemony as state and civil society interact. In this thesis, these
concepts are applied to groups that assume leadership and become dominant in the
public sphere of policy and social action - in this instance, in the sphere of
mY/AIDS and public health. For both KFF and 10veLife, assuming leadership has
involved an embedding of ideas within particular dominant orthodoxies - for
example, technical discourses of quantification and causality - whilst at the same
time employing ideological strategies of legitimation and structural linkages between
groups to consolidate dominance. These strategies have been effective in so much as
they have been financially resourced and focused at levels that are beyond the scope
and framework of activities of other groups in the field. KFF, for example, is
spe~ifically structured to expend resources on influencing policy, whilst 10veLife has
emphasised relations with media partners and other elites in South Africa. It is these
activities that are directed towards framing a dominant common sense about
mY/AIDS, youth and programmatic intervention through discourses that emphasise
knowledge that is 'true' and activities that are strategically appropriate. As Hall
(1982:85) notes, the dominance of certain formations is secured "not by compulsion
but by cultural leadership" whereby consent of subordinate groups is secured. Thus
hegemony involves the "colonisation of popular consciousness or common sense
through the articulation of specific social practices and positions within ideological
codes or chains of connotational significance" (Grossberg 1984:412).
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Consent is related to power - part of which is reiterative, part of which is expansive
(in that it occurs across multiple genres of discourse), part of which is related to
access to discourse fora, and part of which is embedded within structural relations.
Consent is also related to alliances between dominant groups/organisations
(incorporating subaltern groups/organisations where necessary), and IS
interdependent with the perpetuation of a cultural system that legitimates particular
forms of authority. As Mueller puts it:
The ruling class could not build such a hegemonic form of
domination if it did not, first, frame its particular interests in a
universal way, that is in a way that could be seen to further the
interests of the community as a whole, and second, make some
concessions to the 'subordinate classes' of society. Power then,
rests primarily on consent, but is backed up by coercion. (2002:3)
Lears (1985:570) notes that for Gramsci, consent "involves a complex mental state, a
'contradictory consciousness' mixing approbation and apathy, resistance and
resignation" and that "the outlook for subordinate groups is always divided and
ambiguous". The question then becomes, to what degree does consent actually exist?
Clearly, ideology has much to do with producing and reproducing dominant ideas
that are directed towards fostering consent, but it does not follow that absolute
consent is produced. Rather, it has a relation to dominance and power that allows for
dissent to be ameliorated within the framework of hegemony (i.e. non coercively,
and via small concessions), whilst at the same time securing the benefits of
concurrent power relations that involve relativities in access to discourse fora
wherein antithetical discourses might be located. Limited degrees of coercion may
also be applied, where necessary.
Consent is conceptually different to consensus: The former is related to allowing
particular dominant ideas to be sustained (both through hegemonic compromise and
through 'silence' by virtue of relative access to discourse fora), whilst the latter
involves acceptance of ideas (potentially mediated by concepts of 'false
consciousness '). As Therborn (1999: 109) notes: "whereas 'consent' connotes
'agreement to' something or somebody, 'consensus' refers primarily to 'agreement
among' a group of people. Thus real interests and real points of view may be
subjugated within the concept of consent by virtue of the relation between dominant
and subordinate groups, relative structural power, and relative capacity to insert
discourses into the public sphere. In other words, there may exist a consciousness of
the contradictions within a particular hegemonic framework, and at the same time,
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the nature of the hegemonic framework constrains opposition. This suggests that
there remains a coercive element to consent that is structurally determined, whereby
structural relationships within a hegemonic bloc, in combination with imbalances in
power, confer on the powerful, greater opportunity to control access to discourse -
i.e. control over the occurrence and recurrence of ideas within the public sphere.
This power has a repressive element that is not entirely dislocated from coercion. As
Fiske observes:
Because the material and political conditions of subordination
constantly and inescapably remind the subordinate of the
inequalities between them and the power bloc, such consent is
always fragile and precarious... consent has to be achieved on
multiple issues between multiple social formations, and thus, as a
theoretical concept is better suited to cope with social diversity
than is the more homogenized and homogenizing concept of
consensus. (1993:41)
It has been argued that lived experience intersects with ideology in such a way as to
bring contradictions to consciousness. It is therefore assumed that latent critiques
exist by virtue of such consciousness. What is required is an exploration of this
process, and related processes of response towards critique. In the case of loveLife, it
appears that there has been a relative intransigence to critique that has differed from
accommodative processes of consent. Specifically, ideological reiteration appears to
have over-ridden any attempts at accommodation.
Latent critiques of the loveLife programme
During the latter months of 2002, a review was conducted by CADRE to assess
organisational perspectives of the loveLife programme. The views of some 49
individuals holding senior management positions in a range of organisations
operating within the HIV/AIDS field in relation to youth were canvassed. The
organisations included national and provincial government, government funded
AIDS Training, Information and Counselling Centres (ATICCs), and NGOs
operating at national and provincial level. Organisations were identified via the
national mY/AIDS Directory188 in combination with snowballing techniques that
sought referral to similar organisations by respondents.
188 See www.aidsdirectory.co.za
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The review was conducted through telephonic interviews that followed a
standardised question guide (See Appendix 1). Respondents were also asked about
10veLife campaign elements that they were aware of as well as questions including
whether the consortium running 10veLife were seen as consultative and
collaborative; how 10veLife related to the work that respondent organisations were
doing; whether the 10veLife campaign was cost-effective; whether it was well
informed in terms of theoretical framework; whether it was sensitive to gender
issues; how respondents thought 10veLife shaped youth culture; and what respondent
opinions were of the organisation's research and evaluation activities. Respondents
were granted anonymity to allow that discussion could flow freely .189 All interviews
were tape-recorded and transcribed. Transcriptions were checked and then imported
into HyperResearch OSX for coding and analysis. 190
All 49 respondents had heard of 10veLife and nearly all (47) were in a position to
provide reflections of their perspectives and experiences of the programme. Selected
responses are thematised as follows:
o Profile and orientation of the programme
o Contextual contradictions and the paradigm of consumption
~ 0 Constructions of youth sexuality ..-J;>*
I
o The limitations of research
Profile and orientation of the 10veLife programme
During the period up to the end of 2002, the 10veLife programme was presented in
various local discourse fora as an appropriate, highly resourced intervention that was
effective in impacting on mv prevalence amongst youth in South Africa. This
extended to claiming to be South Africa's national mv prevention programme for
youth, and rationalising the programme's massive budget with claims to impact.
These latter claims were viewed cynically by a number of respondents - particularly
189 Most qualitative surveys of this nature incorporate anonymity. Citations of text however require
some level of description to allow for the contextualisation of comments made. In this instance,
the type of organisation represented is identified as a general category, and these are then
numbered to distinguish between individuals responding in each category.
190 Analysis in HyperResearch allows that the position of any given text can be identified by its
position in the original transcript and its character range. The individual transcripts and positions
and ranges of texts drawn upon are provided in footnote references.
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the relationship between access to financial resources and sustainability, as well as
the contradictory relation to impact:
I think if you throw that amount of money at anything then it will
have a profile, so I don't think that the fact that it's in your face
necessarily means that it's a success of the campaign... You tend
to focus on why so much is being spent on this. And I don't think
it's an issue ofjust spending money. It's just that and then the fact
that it's not making an impact. (NCO, Cauteng, R1)191,192
It has to be effective before it can be cost effective. So in order...
one would have to be able to show that it has a positive effect
before you can even look at cost. But what I can say is that it is
an extremely expensive campaign and one wonders if that is the
best use to which that money should be put. Certainly I don't
think so. (NCO, National, R2/93
The large budget employed by the 10veLife programme and relative accountability
and transparency of such high levels of expenditure were also called into question:
I think what they should do they publish a report that, that is the
money that they have received and wherever and say this is the
money that we have spent, how much administration cost. I am
very worried about administration costs especially. (Department
ofEducation, Western Cape, Ri ).194
The inter-relation of the massive budget of the programme with needs on the ground
was also viewed as problematic - specifically the focus on imbalances in resource
allocation the needs of children who had been directly impacted upon by HIV/AIDS
were seen as more pressing:
I can think of much better things to do with money. Do you know
what I would do with that money? Do you know that we've got
22000 orphans in our province? We need to start addressing the
orphan situation and things like that. (Department of Education,
Free State, Ri )195
191 Note that the numbering format adopted is as follows: Organisation description, geographic
location/scope, respondent number in that category (preceded by 'R '). Footnotes reference the
character range of the text in the transcript.
192 10057-10559,2211-2404, NOO Oauteng I.
193 21061-21400, NOO, National, R2.
194 10493-10741, Department of Education, Western Cape, RI.
195 26667-26893, Department of Education, Free State, RI.
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What I hear clinic personnel or provincial people, people
working in the adjacent clinics are saying is ... 'We can't even
afford the basic things. How come does this neighbouring clinic
have chill room, and this and that, and a radio and whatever. '
It's in a sense creating, first of all, a lot of animosity between
staff... feeling that they are neglected and under-resourced and
so forth. Also the feeling that it's going to blow up in somebody's
face, because you can't sustain it. (Department of Health,
National, Ri) 198
We should be mobilizing around an emergency that's going to
change our country... That sort of money should be put into
crisis management. But then you get into politics and the whole
thing is so disturbing. I just want to tell you that I've got
information here that is something like 360 children who should
be getting child support grants. Six are getting them in the rural
areas about 60-80 kilometres from where I live and I've got to
live with that. So the issues are huge. Ask those people what they
think about loveLife. (NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, RI )196
Some respondents had direct experience of ostentatious expenditure within
programme activities, as well developing inappropriately expensive facilities within
impoverished communities - specifically Y-centres and clinics. In the case of the
latter, this was seen as negatively impacting upon morale in non-resourced facilities:
I was quite horrified last week. I happened to go to meet people
at the Hilton Hotel in Durban, which is a fairly high-market
hotel, and it was just inundated with people working on the
loveLife games. There must have been an enormous cost to it... JIl)
They have these Youth Centres. The cost of those - the two of \/")t"'~ " 111'
V \{," ,,',
them that I have seen in KZN - are in the order ofabout four and \;1~, \1· -, Jr\f\. ~'
. ( ',\" \<-"a half million. Now you can't put a four and a half million rand D ft.! oJ' '\ ~
establishment in the middle of the rural community in KZN - it /'" ~'\\ {j , ~() dJ I
would just stand out as a white elephant. (NGO, KwaZulu-Natal, f'V-9/ , cV:
R2) 197 {JI.' \ \ , •
V\IJ /. (; .~ r
J ) IV!) I r,
V (.\.
Implicit in these discourses, is the notion that funding on mY/AIDS should be
expended cost-effectively, accountability and transparently. The contradictions
observed are clearly correlated with contrasting lived (worked) experience of a range
196 17744-18328, NGG, Kwazulu-Natal, RI.
197 2831-3222,9170-9469, NGG, Kwazuiu-Natal, R2.
198 9949-10429, Department of Health, National, RI.
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of complexities in addressing HIV/AIDS and youth - and specifically, that
ostentation and massive expenditure is unsound within such contexts.
Related to these critiques however, is sense of resignation. Respondents appear to be
functioning within a framework where it is assumed that there is little more that can
be done than to observe the contradictions within the programme -(see Lears 1985).
It is however observed that contradictions are not necessarily sustainable, and that
the programme's interventions might eventually 'blow up in someone's face' - by
implication, requiring the programme to be rationalised differently. Within the
framework of the present however, the power to continue unchallenged is positioned
as inevitable.
Contextual contradictions and the paradigm of consumption
10veLife is explicitly located in a paradigm that assumes young people are motivated
by individual aspiration to consumption, and that this form of identity can be
exploited to bring about aspiration to a 'healthy lifestyle' that has self-preservation
(i.e. HIV prevention) at its centre. Respondents noted however, that the majority of
young people they were working with were poor, and that this conception was not
readily integrated into the 10veLife programme's paradigm nor operational practices.
The relation to 10veLife amongst the majority of youth living in poverty was
perceived to be alienating and counter-productive, and in addition, HIV was noted to
be exacerbating the impacts of impoverishment. Consumption was also perceived as
being interrelated with vulnerability to exploitation as a product of the valorisation of
materialist values.
You should be looking at servicing the needs of all young people.
Poor people. Poor young people. Young people are fucked up
because of HIV, or their family situation, and it [loveLije}
doesn't. It really does assume that you're of a certain class.
(NCO, Cauteng 1)199
I'm worried about the kind of consumerism that's involved with
the branding. I know they have kind of alliances with clothing
labels and kind ofproducts, and you know... I would even go so
far as to say as, you know the kind of sugar daddy phenomenon,
where young women are sleeping with guys to get money or
199 12085-12329, NGO, Gauteng, RI.
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things, could be encouraged by the kind of materialism that I'm V
seeing. (NGO, Gauteng, R2/oo
I find it very distinct from an African way of life. Very distinct
from the South African reality. I find that it is talking... talking
above our heads. Because it is talking about things that I'm not
aware of I mean the kind of youth culture that they are trying to
create is the one that is more like bourgeoisie, you know, which
once again does not fit the realities of South Africa. Because the
bulk of the youth of this country is not bourgeoisie and they can't
even aspire to be bourgeoisie. They are even far away from even
being there, you know. So, ya, that's my concern. (Department of
Health, Western Cape, Ri /01
Consumption and materialism were often identified in relation to the notion that the
programme was Americanised, and in this sense was noted as contradictory to South
African culture and counterproductive in the generalised context of poverty. loveLife
was also seen as targeting a particular socioeconomic group - the wealthier African
middle-class.
It's very Americanised. And I think that young people might say
it's fine and they like it, because that's the way they are... but
whether it's really to the advantage of us as South Africans in the
long run, I'm not sure. I can't really say I would approve of that.
(Department of Health, National Ri /02
Do I think that they've got their brief correctly? And I think no. If
it comes to the HIVIAlDS issues, if it comes to lifestyles, maybe
for an American they've got it correctly, but for a South African
they've missed the boat. (Department of Health, Western Cape,
R1)203
I think they may be shaping youth culture in a kind of American
pop style and really reinforcing that kind of idea that comes as
part of globalization of the world if you like. And I think this
could be reinforcing the whole consumer idea. You know. You
must have nice things in order to be a respectable person. I think
they are reinforcing those sorts of concepts, which are very very
200 8822-9356, NGO, Gauteng, R2 .
20 I 21189-21794, Department of Health, Western Cape, RI.
202 21015-21280, Department of Health, National, RI.
203 23730-23960, Department of Health, Western Cape, RI.
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difficuLt in communities that are impoverished. (NCO, KwaZuLu-
NataL, R4/04
Within these discourses it is apparent that 10veLife's common-sense construction of
youth modernity in relation to globalisation that is interrelated to a pathway to a
healthy lifestyle is readily identified as being poorly founded. As one respondent
observes: "I think that there is an assumption there that you are trendy and you wear
the right sort of clothes and you look very attractive, that you are going to practice
safe sex. Which I think is an extraordinary assumption" (NGO, KwaZulu-Natal,
R4).205 The contradiction between poverty and consumption is sharpened by the
relation of poverty to mv/AIDS. As such, this construction is not readily
internalised as a common sense or 'taken for granted' notion and is further seen as
neither empirically grounded nor rational.
Over and above ideological constructions and practices in relation to youth, the
structural hegemonic construction of the 10veLife programme operates along similar
lines. The advisory board and corporate partnerships are heavily weighted towards
the emergent and/or established black middle classes in parallel with well established
media corporates which provide associative support and reinforcement to the thrust
towards consumption. Naidoo (2003) notes in her review of the 10veLife Y-Centre in
Orange Farm, that there is very little emphasis on working with or engaging other
organisations in the area: "I don't think they are willing to work with us because they
have everything that they need. They have the offices, clinics and things. We have
nothing" (p. 17). Similarly, the youth magazines S'camto and ThethaNathi celebrate
the notion of an individualistic, consumption oriented 'global youth culture' and
position South African youth culture as operating largely within this homogenous
paradigm. This is in contrast to the historical trajectory of South African youth
struggle, which is framed by a decentring of individualism:
The vaLue system and the imagery is western materiaLism. We
can't handLe this epidemic off Western materiaLism. And if you
look at the greatest strengths we draw on, we draw on part of~
social cultural traditions of humanism, mobilization,
voLunteerism, and quite strong kind of African traditional vaLue




21214-21719, NOG, KwaZulu-Natal, R4.
9148-9366, NOG KwaZulu-Natal, R4.
18416-18737, Department of Health, Oauteng, RI.
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Constructions of youth sexuality
The 10veLife programme has constructed young people aged 12-17 as a hO!l!Qgenous
group in terms of sexuality. Constructions within research have argued that children
in the younger age range (12-14) are already or potentially sexually active, and that
the overall age range is representative of a group that is contributing to escalating
levels of my (see Harrison and Steinberg, 2002). Respondents however recognise
that this age range is not homogenous in terms of sexuality and sexual risk:
... at 12, 13, children are still in primary school. And there is a
big difference between those children and the ones in secondary
school. .. children go through so much change. /n grade 7,
standard 5, they are still kids, they are still playing with dolls and
cars. (AT/C, Free State, R1)207
We have problems with the younger kids... We're making a
mistake of putting them in the same category. Talking of 12-17
because there is actually quite a big distinction between 12-14
year olds and then 15-17,18 year olds. And trying to tailor-make
the things for them as one group is maybe problematic.
(Department of Health, National, R1/08
The inclusion of explicit sexual imagery and language was also seen as
counter roductive to existing programmes in schools, as well as undermining
parental concerns regarding emerging sexuality:
As a black parent / do feel that it is far too explicit and in many
ways they have not taken one step at a time into talking sex and
sexuality. Its really gone outrageous, calling a spade a spade and
just goes flat out to break the silence and to uncover mystery. It's
not what I as a parent would love for my child. I would like them
to go a little step at a time and to go through one stage at a time.
Its gone way out, to an extreme. (NCO, KwaZulu-Natal, R5/09
Currently there is very little said about abstinence. There is very
little said about faithfulness and partners on a long-term basis.
,,'_ What you see is, kind of, all as if everybody is sexually active and ~
207 9312-9712, ATICC, Free State, RI.
208 13388-14086, Department of Health, National, RI.
209 5000-5438, NOO KwaZulu-NataI, R5.
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It is in these contexts that 10veLife is noted to impinge on a range of particular
concerns regarding how youth sexuality should be addressed - and specifically, that
10veLife messages are ill considered and assume authority over discourses that would
normally be framed differently in ideological apparatuses such as families and
schools. 10veLife is thus considered to be impinging on normative ideological
functions within such apparatuses in a counterproductive way in relation to the social
crisis of AIDS. Additionally, the programme impinges directly on practices within
particular settings - for example, schools or within the mainstream media:
You have no idea about the problems I'm going through with the
principals at the schools and the parents. You must see some of
the letters I get from the parents because they think it is me that is
implementing loveLife ... I want to put something to you. Do you
think this is something that is nice to go into the newspapers. I got
it out of the loveLife book here. 'Get lost in discovering your
lover's body. Talk dirty. Talk sexy. Play games. Find out how
many different parts of the body can feel sexy without touching
the genitals. Play with each other using your fingers or any other
part of your body. There are many ways to reach orgasm and as
long as you body fluids do not get close the other persons genitals
or throat you can have great fun without risk.' A child reads this
... You can go to Playboy... and get something like that. Not so
blatantly in books that are being distributed to children. Can you
imagine ... (Department of Education, Free State, Rl)2JJ
Ideological representations of gender are also problematised, particularly within a
context of post-apartheid South Africa, where gender imbalances have been
constitutionally recognised. The perception is that 10veLife have little conceptual
understanding of the relation of gender to HIVIAIDS, let alone sexism and
disempowerment.
I really do not understand nine tenths of their billboards. And
when I do understand it I am offended as a woman. There was the
one... the most blatant one is that one with 'ride' as if women are
ponies that they must be ridden.m That one I think its blatant it
210 5934-6608, Department of Health, National, R2.
211 10636-10856,21766-22501, Department of Education, Free State, RI.





just invites a slap in the face ... There was one with a woman's
legs around a man and another women touching the man's arse
and stuff like that. It feels to me, and I am not conservative, but it
feels to me as if they took the whole sex issue and shifted it totally
out ofproportion just to be junky and with it and so that they can
be seen that they have the teenagers ears and that they are better
than government type of thing . .. (Department of Health, National,
R2)2J3
In this context programme content impinges with value systems that have been
constructed to address and counter sexual objectification of women, yet their
portrayal is of women not only as sexual objects, but also as sexually aggressive and
non-discriminating. This runs counter to constructions of gender in relation to sex
which foreground rights discourses as embedded in the South African rights
framework, and specifically sets out to counter the objectification of women.
The limitations of research
The research conducted by the 10veLife programme raises questions about
accountability and it appears that scepticism is readily engendered when research
claims are disproportional to the complexities of behavioural impact - a context with
which respondents are familiar:
I'm also research person, you know. I've read their research and
my main concern always was [that] if you do your own research
and get companies to do your research, and you pay them, how
neutral or effective is your research? The question is how
effective is this research that you are doing yourself. I mean
you've got a vested interest in it. (Department of Health,
National, R3)2I4
I've seen the evaluations and they are done by loveLife
themselves, commissioned by loveLife and carried out by
loveLife. I've not seen any external evaluation... But there is very
little outside of what loveLife themselves have commissioned,
which is very dodgy. (AT/CC, Free State, RI/15
213 2976-3309, 10949-11113,4586-4979, Department of Health, National, R2.
214 8460-8700,8828-8945, Department of Health, National, R3.
215 15009-15254, ATlCC, Free State, RI.
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Research methodologies were also viewed as lacking in transparency, with causal
claims being made in ways that were unsupported by data:
They don't give you a huge arrwunt of detail on their reports...
they're very skimpy on methodology and the conclusions that they
draw also seem to be a bit somewhat tenuous. I know that the
casualty issue is a big one in my view they don't even try to link
their programme with anything... obviously you can't... they just
announce that these outcomes are related to them. (NGO,
Gauteng, R3)216
They really need to account on their methodology and their
research. And they also need to account on their organisational
accountability to this country and not just hob-nobbing with
politicians on their advisory committee. I mean real
accountability. (Department of Health, Gauteng, RI)217
Ideology and critical awareness
Ideologies attempt to interpellate human subjects, and "situate individuals in time
and space by reference to personal, positional and social characteristics"
(Abercrombie et al 1994: 154). At the same time, ideologies have an "inherently
dialectical character" and are interdependent with the notion of 'the other', with
ideologies also functioning in contexts where ideas compete with and/or reinforce
each other. Ideology thus relates to human subjects as conscious actors, whereby
there is an interplay between a range of ideologies and processes of sense-making
that are interconnected with lived experience and critical consciousness.
Ideology is collectivised within hegemonic processes, which are initially brought
about by "the building of a broader political alliance, the formation of a new consent,
the expanding of one's social basis of support, and political mobilisation against the
ruling class" (Kalyvas 2000:353). This same process applies to counter-hegemony.
Unless critique is mobilised ideologically and collectively through conscious
organisation and reiterative communication, it is destined to be accommodated
within the hegemonic bloc through consent (or by extension, through resignation).
Although consent by accommodation involves compromise, it does not necessarily
follow that compromise is anything more than a superficial addressing of critique.
216 24015-24530, NGO, Gauteng, R3.
217 42646-42903, Department of Health, Gauteng, RI.
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Also, in any given hegemonic order, in any given historical moment, it may be
possible to deflect critique through other means without having to resort to
compromise - for example by limiting the frameworks within which critical
discourse might occur, by reinforcing reiterative capacity, or by deferring to
discursive strategies such as excommunication, restriction, shielding, or delimited
appropriation (see Therborn 1999a:82-84).
Critique is a fundamental activity in counter-hegemonic processes. Its purpose is to
bring about a crisis of authority and legitimacy by exposing contradictions. Critique
however, is dependent upon the range of practices that occur in constituting
hegemony - i.e. the transition of ideas into organised forms of thought, as well as
mobilisation into ideological and hegemonic blocs that are positioned to articulate
critique via access to reiterative communicative power. Without this level of
organisation, consent is maintained within the dominant ideology by virtue of the
'silence' of opposing thought. One orientation of the concept of consent is that it is a
product of democratic structures and processes of Western political practice, which
are assumed to involve a free flow of ideas, and a relatively free access to public
discourse domains. This argument is weak however, given that access to
communicative power is relative to political, ideological and hegemonic power, with
the consequence that dissent is marginaJised. In other words, processes of consent,
even in democratic contexts, include a coercive element that is brought about by the
structural weight that dominant ideologies are able to secure and enforce within the
public sphere. appositional discourse and critique thus requires concerted action if it
is directed towards ideological forms that are already dominant, and that have to a
greater or lesser extent, become hegemonic.
Critique is a product of contradictions that are brought into the domain of
consciousness through intersections between lived experience, material conditions
and the manifestations of ideological dominance. Consent is thus not necessarily an
outcome of willed consent amongst dominated groups. Rather it incorporates a
process of suppression based in power relations that include a coercive element. This
coercive element is embedded structurally within the contradictions of dominance,
but extends to coercive practices that constrain critique. Critical thought is therefore
endemic in society as a product of ideological contradictions, whether or not
ideological dominance is secured through consent or through coercion. The critical
discourses outlined above demonstrate the existence of latent critiques that extend
deeply into the fundamentals of the 10veLife programme including its programmatic
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assumptions, constructions of youth sexuality and gender, and research claims. These
critiques address directly and cogently, contradictions within the 10veLife
programme, yet implicit in the critiques are the notion that there is little that can be
done to address them. Although the interviews did not set out specifically to address
reflections on processes of engagement, nor the concept of critique, a number of
respondents referred to attempts to address their concerns directly to 10veLife:
LoveLife have never opened the doors for any kind ofjoint work.
You know I have tried to open some of those doors and not really
succeeded. They have got a specific way doing things, and you
know, they don't really want to talk outside of the way they do
things. And also to engage professionally on some of the issues
around HIV/AIDS, I find that doesn't work with 10veLife people.
They have very specific kind of mandate, and they have kind of
stuck to that. They are not interested in talking about issues such
as living with HIV, testing and counseling, treatment, stigma, you
know. So I think there are big gaps in the whole campaign.
(NCO, Cauteng, R2l/8
The experiences of this respondent also highlights that the approach to addressing
critique within 10veLife is removed from the notion of accommodating critique
through mechanisms of consent - i.e. no concessions are made:
I've noticed a lot of 10veLife employees can become quite
defensive of their stuff I mean yes, they kind of open themselves
up for attack, but unfortunately don't engage creatively or
constructively with criticism. They kind of resort to the usual
arguments like 'you're not the target audience', 'you wouldn't
know', 'there's proven research saying the stuff works', which I
mean really, is very dismissive of anyone who has an opinion.
(NCO, Cauteng, R2l/9
Other respondents noted a similar pattern of response: "They treat us like we are
stupid, but they don't know what they are doing. You know what I am saying. Where
does the assumption come from that they know it all. It's their opinion, you know"
(Department of Health, Gauteng, RI).220 Direct engagements with 10veLife director,
David Harrison, were also met with inflexible response:
218 13715-14539, NGO, Gauteng, R2.
219 15590-16038, NGO, Gauteng, R2.
220 41490-41700, Department of Health, Gauteng, RI.
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We've tried to get them to come to meetings and I think my
discussion with David [Harrison] confirmed that they have a very
fixed programme which is determined - whether it's determined
by the funders or whoever - but that's the feeling I get, there is
very little flexibility for discussion or negotiation about what they
do. (NGO, Gauteng, Ri)22I
Within the national Department of Health, which, by virtue of providing and
overseeing government funding of the programme, is part of the 10veLife
partnership, neither engagement nor concession were forthcoming.
I know that some of my colleagues go to their meetings. And the
overall perception that I have of these types of meetings are that
they are arrogant and that they dictate whatever they want to do.
Government does not really feature very high on their agenda on
what we are doing. For instance we have a campaign on ARC but
they are not interested in ARC they do XYZ. This is the type of
perception that I get from my colleagues that they are notJeally
interested in }ollpwing the countries overall strategy.





It is these experiences that suggest that hegemony and power are interlinked, and that
consent is only necessary when critiques cannot be moderated by power alone.
Individual level critiques, taking place outside of an organised and mobilised
discourse framework, are dismissed by virtue of that lack of organisation and/weight
of mobilisation. This is also loosely related to Therborn's concept of
excommunication - whereby antithetical arguments are dismissed as being illogical,
and that the arguer simply 'doesn't understand', is unknowing and his/her arguments
are thus invalid. It is worth noting however, that critiques across organisations are
distinctly similar, and the potential for mobilisation along common ideological lines
therefore also exists.
The idealised visions of ideological domination as involving, on the one hand a
dichotomous conception of force and consent, and on the other, involving an
overwhelming degree of 'false consciousness' and/or interpellation, need to be
understood as incorporating contradiction and complexity. Ideological domination is
not achieved on an either-or basis - force and consent interplay to various degrees.
221 15008-15333, NGO, Gauteng, RI.
222 7949-8466, Department of Health, National, R2.
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Equally, whilst the goal of ideology might be to bring about interpellation, it does not
follow that contradictions emerging from lived experience are ameliorated by the
dominant ideology. Rather, the collective weight of domination that combines
structural relations between organisations and communicative power, includes a
coercive element. Therborn (1999:95-98) recognises that such forms of coercion are
inter-related with acquiescence. These include:
o Accommodation, where "rulers are obeyed because the ruled are constituted to
regard other features in the world as more salient to them then both their present
subordination and the possibility of an alternative regime";
o Inevitability, which relates to ignorance of an alternative in relation to
marginalisation; .
o Sense of representation, which assumes representivity within the rulers;
o Deference, which involves "enunciations of what is good about the present
rulers";
o Fear, which brings about acceptance;
o Resignation, which "derives from considerations of what is possible in a given
situation".
Whilst intended to offer explanation at the level of social formations, the concept of
acquiescence is important to understanding the relationship between dominance and
resistance. In the examples above, acquiescence is achieved through resignation - the
sense that there is little that can be done within the given situation. Alternately, that
over time the contradiction's will "blow up in someone's face", but that this will take
place independently of oppositional mobilisation.
HIVIAIDS programmes working in the field advance their strategic interests
differently, with many interventions functioning and legitimating their activities
within the framework of a single organisation, rather than requiring independent
legitimation through structural linkages to others. This is not to say that structural
linkages do not exist - many NGOs, for example, receive funding and have formal or
informal linkages and partnerships with national and provincial government - but the
rationale for the linkages is not particularly oriented towards an ideological
functioning (i.e. legitimation of the particular programme). The product of these
different operational strategies is that the construction of an ideologically motivated
bloc automatically entrenches power over groups that are not organised along similar
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lines. Critique is thus relative to power, which in turn is relative to concerted
ideological mobilisation.
There is an interplay between hegemony and power located within a particular group
or 'power bloc' and accommodation through consent. In the case of 10veLife, power
is interdependent with the hegemonic bloc that provides structural support to the
programme - structural linkages to government, local funders (e.g. Mandela
Foundation), and wide-ranging elites. This power is exercised, even within the bloc
itself. For example, although the national Department of Health is a stakeholder in
the programme, there is little opportunity for internal critique, which suggests that
power to determine the direction of the programme is not interdependent with
consent (nor consensus) within the power bloc.
Fiske introduces the concept of power located within a power bloc as 'imperialising'
power that operates vertically from the top down, and can be contrasted with weaker,
bottom-up forms of power:
I propose to call strong, top-down power 'imperialising' and
weak, bottom-up power 'localising'. The aim of imperializing
power is to extend its reach as far as possible... Its systems are
exploited best by formations of the power-bloc because they have
the most to gain and the least to yield by submitting themselves to
its discipline. (1993:11)
He further notes that the contrasting form of power, 'localising' power, is not
concerned with the domination of other social formations and is "not concerned with
constantly expanding its terrain, but interested in strengthening its control over the
immediate conditions of everyday life" (Fiske 1993:12). Imperialising power has to
do with subordination, and this suggests that there is an interplay between force and
consent that is functional to hegemony. In this sense, consent-making is interrelated
to relativities of power, with structural power incorporating an element of force by
virtue of being related to a hegemonic bloc that Iimits the entry of critical discourses
into the public sphere. In the case of 10veLife, structural power, with its direct
linkages to discourse fora, delimits the potential for critical discourses to be
articulated publicly, whilst the localising nature of power within groups that perceive
critique, moderates the necessity for organised critique. In this context, critique is
addressed by resistance the 10veLife programme - no quarter is given to critiques
that are not immediately threatening. As Fiske notes: "Discourse is always a matter
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of contestation, and it is in the interests of the dominant social formations whose
alliances comprise the power-bloc to repress or deny this contestation" (1993: 15).
Critique, consent and coercion
Individual level critiques occurring outside the public sphere are readily addressed by
deferring to structural and agential power - i.e. there is little reason for private (non-
public) critiques to be addressed, but not all critiques occur outside of the public
sphere. Dominance involves a wide range of ideological intersections, which are
summed up by Eagleton as follows:
A dominant power may legitimate itself by promoting beliefs and
values congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such
beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently
inevitable; denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding
rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic
logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself
Such 'mystification', as it is commonly known, frequently takes
the form of masking or suppressing social conflicts, from which
arises the conception of ideology as an imaginary resolution of
real contradictions. (1991:5-6)
In the latter half of 2002, for example, Fair Lady (a national 'women's' magazine),
commissioned a former Culture Communications and Media Studies student at the
University of Natal, Richard Delate, to produce an article on the programme.223
Delate proceeded to conduct a series of interviews for his article. However, as the
process continued, and prior to any publication of material by Fair Lady, 10veLife
director, David Harrison set out to diminish any possible critique that might occur in
relation to the article. In a letter to Fair Lady editor, Anne Donald, Harrison outlines
his rationale as follows:
I am writing to restate our serious concerns about the
commissioning of Richard Delate to write an investigative article
on loveLife. While I accept your assurance that you would not
permit Fair lady to be used unfairly, I need to bring to your
223 Fair Lady were in fact an early partner in the loveLife programme and were commissioned to
produce a regular column targeting young teens. Tensions arose however between writers at Fair
Lady, and representatives of loveLife, who insisted on full editorial review and control, and the
column was consequently dropped (Personal communication, Lindy Wilbraham, November
2002). At the time of commissioning Delate, Fair Lady were pursuing a new editorial strategy
that emphasised critical journalism (Personal Communication, Richard Delate, July 2002).
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attention the unprofessional and overtly biased manner in which
Mr Delate is pursuing his investigations.224
Harrison goes on to allege that Delate describes himself as a 'loveLife dissident', that
interviewees from the Department of Education and Independent Newspapers had
both contacted him telephonically to say that "Richard Delate is on a mission to trash
10veLife", that internal documents provided to Delate had been circulated to others,
that Delate visited 10veLife facilities unannounced, and that his investigation was
inadequate because he only visited one Y-Centre and none of the "sixty government
clinics or over a hundred NGOs working with 10veLife" (Harrison 2002: 1-2). In
conclusion, Harrison notes: "I look forward to hearing from you. While we have no
reason to doubt the good faith of Fair Lady, some of the allegations being made are
very serious and we also wish to reserve our rights to defend the good name,
reputation and important work of 10veLife" (Harrison 2002:3).
In this instance Harrison adopts a number of discursive strategies interrelated with
structural power to undermine critique of the 10veLife programme and to prevent
such critique from occurring in the public sphere. In this instance, the threat of legal
action offers an important coercive element that is positioned to bring about
acqUIescence. Although, for example, Harrison is at pains to assert the notion that
Fair Lady is an independent media entity operating within the general framework of
journalistic ethics (e.g. 'the good faith of Fair Lady'), he inserts his complaint prior
to completion of the article (let alone publication), and explicitly threatens to take
legal action should the article not meet his expectations. In other words, he is
evoking fear. Fair Lady thus has to balance the risk of the threat to legal action with
rights to freedom of expression.
Labelling Delate a 'loveLife dissident' draws on a discourse construction prevalent at
the time that was used to debunk the discourse power of' AIDS dissidents' - a small
group of scientists who denied the relationship of mv to AIDS and whose ideas
were being fostered by President Mbeki. By inference, Harrison positions 10veLife as
'scientifically true', much as the scientifically established relationship between HIV
and AIDS.
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This dismissal, alongside other arguments put forward in the letter, are
consistent with Therborn's concepts of excommunication, "the victim of which is
excluded from further meaningful discourse as being insane, depraved, traitorous,
224 Letter by David Harrison to Anne Donald (2002, November 4).
225 Delate denies ever describing himself in this way (Personal communication, Richard Delate,
November 2002).
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alien and so on. The excommunicated person is condemned ... to ideological non-
existence, he is not to be listened to", and restriction, whereby a person's right to
speak is positioned as interdependent with what he might say and is 'buttressed' by
'material sanctions' (Therborn 1999a:82-84). Delate is positioned as vexatious and
insane, working to irrational agenda's. Similarly, his discourse, by implicit threat of
legal recourse, should be restricted - he has no right to speak, nor to say what he
wishes to say.
In relation to excommunication, Harrison's assertions draw on ad hominem argu-
ments - i.e. attacks on his person, that are utilised to infer the logic that his personal
agendas undermine an objective accounting of the 10veLife programme. Ad hominem
argumentation was defined by Locke as relating to "press[ing] a man with the
consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions," and was later
expanded by into a broader definition as arguments that were "addressed to the
peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the
individual" (Walton 2001 a:209). The approach has to do with refuting the arguers
point through avoiding direct response to the argument itself - an approach in
discourse that allows attention to be shifted away from the argument towards
suggestions of implicit weakness in the intellectual standing and propriety of the
arguer. As Walton further notes - "the attack alleges that the arguer has some kind of
defect of ethical character, like dishonesty for example, and then uses that allegation
to try to suggest to an audience that the arguer's argument should be discounted"
(2001a: 210).
Ad hominem includes a number of subtypes or strategies (See Walton 2000a):
o Abusive argument - whereby the arguer is attacked directly and personally (i.e.
the person is a bad person). In such instances the objective value of the argument
is, on the surface, undermined by shifting emphasis to the person of the arguer,
suggesting that the standpoint of the arguer should be contextualised by his or her
'moral' character. By inference, the argument suggests at the same time, that the
critique is advanced from the basis of ethical and moral purity, and that the
argument put forward by the arguer is so fallacious and improbable as not
necessitating direct refutation of the argument itself.
o Circumstantial argument - whereby a suggestion is made of a conflict between
the argument put forward, and a person's actions or practices (i.e. to suggest
inconsistency, not practicing what they preach);
197
o Bias - whereby the arguer is suggested to have a vested interest in the conclusion
of the argument, and therefore presenting an argument selectively;
o Dogma - which is used to suggest that the arguer lacks the capacity to be open-
minded in advancing his/her position - for example, grounding argument from the
point of view of religious or political beliefs.
All four subtypes are employed by Harrison in his argument to Donald, and these
strategies were indeed successful. Although Fair Lady did not defer publishing
Delate's article, Harrison's assertions contributed to the inclusion of a response to the
article (which he was given the opportunity to read prior to publication) on behalf of
the 10veLife programme. The response skirts any form of accommodation, relying
simply on reiteration of previous claims:
Up to 50 percent of our children under the age of 15 will,
sometime in their lives, contract H1V - unless we change the
course of the epidemic... We could even halve the rate of new
infection and reverse the course of the epidemic. To achieve this
we need an effective, large-scale national campaign in place
now... All projections point to benefits far outweighing costs...
Two thirds of those exposed to loveLife say they are now more
likely to delay and abstain from sex. 80 percent of sexually active
people exposed to loveLife say they now use condoms more
consistently. (Fair Lady 2003, January)
Excommunication and restriction, in combination with ad hominem strategies, are
utilised elsewhere by the 10veLife programme and Harrison. In October 2002, for
example, the Communication Initiative, a website run by a range of organisations
active in health communication globally, initiated a debate on HIV/AIDS
communication in South Africa. In an initial discussion relating to 10veLife, Harrison
reflects on a Washington Post article that was critical of 10veLife's billboards,
positioning the authors, Daniel Halperin and Brian Williams, as follows:
I'm also not sure that the best evidence concerning a public
response to the billboards can be gauged from ad hoc questioning
of individuals on a trip throughout South Africa. I think just think
that more systematic, objective (and not uncritical) evaluations
are available - and we're happy to share them. 226
226 http://www.comminil.com/strategicthinking/s12002/lhinking-413.html. retrieved December 2002.
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In essence, Harrison suggests that the commentary in question was an unsystematic
exercise conducted by individuals on a 'trip', and that 10veLife's own authorised
texts which 'even' include critique, are the only ones that are valid - a notion
Therborn (1999) refers to as shielding - i.e. only some discourses are allowed to
exist. In his response, Halperin notes:
What Harrison terms our 'ad hoc questioning of individuals on a
trip throughout South Africa' in fact consisted of systematic
qualitative research conducted by myself, a University of
California at Berkeley trained medical anthropologist (PhD) and
epidemiologist (post-doctoral training), and Brian, a well-known,
highly-regarded South African HIV researcher (PhD trained in
epidemiology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine). But then, I suppose, while LL's focus groups are
advertised as 'state of the art evaluation,' ours must have been
merely ad hoc questioning...227
Similar critiques of Halperin and Williams were advanced in letters to the
Washington Post at the time of the article, which Halperin notes, alleged that "our
article was a 'typical fly-by-night hack piece thrown together by American safari
researchers who simply don't understand the South African reality ..."m
Ad hominem responses were also constructed in response to public critiques by
advertising executive, Peter Vundla, in July 2003. At a public meeting, Vundla
accused 10veLife of 'racial insensitivity', implying that the mY/AIDS pandemic was
a 'black thing', and being 'so pervasive, so extravagant, yet so frivolous' (City
Press, 5 July 2003).229 Harrison's response was to state that:
It is ironic that on a day when I am in rural KwaZulu-Natal
visiting clinics and community centres, Vundla is standing on a
podium addressing a business meeting in Johannesburg calling
us frivolous ... we have invited Vundla to come and witness for
himself what 10veLife is doing after he made similar remarks in
April, but he chose not to take the opportunity, and instead
became an armchair critic tearing down the efforts of 10veLife.
(City Press, 5 July 2004)
227 htlp:llwlvw.comrninit.com/majorclorno/southafrica/msg00002.hlml, retrieved December 2002.
228 Ibid.
229 City Press (2003, 5 July) Vundla lambastes loveLife.
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Here Harrison adopts abusive argument, positioning himself as 'good' and
'righteous' and Vundla as 'bad'. Equally, Vundla is accused of dogma, by virtue of
failing to be open-minded. Instead, he is an 'armchair critic'. A further response was
elicited in a letter to City Press, ostensibly by a loveLife groundbreaker, Mathapelo
Potsane, which includes ideological intersections with ad hominem arguments in
combination with reiterations of loveLife's research findings:
I don't think he's aware of the fact that 62% of South Africa has
heard about loveLife and of those who have heard about loveLife,
76% say it has made them aware of the risks of unprotected sex,
and 65% of those who know say loveLife has caused them to
delay having sex... Get off your high horse and come walk a mile
in my size 4 Hi Tec takkies and sit in on one of my positive
lifestyle sessions... Besides, what good is a 'man with impeccable
advertising credentials' if he can't inspire. (City Press, 19 July
2003)230
In August 2003 my own insertion of critique into the public sphere, in the form of a
conference paper entitled "Reappraising youth prevention in South Africa", which
was presented at the First South African AIDS Conference in Durban, elicited
similar responses. The paper, which outlined empirical lacunae in loveLife's claims,
included reference to:
o A monocausal orientation and limitations of the claim to reduce HIV prevalence
by 50% in three to five years;
o False assertions about mY/AIDS in South Africa;
o A competitive approach in relation to other programmes and active undermining
of the red ribbon campaign and the toll free AIDS helpline;
o Use of leading question in surveys.
Harrison's response in September 2003, entitled 'Your crusade against loveLife',231
followed an accusatory approach making a number of false allegations about myself
and Delate (who was then a CADRE employee), drawing on various ad hominem
assertions, and concluding with the threat to legal action as follows: "We will
carefully monitor your actions with respect to loveLife, and should you persist, we
will reserve all rights in this regard". Ad hominem assertions included:
230
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City Press (2003, 19 July) Vundla's criticism is just hot air.
Letter by David Harrison (2003, 17 September).
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o "You either have little understanding of basic methodological principles of
sampling, triangulation or analysis, or you have deliberately misstated the facts to
suit your own purposes" (bias; dogma);
o You feel that you could have done better (circumstantial argument);
o You and your organisation have engaged in questionable ethical practices under
the guise of research (abusive argument);
o Many observers have pointed out that your actions are undermining your own
integrity and academic standing (dogma). 232
Similar to the approach used in relation to Fair Lady, Harrison positions 10veLife as
fair and balanced at the outset: "We have no problem with genuine critique of our
work", before proceeding to defer to legal threats and other assertions.
In relation to the responses to Vundla, Delate and myself, there is clearly little
attempt to moderate any aspect of the 10veLife programmes or its claims. Instead
these are dogmatically sustained in favour of a coercive strategy incorporating threat
and designed to undermine critique and generate fear (primarily of legal action, but
additionally, in the case of Vundla, for example, of being attacked and undermined
publicly). Although all three critiques were made in public fora - Vundla and Delate
in the press, and myself in a conference setting - all were countered by attack and
reiteration, rather than accommodation. Harrison's further responses in his letter
regarding my questioning of 10veLife's research predominantly involved justification
rather than retraction, and included additional false claims - for example, the claim
that more than a third of babies were born to women under the age of 18, which was
refuted, is suggested to have been withdrawn soon after it was originally published in
1999. It however recurs in 10veLife's 2003 monitoring report (IoveLife 2003b:51).
He also claims that the limitations of 10veLife's early national surveys (upon which
10veLife based considerable claims to success) were "market research" and were
supplemented by "a comprehensive evaluation plan" - hardly the positioning that the
earlier surveys enjoyed when data was utilised to promote 10veLife as a monocausal
entity.
Given that 10veLife is situated within an extensive ideological bloc that is
hegemonised by virtue of structural linkages to a range of parallel dominant
organisations including the state, there is little need for the programme to defer to
232
Letter from David Harrison entitled "Your crusade against loveLife" (2003, 17 September).
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critique when coercive responses can instead be employed. In particular, loveLife is
not bound by the need to accommodate critique - and as is observed in the interviews
with NGO representatives - the programme simply continues on its path in spite of
critique. There are numerous other critiques of the programme - for example, critical
articles in Noseweek, and The Citizen,233 amongst others; critiques by other
individuals, for example lawyer Christine Qunta;234 internet newsgroups;235 and
critiques that take the form of seeking legal redress - for example, appeals to the
Advertising Standards Authority or SABC in relation to loveLife's billboard
content.236 On one occasion at the end of 2002, loveLife sent out an e-mail circular
entitled "Friendz of loveLife" in response to "several media reports critical of
various aspects of loveLife".237 The media reports were positioned as being based on
"inaccurate information and in some cases, deliberate misinterpretation of the facts".
The circular responded to critiques in relation to promoting teenage sex, the
obscurity of its billboards, problematics of its research (and how these were
addressed by oversight from the Center for AIDS Policy at the University of
California at San Francisco), and reiterating various claims to reach and impact.
However, in relation to critiques over the extended time period since the
programme's inception, only some critiques are addressed directly. For the most part,
the utility of access to communicative power, mainly through directed public
relations activities, allows for reiteration of constructions of loveLife through
reporting on programme activities, launches and the like, in combination with claims






Noseweek. (2003, July). 10veLife has SA media against the wall, pp. 12-28; The Citizen. (2003,
29 July). Lewd 10veLife promotes itself - not reduced teen AIDS levels.
Qunta, C. (2002,27 September). Questions 10veLife needs to answer, Business Day. Qunta
critiques 10veLife on the basis of poorly conceived content in relation to culture: "Why does
10veLife assume that teenagers think it is cool to be sexually active at an early age? Why does
10veLife want to teach parents how to talk to their children when they offend such parents by
running ads that entrench the view that it is perfectly okay to engage in sex at 14 or 15 as long as
condoms are worn?", and further "We should be wary of allowing one organisation to monopolise
funding and media space at the expense of organisations in the communities most affected, who
do not have the access to the international funding that 10veLife has."
For example, the Communication Initiative debate in 2002.
See Africa Christian Action. (2003, 16 April). Feedback on 10veLife 'one roll on all women want'
billboard, www.christianaction.org.za/mediaegroups/pressrelease200J_04_16.htm ; The Star.
(2002, 12 July). Angry dad gets Uys' AIDS advert pulled.
E-mail byDavidHarrison.Friendz of 10veLife, December 2002.
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Structural level critique
Whilst critique in relation to external individuals and organisations, it is assumed that
these would occur within the ideological bloc that surrounds 10veLife, given that
intra-bloc organisations may disagree with strategic direction. Certain groups have
removed themselves from the bloc over time - for example Media Training Centre
and Advocacy Initiatives are no longer part of the implementing partnership,
UNICEF ceased funding of 10veLife, and Zanele Mbeki quietly disappeared from the
Advisory Board. These shifts have however occurred outside of the public domain
and it is therefore unclear what premised them. Equally, many of the alliances that
constitute the bloc have little to do with determining the strategic direction of
10veLife - for example, funding entities are specifically buying into 10veLife's
existing model, whilst corporate funding and 'in-kind' contributions as well as elite
individuals, engage with the programme in relation to securing an association with
youth and mY/AIDS in South Africa - for example, the benefits secured by Anglo
in terms of receiving recognition and Awards when funding 10veLife. In all of these
engagements it appears that the content and direction of the 10veLife programme is
uncontested. In 2004 however, a dispute arose between the South African
government and the Global Fund around the funding of 10veLife - specifically
financial reporting on achievements in relation to securing further tranches of
funding for the implementation of the National Adolescent Friendly Clinic
programme. This includes recruitment of clinics, training of staff, conducting quality
assessments, fitting chillrooms and 10veLife kiosks, appointing and training
GroundBreakers, and conducting programmes in schools. Over the quarter I
November 2003 to 31 January 2004, 10veLife reported operating 99 clinics (many of
which were operational under Department of Health funding), equipping 72 with
chillrooms and kiosks, and appointing and training 156 GroundBreakers - making a
request for $3 177 779.238 In the following quarter a request was made for a further
$3 008,667 on the basis that 200 clinics were operational (an average of 1.6 clinics
per working day),239 166 had completed full qual ity assessment, and 345
GroundBreakers had been trained.
238
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Global Fund request summary, SAF-l 02-G02-C-00.
The NAFCI concept involves the recruitment and orientation of clinics towards adult friendly
operation.
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Global Fund monies are paid direct to the South African treasury, which then
disburses funding according to internal processes. Transfer of second tranche
funding to 10veLife was delayed on the basis of concerns raised by the ministry of
health regarding performance claims - specifically, claims to performance within the
2003/2004 quarter, with HIY/AIDS programme Chief Director, Nono Simelela,
stating:
loveLife received their first allocation of money on 30 January
this year, and the organization sent a second request three
months after that... The department first need to evaluate this
request... I discharged a team to go and double-check the books,
because loveLife does not only get money from the Global Fund,
but receives R75-million from the government. (SABC News, 25
May 2004)240
This delay prompted Global Fund Director, Richard Feachem, to threaten to rework
the funding arrangement to allow the Fund to give money to 10veLife directly,
bypassing the checks within the existing process: "It's intolerable that the money
gets stuck in Pretoria. And if Pretoria can't move it for any reason, then we will
simply withdraw it and establish direct relationships with the people actually doing
the work.,,241 Feachem's comments drew the ire of Health Minister, Manto
Tshabalala-Msimang, who noted that the department wished to avoid the possibility
of 10veLife 'double-dipping' into funds, and the need to ensure that South Africa
adhered to the "good financial management and reporting,,242 that was one of the key
principles of the fund, and further, that "Dr Feachem has no right to threaten to
reorganise arrangements between the Fund and South Africa without establishing
what the facts are". 243
Following this dispute, President Mbeki devoted his weekly newsletter to the issue
under the headline "Accepting goodwill should not make us subservient",244 in which
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SABC News. (2004,22 May). Global Fund threatens to withdraw funding for AIDS.
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requesting a second disbursement "a mere two months after it had received its first
tranche". 10veLife had also failed to indicate which activities utilised South African
government funds, and which were attributed to Global Fund monies. Feachem was
also seen as undermining South Africa's sovereignty and autonomy in relation to the
Fund, and Mbeki reports Tshabalala-Msimang's letter to Feachem as noting:
I am not only shocked but also deeply disturbed by loveLife's
irresponsible action in this regard... It is my considered view that
he could not have been provided with the relevant information by
anybody but 10veLife... 10veLife in this instance disregarded and
disrespected such cordial platform, but chose to go to the Global
Fund with such misleading information... I must further point out
that it is clear to us that this kind of misleading by loveLife
presents critical lessons to us such as that organizations like
loveLife will, from time to time, use media sensationalism to
achieve narrow selfish objectives, which consequently lead our
Government into being undermined, as is now the case. (Mbeki
2004, 28 May)
Mbeki then goes on to link US-based ratings that define country risk assessments for
investments in South Africa, and that accusations such as those levelled by Feachem,
promoted the notion that "everything in Africa is bad, a racist stereotype". Mbeki
concludes:
In his comments, Professor Feachem referred to the Global Fund
grants voted for South Africa as 'our money' to emphasise the
relationship between the benefactor and a recipient of
benefaction... he emphasized the power of the benefactor to do in
our country as it pleases, and our helplessness to do anything in
this regard, because of our poverty... we would betray those who
sacrificed for our liberation, and corrupt our freedom, if we
succumbed to the expectation of some of those more richly
endowed than ourselves, that our poverty should condemn us to
perpetual subservience. This will not do. (Mbeki 2004,28 May)
Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang's critiques bring to the fore a range of contra-
dictions in relation to the funding of 10veLife- specifically the power relations
between the Fund and the South African government. Alongside this, 10veLife had
been forced to account for its outputs. It is unclear what the long-term repercussions
of this dispute might be, given that it involves senior government officials who hold
sway over funding processes. On the short-term however, it appears that there has
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been little impact on the relationship with the KFF. On 6 July 2004, KFF hosted a
gala dinner at the Westcliff Hotel in Johannesburg at which Deputy President, Jacob
Zuma, was a guest speaker. Zuma drew attention to KFF's investment of $200-
million in South Africa over 17 years, noting that 10veLife had made "tremendous
progress" and pointing out that
while appreciating the role of 10veLife, we cannot ignore that fact
that it has often stirred controversy. There are constituencies in
our country who have at times argued that 10veLife promotes
promiscuity amongst youth and who lobby government to
withdraw financial support for this programme... Others were
even horrified at my role in participating in 10veLife's
campaign... Slowly but surely the results are becoming visible ...
Dr Altman and all trustees, let me in closing once again express
our appreciation of the support the Foundation has given us over
the last 17 years. It is a valuable partnership, which has worked
tremendously for this country. We urge you to continue working
with us in this second decade of our freedom. (Zuma, 2004,
6 Julyi45
Previously, Zuma himself had been publicly embarrassed as a result of his
association with 10veLife when African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) MP,
Cheryllyn Dudley read from a 10veLife manual in Parliament that stated that it was
"essential for children by at least grade six to have a clear understanding of the exact
mechanics of how to give a female an orgasm, including how a female or a male can
give a woman oral sex", to which Zuma responded, "I can't answer on wrong things
that people do that are unnatural. I can't talk about that" (Business Day 2002, 13
June).246 In spite of these problematic associations however, and in the case of Mbeki
and Tshabalala-Msimang - critiques of underlying contradictions - the government
relationship with KFF, grounded in the 10veLife programme, was set to continue.
Counter-hegemony
The limitations imposed on HIV/AIDS activities by the 10veLife programme have
been articulated on various fronts. These critiques include concerns about
programme content, issues relating to validity of research assertions and claims to
245
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Zuma, J. (2004,6 July). Address by Deputy President Jacob Zuma at the Kaiser Family
Foundation gala dinner, Westcliff Hotel, Johannesburg.
Business Day (2002, 13 June). Zuma refuses to answer questions on oral sex.
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impact, and an aggressive, intransigent and competitive approach that impinges on
the work of other organisations. Additionally, within some sectors of the political
sphere, it is recognised that 10veLife places 'selfish' interests over public/
governmental interests. 10veLife's power base, in the complex of associations and
structural links that extend locally with corporate entities and elites, as well as
globally with entities including dominant policy defining formations such as the UN
and UNAIDS, allow for forward movement without addressing consent by
accommodation. At the ideological level, reiterative discourses and claims,
maximised by KFF's conscious strategy globally, and the 10veLife programme's
related strategy locally, have reinforced common-sense perceptions of the
programme, to the extent that individual-level critiques have been insufficient at
mobilising wider dissent. Within sectors that are informed by grounded experience in
the mY/AIDS field, the contradictions of the 10veLife programme are readily
apparent, and critiques readily articulated, including the potential in some instances,
to insert these into the domain of discourse within the public sphere. For the most
part however, these are interrelated with limited mobilisation and acquiescence.
Naidoo's analysis of response to the 10veLife programme by community members in
Orange Farm (Naidoo 2003), illustrates that such perspectives may be informed by
lived experience without necessarily being interdependent with a high degree of
knowledge about mY/AIDS or research. For example:
I think they should go back to their boardroom and look at the
problems facing Orange Farm because if they are getting funding
just to make youth happy, its not a bad thing... but in terms of
priorities, to prioritise this thing? We have many problems.
(p. Il)
and
I think there must be somebody who's on top there who's trying to
promote loveLife, to make it look as if it is doing good for the
community, you know. But at the end of the day it's not doing
much. More especially if you look at the funds that are allocated
to them. (p. 16)
Insertion of such perspectives into the public sphere is complex, in this instance only
occurring as a product of a research activity. Whilst such perspectives might
undermine common-sense constructions of the programme, it is however the
combination of ideological reiteration across diverse fora, incorporating structurally-
based 'knowledge elites' that underpin common sense. These include experts in the
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field who are acknowledged by their associative positioning with elite organisations
such as the UN and UNAIDS, or researchers associated with universities and
research institutes, or individuals such as Nelson Mandela, and it is against all of
whom it is complex to mount critique. Equally, KFF and the 10veLife programme
have relied on propagandistic structuring of argument incorporating the construction
of 'common sense' sequential logics underpinned by orthodoxies of moral panic,
quatification, causality, and materialist consumption: for example, youth are the
driving force underpinning the epidemic (moral panic), the epidemic is a crisis
(moral panic) other programmes have not worked or are inferior (moral panic), high
cost high impact intervention is needed (quantification), 10veLife offers a
monocausal pathway to solve this problem (causality), this can be achieved with a
'lifestyle brand' (materialist consumption); 10veLife understand youth (materialist
consumption), 10veLife indeed has wide reach and is making demonstrable impacts
(quantification/causality). Spoken from the seats of power, as Tomaselli (1992) puts
it, and inserted into a range of discourse fora and genres, such discourses underpin
the capacity to orient and perpetuate common-sense constructions.
Ideological resistance and hegemony
Ideology and power are intertwined, and ideology, when positioned in relation to
lived experience always encounters critical consciousness and resistance by virtue of
the role of ideology as a mechanism for simplifying and explaining away
contradictions. As Foucault observes
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority
in relation to power... [TheJ strictly relational character of
power relationships... depends on a multiplicity of points of
resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or
handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present
everywhere in the network ofpower. (1990:95)
For Gramsci, sustaining power involves accommodation through consent - a
conception primarily designed in relation to the dominance of social formations. The
ascendant ideological bloc wins consent as it ascends to power, and sustains this
consent by virtue of accommodating opposition. As Fiske notes:
because the material and political conditions of subordination
constantly and inescapably remind the subordinate of the
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inequalities between them and the power-bloc, such consent is
always fragile and precarious, is always subject to contestation
and consequently has to be constantly won and rewon. (1993:41)
The conceptions of resistance outlined further above offer insight into awareness of
contradictions and subjugations - 10veLife contradicts experiences and approaches to
the epidemic that have been established ideologically through different pathways,
10veLife has a base in power that is contradictory to its value, 10veLife's
constructions of response to the epidemic are dysfunctional, and 10veLife is
grounded in self interest. Ideology in this sense, does not uniformly bring about
overarching interpellation, although elements of it may be sustained within common
sense. Resistance to particular ideological constructions are weakened by limited
access to discourse genre and fora - i.e. access to communicative power is relative,
and weaker access has the effect of sustaining and entrenching power. Equally
resistance within the public sphere is weakened by virtue of tending to be isolated to
once-off engagements, rather than sustained reiterative attacks. Similarly, resistance
to the 10veLife programme, although emanating from diverse sectors, and although
occurring over time, has not been organised between individuals, groups and
organisations resisting the programme. Thus, it is possible for 10veLife to
acknowledge critique, and instead of addressing it, simply point out that the critics
are wrong, in combination with continuing on a reiterative pathway. Equally,
resistance can be addressed coercively through a combination of strategies of attack
- notably undermining the attacker through political discursive strategies
incorporating excommunication supported by ad hominem approaches to
argumentation that involve undermining or removing 'the enemy' from the discourse
sphere, or alternately through invoking fear of sanction. In essence, an authoritarian
orientation, rather than a democratic one.
Hegemony is the product of assuming leadership and mobilising resources that are
directed towards dominance. This is an intrinsically political process requiring both
ideological processes situated in discourse alongside concrete actions and practices
that are reinforced by structural linkages. These actions are pursued and sustained
througj a complex heterogeneous hegemonic bloc. In this sense, the 10veLife
programme is not one coherent entity, but a complex of entities within which
10veLife is a common interest, a mutual collaboration - but the bloc itself
incorporates a wider range of interests. In this sense, ideology is diffused to the
point of making it to all intents and purposes, unassailable. Resistance is one thing,
but attack is another, and given that systematic attack is the only effective way to
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insert discourses of resistance in the public sphere, such attack needs to be diffused
across the range of entities within the hegemonic bloc. It is however, difficult to
envisage how this might be achieved - for example, on what basis does one resist the
multiplicity of endorsements of, and associations with, the 10veLife programme. On
what basis is the UN's endorsement of the Global Media Coalition, with its
tangential endorsements of the 10veLife programme engaged; similarly the Global
HIV Prevention Working Group, or individual endorsements of the programme by
various elite figures. KFF's approach to power has been an imperialising one that has
operated both locally and globally, making resistance more complex, and this
represents a wide sphere of access to communicative power. Equally, resistances are
less likely to be global ones, given that this requires access to resources on a global
scale instead they are at best located locally. Given differentials of power, resistance
devolves to defensive localist strategies, as opposed to active organised resistance -
for example, the localised attempts at resistance through ad hoc engagement with the
10veLife programme as described by NGO representatives working in the HIV/AIDS
field. Resistances beyond one's immediate locale are however possible - for
example, the critical discussion of the 10veLife programme on the Communication
Initiative website had global reach, as did the active resistance of the planned 2002
Geneva meeting co-ordinated by WHO. One would also assume however, that
structural level resistances - particularly within the bloc itself, might bring about a
'crisis of authority' - for example Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang's recognition of
10veLife's political compromise of their authority by eliciting Feachem's assistance
directly, and critiquing government management of Global Fund monies. Mbeki's
critique specifically, is located in discourses of struggle and anti-imperialism, which
given his parallel authority, would be likely to compromise the 10veLife programme
and KFF's related positioning. Yet, on the short-term, this does not appeared to have
brought about a crisis of any kind. Zuma instead, provides endorsement of KFF
involvement in South Africa, and there appears to have been little direct sanction (as
articulated in the public sphere at least).
It is insufficient that counter-hegemonic response to the differentials of power
incorporated in the 10veLife programme be addressed through discourse in a
'struggle for meaning' on an ad hoc basis, for it is the structural power that is at the
same time globalised, that sustains the 10veLife programme. This is not to say that a
'struggle for meaning' is not incorporated within resistance, but this struggle requires
reflection on strategic pathways, ideological structuring and political action. At the
first level, ideological mobilisation involves setting a common agenda:
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Summing up the dominant aspect or aspects of the crisis,
identifying the crucial target... and defining what is possible and
how it should be achieved. Such mobilization develops through a
breach in the regime's matrix of affirmations and sanctions,
which in normal times ensures compromise or acquiescence and
the successful sanctioning of oppositional forces. This breach
grows to the extent that it is itself successfully affirmed...
(Therborn 1999:116)
At the second level, as Therborn suggests, it involves establishing a breach - a
pathway through which to bring about a crisis of authority and legitimacy in the
public sphere. In historical terms, relatively large scale, rapid, mobilisation. This
might involve a return to the past - for example, evocation of the values that were
entrenched in the mY/AIDS movement prior to (or currently functioning alongside)
the 10veLife programme - for example: avoiding moral panic constructions and
blame; avoiding claims-making; acknowledging complexity in relation to causality;
recognition of the value of bottom-up perspectives and mobilisations; suspicion of
corporate and governmental power blocs; resistance to Northern constructions of
Southern 'problems' and the like. Similarly, mobilisation involves alliance building
and a relation to structural power, and equally an ideological direction that is forward
looking. In essence, resistance mirrors the strategies that bring about ideological
dominance and subjugation in the first place, and sustained resistance requires the
development of ideological and hegemonic blocs to the point of dominance. Within
this entire process, the simplifications and masking of complexities and




Ideology is a fundamental aspect of society, and ideological analysis has been
applied to the development of explanatory frameworks for understanding structural
dominance within social formations. Ideologies are generalised throughout society
and include dominant, dominated and ascendant bodies of thought. Structural and
post-structural conceptions of ideology have focused on macro-ideological
phenomena and processes, offering explanation of relations between economic base
and super-structure as they inter-relate with ideological dominance.
Ideologies are in essence, summative frameworks for understanding the world that
incorporate reference to the past, present and future and are directed politically
towards dominance. These include the notion of an interpellative aspect that IS
related to identity and subjection. It is recognised however, that interpellation is
relative to consciousness of contradictions related to material conditions and lived
experience. In this sense, ideologies are never totalising. Rather, ideology may be
understood as a process of producing and framing meaning:
Ideology works as a practice, not merely by producing its own
system of meaning but rather, the power of a particular system to
represent its own representations as a direct reflection of the
real, to produce its own meanings as experience. (Grossberg
1984:409)
Gramsci (1971) offers an understanding of how ideologies become ascendant and
dominant, and how dominance is secured over time through inter-relations between
common-sense constructions and consent. Ideologies serve the interests of particular
social formations or classes over others, and at the macro-level this has to do with
organised thought as it relates to power.
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Ideological trajectories
This thesis has sought to explore the concept of ideology and related concepts of
dominance, power and hegemony, through the utility of relocating macro-level
understandings and analysis of ideology with analysis of superstructural entities -
notably organisations, groups and elites (accepting that there is some relation to the
base and to the macro-ideological frame). Ideological constructions intersect directly
with emerging ecological phenomena such as my as a product of the need to
address the exigencies brought about by the disease. Consequently, mY/AIDS has
been correlated with the need to develop policies and strategies to address the
influence and impacts of the disease on society. Such responses have been articulated
within the public sphere through discourse.
Ideological discourses about mY/AIDS have drawn on particular epistemological
foundations and world-views, incorporating intersections with parallel ideologies,
and in many instances being directed towards achieving expansion and dominance of
particular ideas. This ideological strategy has been located within existing common-
sense frameworks, operating in conjunction with the ideological utility of particular
constructions that foster rapid acceptance of ideas and the need to move forward,
including, for example, discourses of moral panic, but also related strategies such as
the need to massively resource the 10veLife programme247 without necessarily having
sufficient evidence upon which to base such investment:
Although definitive proof of success is significant reduction in
HIV rates among young people, we cannot wait for final
confirmation. Intermediary indicators, namely: i) public response
to interventions; ii) predictors of sexual behaviour; and iii) self-
reported sexual behaviour known to mediate HIV reduction can
provide tentative evidence of positive change... [2002 findings}
suggest that loveLife is on the right track. (Harrison & Steinberg
2002:4)
This ideological argument, directed towards expansion and dominance, has
functioned in concert with patterned reiterative approaches to claims-making,
intersecting with structural relations. Reiterative claims through discourse, founded
in particular epistemological assumptions, and integrated via discourse with
247 See Harrison and Steinberg. (2002:4). "loveLife estimates that it requires $40-million per annum
to fund its national HIV prevention programme at optimal levels".
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structural alliances and access to discourse genre's and fora, are fundamental to
ideological direction and common sense. As Therborn puts it: "All ideologies operate
in a material matrix of affirmations and sanctions, and this matrix determines their
interrelationships" (1999:33).
The patterning of loveLife's ideological development and trajectory is depicted in
Figure 11, below. The figure illustrates the inter-relation between epistemological
foundations and subsequent process of ideological discourse. These include
foundational claims, interlinked with legitimating processes and counter-critique
strategies that allow discourses to be reiterated and legitimated in service of common
sense.
Figure 11: Ideological trajectories towards the construction of common sense
Particular claims can be considered fundamental to the ideological process -
specifically claims that rationalise and justify the relevance of a particular ideology
to social goals. In the case of 10veLife, these goals are framed as influencing the
reduction of HIY amongst young people through reducing HIY infection, and
claiming legitimacy based on supposed causal impacts. Table 2 below illustrates the
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trajectory of a particular set of causal claims to do with early impacts of the 10veLife
programme as they have been reiterated in selected discourse genres and fora. The
pattern includes extensive reiteration, with no accommodation in the later period in
spite of contestation and critique with regard to these particular claims. In this
instance, although it was known through 10veLife's own research that the
programme had had negligible national impacts (Pettifor et al 2004:71), and that
other critiques had problematised methodologies as poorly grounded, 248 (which
taken together, would have informed understanding of the limits of such assertions),
the claims were inserted on the cover of 10veLife's 2004 brochure (2004a), and on
the organisation's website as late as November 2004. This trajectory illustrates the
utility of particular discourses in supporting causal claims to impact, as well as the
limitations of the concept of consent via accommodation - i.e. ends-means
orientations allow overall ideological goals of expansion (and rationalisation of the
same) to subsume intra-organisational knowledge of the limitations of the
programme, whilst consent by accommodation does not necessarily follow critique
of the limited empirical foundations upon which the claims are made.
Including points raised in relation to methodological aspects of the research by CADRE on
Communication Initiative and Parker (2004).
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Table 2: Trajectory of reiterative claims to impact
Claims Reiteration Timeline
· 62% of all young Claims first appear in a document entitled "Chartpack: Selected Findings from a February 2002
South Africans know Forthcoming Report: The 2001 National Survey of South African Youth".249
about 10veLife;
· Of those who know Claims reiterated on the Communication Initiative website on page entitled: April 2002about 10veLife 76% "Impact Data - 10veLife Campai~n - South Africa: Examples from most recent
say loveLife has made independent evaluation: 2001". 0
them more aware of Claims reiterated 10veLife (2002b), a research report describing a 'national May/June 2002
the risks of survey of South African youth'.
unprotected sex; 65%
Claims reiterated on the cover of 10veLife (2002b), framed by the title of the May/June 2002say loveLife caused
them to delay or report 'laveLife's far us ... "
abstain from sex; Claims reiterated in 10veLife brochure (2002c). May/June 2002
· 64% of those who Claims reiterated on Kaisernetwork.org - "loveLife Campaign Shows Signs of June 2002
know about 10veLife Influencinq sexual behaviour of South African youth. 251
say it has created
Claims reiterated in "Behaviour Change: The cornerstone of prevention" July 2002opportunities for them
to talk to their parents (Harrison & Steinberg 2002), presented at 14
th International AIDS Conference in
about HIV/AIDS; Barcelona
· Among sexually Claims contested in submission to Communication Initiative discussion on October 2002experienced youth HIV/AIDS communication by CADRE. 252
who know about Claims reiterated in submission to Communication Initiative discussion on October 2002
loveLife, 78% say HIV/AIDS communication bv 10veLife.253
loveLife has caused
Claims reiterated in e-mail entitled "Friendz of 10veLife" circulated by 10veLife December 2002them to use a
condom; 69% have Director, David Harrison.
254
reduced their number Claims reiterated in summary in article in Fair Lady (2003, January). Includes January 2003
of sexual partners; modified claim - 80% of sexually active young people exposed to 10veLife say
63% say they are they now use condoms more consistently.
more assertive in
insisting on condom Claims reiterated in 10veLife brochure (2003a). Early 2003
use. Claims reiterated in a letter by 10veLife GroundBreaker, Mathapelo Potsane, to July 2003
City Press, contesting Peter Vundla's critique of 10veLife.255
Claims contested at First South African HIV/AIDS Conference as leading (Parker August 2003
2003).
loveLife director Harrison suggests that the survey in question is 'market September 2003
research' and part of a more comprehensive evaluation plan. 256
Claims reiterated on cover of 10veLife brochure (2004a). March 2004









10veLife. (2002). Chartpack: Selected Findings from a Forthcoming Report: The 2001 National
Survey of South African Youth. February 2002.
Note claim to "independent" evaluation, which masks KFF's direct involvement in data analysis.
wlVlV.comminit.com/eva.luations/idkdv2002/sld-2371.html, retrieved October 2004.
http://wlVlV.kaisernetlVork.org/daily repol1s/rep hiv recent rep.cfm?dr DateTime 07-09-
02&sholV=ves, retrieved January 2003. The report cites Reuters Hea.lth as source.
CADRE. (2002, 16 October). 10veLife: A measure of success?
www.comminit.com/majordomo/soLlthafrica/msgOOOI7.html. retrieved October 2002.
10veLife. (2002,21 October). 10veLife's input to discussion forum.
www.comminit.com/majordomo/soulhafrica/msgOOO 19.html, retrieved October 2002.
E-mail by David Harrison (2002, 11 December). Friendz of 10veLife.
City Press (2003, 19 July) Vundla's criticism is just hot air.
Letter from David Harrison entitled "Your crusade against 10veLife" (2003, 17 September)
Of those young people who know about 10veLife 65% say 10veLife has caused them to delay or
abstain from sex http://www.loveLife.org.za/corporatelindex.html. retrieved 28 November 2004.
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Appropriation of indigenous and global sphere's
Structural relations with existing dominant ideological entities have underpinned the
capacity of KFF and 10veLife to become ascendant, to assume leadership, and in
effect, to appropriate elements of indigenous and global public sphere's in relation to
youth and HlV/AIDS. This has been inter-related with the legitimating authority
derived from the notion of philanthropic and social goals, but has been
interdependent with the strategic resourcing of a range of structural linkages.
Alliances and related access to elites has involved diverse sectors ranging from UN
organisations, through to former US presidents, rock stars such as Bono, Hollywood
actors, politicians, corporate heads and the like. As Burton and Higley point out, elite
formations may include relatively strong integration (in this case centred around the
10veLife programme), but wide differentiation and autonomy in relation to their own
diverse and specific interests:
Elites are enmeshed in dense and interlocked networks that cut
across factional and sectoral boundaries and provide connections
and access to key decision-makers. Elite functional differentiation
is extensive and each sectoral elite possesses substantial
autonomy. (2001:187)
In relation to ideological expansion and ascendancy, discourse provides the
fundamental link between these wide-ranging structures, and access to, and
resourcing of, discourse genres and fora (i.e. securing communicative power), has
been integral to this process. Emerging discourses have often included a circular
aspect in relation to the ideological bloc - i.e. it is not only the 10veLife programme
that is reified and valorised, but additionally one or more of the entities constituting
the bloc. This circular ideological process is functional to the hegemony. As
Grossberg notes:
Hegemony is the ongoing process by which a particular social
bloc (made up of various class fractions) maintains its position of
power by mobilizing public support for its social projects in a
broad spectrum of social life. Hegemony is a question of
leadership ... it involves the colonization ofpopular consciousness
or common sense through the articulation of specific social
practices and positions within ideological codes or chains of
connotational significance. (1984:412)
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Dominance and direction towards common sense is inter-related with reiterative
discourse practices as they intersect with communicative power. Whilst theories of
persuasion and propaganda have generally been dismissed by virtue of their implicit
relation to linear models of communication, it cannot be ignored that propagandist
strategies are relevant to ideological discourse. There are many similarities between
the coercive ideological strategies identified by Therborn (1991) - notably
excommunication; restriction; shielding; repetition; and delimited appropriation of
discourse - and those identified by Black (2001) - notably reliance on authority
figures; abstractions; physical representations; simplifications; temporal disjunctures;
finalistic points of view and competition. Other strategies including hyperbole and
othering, in combination with approaches to structuring arguments and justifications,
and insertions of false logics such as encompassed within ad hominem constructs, are
all functional to the same end - ideological direction towards dominance.
Approaches to ideology critique
The central purpose of this thesis has been to develop analytic approaches for
understanding how ideology emerges in the context of an epidemic such as
mY/AIDS, and how particular ideological processes are directed towards
dominance. Approaches to analysis have involved an expanded repertoire of
strategies. These include: analysis of epistemological foundations; analysis of
discourses incorporating particular epistemologies/orthodoxies; analysis of c1aims-
making discourses; analysis of structural linkages, partnerships and alliances;
analysis of processes of legitimation and analysis of communicative power and
access to the public sphere. These intersect with analyses of latent critiques and
critical discourses as they relate to hegemonic and counter-hegemonic processes. The
overall process can be modelled as follows (Figure 12):
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Figure 12: Ideology critique model
Analysis of epistemological foundations
(eg. quantification, causality, consumption)
Analysis of discourses incorporating
epistemological/orthodox constructions
Analysis of claims-making discourses
(eg. moral panic, research)
~
Analysis of structural linkages, partnerships
and alliances
~
Analysis of legitimating strategies and
discourses
~
Analysis of access to communicative power
and the public sphere
~
Analysis of latent critiques and critical
discourses in the public sphere
Analysis of hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic processes
Critique of ideology is oriented towards identifying and unmasking contradictions
and related differentials of power. The approach is essentially an evaluative one that
is directed towards achieving transparency as opposed to being informed or directed
by a particular moral purpose. This process is however itself ideological, in that
exposing contradictions has the effect of weakening particular ideological
219
constructions, and such critique may be introduced into counter-hegemonic
processes.
In the case of KFF and 10veLife, the analysis undertaken has allowed for a theoretical
and practical exploration of contradictions that were framed by discourse construc-
tions and structural inter-relations. Analysis of public level and latent critiques
suggests that contradictions are readily understood by various sectors, and thus,
whilst ideologies may be structured to achieve interpellation, it does not necessarily
follow that interpellation is achieved to a large degree.
Countering critique within a framework that includes dominant access to
communicative power, in combination with structural power, has not required that
the 10veLife programme devolve, to any great extent, to the concept of
accommodation by consent. Instead, it has been possible to defer to ideological
reiteration (via dominant access to communicative power), alongside coercive power
(threats of legal action, ad hominem attacks on critics). In this sense, the programme
has been engaged in a 'war of position'.
Dominance may be countered both passively and actively. Active dominance is inter-
related with mobilisation, but there is little likelihood that the 10veLife programme
poses sufficient threat to engender mobilisation amongst those organisations that
perceive its contradictions. Whilst critical discourses may become more vocal,
coherent and sustained, the pragmatic interests of programmes working in the
HIVIAIDS field are unlikely to be mobilised unless the threat posed by 10veLife
directly affects their pragmatic activities.' Rather, some degree of acquiescence is
likely.
Within the bloc that constitutes 10veLife, it is apparent that contradictions maY~ISO
be articulated - for example, Mbeki's framing of 10veLife's vested interests.
However, on the short-term at least, it appears that deference is given to maintaining
the status quo within the bloc as a whole - thus Zuma's acquiescent reification of
KFF's involvement in South Africa, including involvement in the 10veLife
programme.
Clearly, both KFF and 10veLife involve a range of contradictions that are over time, ,
likely to become more transparent - both by virtue of ad hoc critiques, as well as
being a product of the complexity of sustaining contradiction within global and local
HIV/AIDS policy and strategy. There is little to suggest that the 10veLife programme
will be in a position to make good on its promises and claims, and there is some risk
220
to the organisation as a result of this. There is, for example, a growing cynicism in
relation to the global AIDS Conference that has to do with how the 'right to speak' at
such fora, and a global call has been made for change. This includes contesting the
dominance of drug companies at such fora, failure to provide a forum for debate, and
marginalisation of resource poor groups and countries. 258 The International AIDS
Society, which manages the conference, has indicated its intention to explore future
directions for the conference through a broad-based consultative process.259 Such
dissention may contribute to broader critique of ideologically dominant groups.
The massive resources required to sustain the 10veLife programme, even within the
global framework of increasing financial commitments, is unlikely to be sustained,
as the need for funding to be directed to other growth points of the epidemic
becomes apparent - for example the emerging epidemic in Asia. Some strategic
direction has been given by KFF to the notion of replicating 10veLife as a model for
application elsewhere. It is this direction that is central to the global positioning of
the 10veLife model in wide-ranging discourse fora as a successful and replicable
approach to mv prevention. However, although it may have been possible to secure
positional influence over the first round of Global Fund grant-making (amongst other
spheres), it is unlikely that reiterative claims-making alone can sustain the
programme at the level of global policy and strategy development in relation to
mv/AIDS. The Global Fund, for example, has considerable resource shortfalls
(Global Fund Observer, 2004 August 24), and is unlikely to be in a position to
further fund existing grantees beyond initial commitments. Similarly, it is unclear
whether the South African government would continue beyond its own three-year
commitment to the 10veLife programme.
Clearly, within the present climate, counter-hegemonic discourses will continue to be
aggressively countered, and it remains to be seen whe~her contradictions can be
sustained over extended periods of time. 260
258 See Ford, T. (2004, 1 September). Call for change to the lAC, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Los
Angeles, www.aidshealth.org.
259 See IAS. (2004,24 November). IAS announcement: Future Directions Project for the
International AIDS Conference, e-mail.
260 Somewhat ironically, it appears that KFF is diversifying its ideological strategy. A recent report
was produced under the auspices of Y-Press, a non-profit news organisation housed in
Indianapolis, describes a visit by Michal McDowell, a 15-year old student, who travelled with her
mother, KFF board member, Jennifer Drobac, to South Africa. It describes her involvement in a
tour along with KFF, "one of several funders" who toured "loveLife facilities to determine
whether to renew their pledge in 2005". She describes walking through the "slums of Soweto", of
wanting to vomit at the smell of human waste, how 85% of South Africa's youth have heard
about loveLife, and how about one-fourth said they did something as a result of the loveLife
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campaign. She concludes: "However, loveLife needs money. Since it receives a large portion of
its funds in US dollars, that aid has been cut significantly by the dollar's weak exchange rate. One
result is that loveLife has been unable to answer more than one-third of the 300 000 calls it
receives every month on the hotline." Perhaps an interesting way to pass the time on a visit to
South Africa with mom. Alternately, a sign that any and every opportunity for ideological
reiteration must be identified and integrated into the overall strategy for ideological dominance.
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Appendix 1
Survey of NGO impressions of the loveLife
campaign
Introduction
Hello, my name is . I am conducting a survey on behalf of CADRE
to look at the impressions of NGOs of the loveLife campaign. I would like to set
up a time to interview a person from your organisation. We would like to speak to
a senior person who is involved with HIV/AIDS communication and who can
represent the views of your organisation. (Get name of person if this is not the
person to interview)
The questionnaire would take about 30 minutes to complete. If you have time
now, could we go ahead. If not, could we set a time.
The questionnaire is anonymous. I will only record the type of organisation you
are from (e.g. Provincial health dept; NGO, Gauteng etc.). We will be recording
the interview for quality control purposes, and to ensure that your opinions are
reproduced exactly.
1. Which elements of the loveLife Campaign are you aware of? (unprompted)
o Bill boards/Taxis
o ThethaNathi newspaper insert
o S'camto newspaper insert
o Print advertisements (S'camtoPrint) (I think this is same as above)
o TV advertisements/programmes
o Radio advertisements/programmes (eScamtweni on Metro)
o loveLife games
o loveTrain
o Antarctica tour/Love Tours
o GroundBreakers
o Thetha Junction Helpline
o Y-Centres / NAFCI Clinics
o Parent Campaign / Parent Helpline
o loveLife Website
o Other. List _
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2. Of the above, which TWO aspects would you like to talk about?
o Billboardsrraxis (Skip to 5)
o ThethaNathi newspaper insert (Skip to 6)
o S'camto newspaper insert (Skip to 7)
o Print advertisements (Skip to 8) (S'camtoPrint)
o TV advertisements (Skip to 9)
o Radio advertisements/Programmes (eScamtweni on Metro) (Skip to 10)
o 10veLife games (Skip to 11)
o 10veTrain (Skip to 12)
o Antarctica tour/love Tours (Skip to 13)
o GroundBreakers (Skip to 14)
o Thethalunction (Skip to 15)
o Y-centres / NAFCI Clinics(Skip to 16)
o Parent Campaign / Parent helpline (Skip to 17)
o 10veLife Website (Skip to 18)
o Other _
3. What is your general impression of the BILLBOARD/TAXI campaign?
o Do you think the billboards effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the billboard messages are clear? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to
information on the billboards?
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)
4. What is your general impression of the THETHANATHI insert?
o Do you think ThethaNathi effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to
information in ThethaNathi?
Cl Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)
5. What is your general impression of the S'CAMTO insert?
o Do you think S'camto effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to
information in S'camto?
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
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o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)
6. What is your general impression of PRINT ADVERTISEMENTS?
o Do you think the print ads effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to
information in print ads?
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)
7. What is your general impression of TY ADVERTISEMENTS / PROGRAMMES?
o Do you think the TV ads / programmes effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to
information in TV ads / programmes?
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images used in relation to gender? (Give examples)
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
images in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give examples)
8. What is your general impression of RADIO ADVERTISEMENTS /
PROGRAMMES?
o Do you think the radio ads /programmes effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the information is clearly conveyed? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to
information in radio ads / programmes?
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages, or
programme content in relation to gender? (Give examples)
o Do you have any views, positive or negative, about the words, messages or
programme content in relation to the use of language and symbols? (Give
examples)
9. What is your general impression of the LOVELIFE GAMES?
o Do you think the games effectively target 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the games are effective for conveying HIV/AIDS information?
(Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the games?
(Give examples)
o Do you have any thoughts on the games in relation to gender? (Give examples)
10. What is your general impression of the LOVETRAIN?
o Do you think the 10veTrain effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the 10veTrain is effective for conveying HIY/AIDS information?
(Give examples)
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o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the
10veTrain? (Give examples)
o Do you have any thoughts on the 10veTrain in relation to gender? (Give
examples)
11. What is your general impression of the ANTARCTICA TOUR/LOVE TOURS?
o Do you think the Antarctica Tour effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the Antarctica Tour is effective for conveying HIV/AIDS
information? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the
Antarctica Tour? (Give examples)
o Do you have any thoughts on the Antarctica Tour in relation to gender? (Give
examples)
12. What is your general impression of the GroundBreakers?
o Do you think GroundBreakers effectively targets 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think the GroundBreakers is effective for conveying HIV/AIDS
information? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to
GroundBreakers? (Give examples)
o Do you have any thoughts on the GroundBreakers in relation to gender? (Give
examples)
13. What is your general impression of the THETHA JUNCTION HELPLINE?
o Do you think Thethalunction effectively supports 12-17 year old youth?
o Do you think Thethalunction is effecti ve for conveying HIV/AIDS information?
(Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had in relation to Thethalunction?
(Give examples)
o Do you feel that the helpline has the necessary technical capacity?
o Do you feel that the helpline has the necessary linguistic capacity?
o Do you think that the counsellors are sufficiently informed and supported?
14. What is your general impression of the Y-CENTRES/NAFCI CLINICS?
o Have you ever visited or referred people to a Y-Centre/NAFCI Clinic. If yes,
which one, and what were your impressions?
o Do you think the Y-Centres/NAFCI Clinics meet the needs of 12-17 year old
youth?
o Do you think the Y-Centres/NAFCI Clinics are effective for conveying
HIV/AIDS information? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had in relation to Y-Centres/NAFCI
Clinics? (Give examples)
o Do you have any thoughts on the Y-Centres/NAFCI clinics in relation to gender?
(Give examples)
15. What is your general impression of the PARENT CAMPAIGN / HELPLINE?
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o Do you think the Parent Campaign / Helpline effectively supports parents of 12-
17 year old youth?
o Do you think the Parent Campaign / Helpline is effective for conveying
HIY/AIDS information and/or providing appropriate support to parents? (Give
examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the Parent
Campaign / Helpline? (Give examples)
o Do you have any thoughts on the Parent Campaign / Helpline in relation to
gender? (Give examples)
o Do you feel that the helpline has the necessary technical capacity?
o Do you feel that the helpline has the necessary linguistic capacity?
o Do you think that the counsellors are sufficiently informed and supported?
16. What is your general impression of the LOYELIFE WEBSITE?
o Do you think the 10veLife Website responds to the concerns of 12-17 year old
youths?
o Do you think the 10veLife Website is effective for conveying HIY/AIDS
information? (Give examples)
o Can you describe any experiences you have had recently in relation to the
10veLife Website? (Give examples)
o Do you have any thoughts on the 10veLife Website in relation to gender? (Give
examples)
17. Do you feel that the consortium running 10veLife are consultative or
collaborative in their approach to other organisations? (Give examples either
way).
18. In general, does the work of 10veLife simplify or make more difficult the work
that you are doing? (Give examples)
19. Do you think the 10veLife campaign is cost-effective? (Give examples)
20. Do you think the 10veLife campaign is well informed in terms of theoretical
framework and research? (Give examples)
o What are your opinions on research/evaluation emerging from the 10veLife
campaign? (Give examples)
21. Do you think the 10veLife campaign is sensitive to gender issues? (Give
examples)
22. How do you think 10veLife shapes youth culture in South Africa, if at all?
23. Can you give me two or three words or concepts that summarise or describe your
view of 10veLife
24. Is there anything else you would like to add?
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We are contacting various government departments as well as NGOs throughout
the country. Are there any particular people or organisations you would suggest
we contact?
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